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Abstract 
Managing out-of-stocks (OOS) and over-stocking (OS) occurrences is aimed at 
optimising on-shelf availability of stocks (OSA). OSA is a key performance indicator of retail 
logistics and is at the heart of order fulfilment. Yet, despite over 40 years of research on 
OOS, OOS rates remain at an average of 8%. Further, while there has been clear evidence 
that the store is the major contributor to OOS situations, the store continues to remain a 
‘black-box’ in OOS research. Previous studies on OOS tend to focus predominantly on 
issues, such as consumer responses to OOS, extent and root causes of OOS, and use of 
technology to minimize OOS and OS occurrences. Despite the significant influence to 
minimise OOS and OS occurrences, the accurate execution of in-store processes has to 
date received little recognition.  
The study employs a case study approach to examine how supermarket stores 
execute in-store processes to manage OOS and OS occurrences.  The study was based on 
the in-store operations practices of 19 stores of a major supermarket chain in Singapore.  
Semi-structured interviews with store managers and supervisors were conducted at each of 
the 19 stores, supplemented by unobtrusive on-site observations on the execution of in-store 
processes. Within-group analysis was conducted on store-specific operating procedures 
(SSOPs) on each stores’ in-store processes. Cross-group comparative analysis was also 
conducted on the operations practices employed by the 19 stores. Patterns of OOS and OS 
occurrences, as well as their resolutions, were identified.  Based on the similarities and 
differences in approaches in managing OOS and OS occurrences among the 19 stores, a 
number of working propositions were developed, contributing to the knowledge base of OOS 
and OS management. 
The results of this study indicate that majority of OOS incidences in stores of the 
case supermarket chain occurred as a result of various relatively trivial lapses in human 
actions, such as scanning errors or inaccurate deliveries, rather than caused by major 
operational problems. Effective management of OOS and OS was dependent on the store 
managers’ attitude towards management of OOS and OS. The study found store managers 
with positive attitude towards the management of OOS and OS led to low extent of OOS and 
OS incidents and effective relationships with headquarters and suppliers. 
Mainstream inventory management literature showed that OOS and OS occurrences 
are generally brought about by mismanagement of logistical processes, specifically, in-store 
logistics operations. This study, however, has shown that trivial operational issues and minor 
human errors are major sources of OOS and OS situations, and store managers’ attitude 
played a significant role in the management of OOS and OS occurrences.  
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 Motivation 1.1
This thesis aims to explore and investigate how stores of a supermarket chain manage out-
of-stock (OOS) and over-stocking (OS) occurrences. Research into OOS and OSA in 
supermarkets has been carried out for over 40 years, yet ‘shelves were ‘still empty” (Aastrup 
and Kotzab 2010). The problem is so severe that even Wal-Mart, well known as a ‘paragon 
of logistics’, is also struggling to restock their shelves (Dudley 2013). A comprehensive study 
conducted by A.C. Nielson for the National Association of Food Chains in 1968 found that 
stores experienced 12.2% of OOS that were fundamentally caused by inadequate space 
allocations, incorrect ordering routines and lack of experienced personnel (Aastrup and 
Kotzab 2010). Over three decades later, in one of the most comprehensive, worldwide 
surveys on OOS, Gruen et al. (2002) reported that OOS averaged 8%, despite the increased 
use of advanced technologies (see Figure 1-1). ECR Europe (2003) stated that an OOS rate 
of 7%-10% would translate into annual sales of £4 billion for European supermarket chains.  
 
 
Figure 1-1 Worldwide Overall OOS Extent (Source: Gruen, Corsten and Bharadwaj 2002, p.11) 
 
Due to the complex nature of grocery retailing (Skinner 1974; Ton and Raman 2010), 
managing an extensive array of product assortment (e.g. food, non-food, household, 
electrical and health and beauty products) exposes the grocery retailer to mistakes, e.g. 
2 
 
error scans caused by similarity of product packaging (Raman, DeHoratius and Ton 2001). 
In addition, grocery retailers, such as supermarkets, face constant challenges in offering a 
plethora of products and services to satisfy customers’ demands and in controlling costs to 
support such offerings (Yücel, Karaesmen, Salman, and Türkay 2009). Failure to manage 
OOS occurrences and to maintain on-shelf availability (OSA) will eventually lead to high 
operating costs and poor patronage (Lowson 2001; Taylor and Fawcett 2001; ECR Europe 
2005; Goswami and Mishra 2009). Although losses due to OOS will affect both retailers and 
manufacturers, reducing OOS in retail stores is ultimately the responsibility of the former 
(Gruen and Corsten (2002). Another consequence of mismanagement of OOS incidents is 
increased logistical and supply chain costs (ECR Europe 2003). Mismanagement of OOS 
incidents results in inaccurate inventory information, which impacts product ordering (Gruen 
et al. 2002). Inaccurate ordering can cause unnecessary inflation of product demand, i.e. the 
‘bull-whip’ effect, driving up logistical and supply chain costs (ECR Europe 2003).  
 
A closely related yet contrasting problem to OOS is over-stocking (OS). To mitigate the 
negative impacts of OOS occurrences, grocery retailers have largely resorted to OS of 
products (Anand and Cunnane 2009), which increases inventory holding costs (ECR UK 
2003; Anand and Cunnane 2009). Another problem with OS is its impact on space 
management (Gruen et al. 2002). Maintaining excess stock puts a strain on the organisation 
of store back rooms, which can lead to ineffective and inefficient replenishment of display 
shelves (Waller, Tangari and Williams 2008). To achieve optimum OSA, Aastrup and Kotzab 
(2010) suggest that grocery retailers need to find a balance between minimising the cost of 
understocking (i.e. OOS) and that of over-stocking (OS). 
 
In an intensely competitive environment, OSA is critical in achieving store loyalty (Miranda, 
Kónya and Havrila 2005). With OSA as a key performance indicator (Cachon 2001), Pal and 
Byrom (2003) argue that grocery retailers must ensure they offer the right product, at the 
right time, the right price and the right place. If any 'rights' are not achieved, OOS occurs, 
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OSA is affected and the risk of losing customers becomes a reality. The key to effective OSA 
management is minimising OOS occurrences (Corsten and Gruen 2003). Despite 
unrelenting logistical innovations in recent years, which continue to streamline supply chain 
operations, retailers remain concerned about OSA issues (Fernie and Sparks 2004; ECR UK 
2004; Fernie and Grant 2008; Aastrup and Kotzab 2010; Grant 2012). 
 
In short, OOS and OS occurrences negatively impact not only grocery retailers (due to lost 
sales and store loyalty) but also manufacturers (due to lost sales and brand loyalty) and 
consumers (who are unable to complete grocery shopping lists).  The underlying issue with 
OOS and OS management is to be aware of the extent of focus required to implement in-
store processes effectively and efficiently to minimise OOS and OS occurrences (Corsten 
and Gruen 2003; Kotzab and Teller 2005; Ton and Raman 2010). This study looks into how 
stores of a supermarket chain in Singapore manage OOS and OS occurrences. It aims to 
identify the specific activities these stores undertook to execute in-store processes in ways 
to minimise causes of OOS and OS. 
 
Previous studies on OOS and OSA occurrences have largely been conducted from two 
perspectives. The first perspective focused on examining consumer reactions to OOS where 
causes have emerged from the demand side (Emmelhainz and Stock 1991; Verbeke, Farris 
and Thurik 1998; Campo, Gijsbrechts and Nisol 2000; Fitzsimons 2000; Gruen et al. 2002; 
Sloot, Verhoef and Franses 2005; Che, Chen and Chen 2012). Studies on consumer 
reactions to OOS have found five common reactions to OOS incidents: (1) Switching size; (2) 
Switching brand; (3) Switching store; (4) Delaying purchase; and (5) Deferring purchase 
(Emmelhainz and Stock 1991; Campo et al. 2000; Fitzsimons 2000; Corsten and Gruen 
2003). The second perspective concentrated on exploring the extent and root causes of 
OOS and OS emerging from the supply side (Corsten and Gruen 2003; ECR Europe 2003; 
Kotzab and Teller 2005; Scott 2006; Anderson, Fitzsimons and Simester 2006; Anand and 
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Cunnane 2009 and Aastrup and Kotzab 2009; 2010). This study joins the latter research 
stream, focusing on how supermarket stores manage OOS and OS occurrences.  
 
Previous studies have identified factors found to influence the extent of a stockout to include 
the location of stockout within a distribution channel, the effects of size of a stockout and the 
product characteristics (e.g. type, value, promotional or non-promoted) of the under-stocked 
item (Walters 1977; Ettouzani et al. 2012). Gruen et al. (2002) found that 72% of OOS 
causes stemmed from in-store processes which included in-store planning (e.g. excessive 
product assortment, inadequate shelf space and management (Corsten and Gruen 2003; 
Kotzab and Teller 2005; McKinnon, Mendes and Nababteh 2007)), in-store ordering (e.g. 
inaccurate order quantity or product and delayed ordering (Corsten and Gruen 2003; ECR 
Europe 2003; Gruen and Corsten 2007)), and in-store replenishments (e.g. incorrect shelf 
space allocation, infrequent replenishment activities to storage and shelves and insufficient 
manpower to execute replenishment activities (Fisher, Krishnan and Netessine 2000; Waller 
et al. 2008; Ton and Huckman 2008)) (see Figure 1-2). The ineffectiveness in transferring 
goods from the stores' receiving dock onto the display shelves, known as ‘the last 50 yards 
of a supply chain’, has also been blamed for causing OOS (Grant and Fernie 2008). ECR 
Europe (2003) observed that product availability deteriorates throughout the supply chain; 
they found that service levels between parties in a supply chain indicated ‘shelf service 
levels’ to be around 92-93%.  
 
In 2009, in-store operations contributed to 98% of OOS in stores (Aastrup and Kotzab 2009). 
The type of stores, day of the week, age of store, range of SKU variety, infrastructural 
environment and quality of logistical infrastructure have all been found to affect the 
occurrences of OOS (Taylor and Fawcett 2001; DeHoratius and Raman 2003). For example, 
stores with a higher variety of SKUs tend to experience higher inaccuracies, as these stores 
normally carry multiple items very similar to each other (Raman et al. 2001). In addition, 
while OOS causes are generic to all product range, its negative impacts vary with certain 
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products (e.g. high value or high turnover products), and, therefore, the negative impacts of 
OOS on these products are more significant (McKinnon et al. 2007). Another example where 
infrastructure affects the impact of OOS occurrences is in older stores with less efficient 
docks, which are located in congested urban areas and have complicated delivery and 
receiving operations (Taylor and Fawcett 2001). As the stores of the case supermarket chain 
were located in different parts of Singapore, this study investigates whether locational factors 
(e.g. densely populated residential areas) and store characteristics (e.g. age of stores and 
store formats) influence the management of OOS and OS occurrences. 
 
 
Figure 1-2 Summary Findings of OOS Causes – Worldwide Average (Source: Corsten and Gruen 
2003 p.609) 
 
Proposed solutions to resolve OOS occurrences encompass areas of process improvement, 
operational accuracy, incentive alignment and human factors (Corsten and Gruen 2003; 
McKinnon et al. 2007; ECR Europe 2003; Kotzab and Teller 2005; Grant and Fernie 2008; 
Svensson 2002). For example, the use of Planograms has been suggested as a means of 
improving management of product assortment and shelf space (ECR Europe 2003; Quelch 
and Jocz 2012). However, lack of adherence to Planograms by staff negated their 
effectiveness (ECR 2003; Product Profitability 2009). Strategies to improve operational 
accuracy have looked at inventory management, with initiatives such as continuous 
replenishment programs, computer-assisted ordering (Harris, Swatman and Kurnia 1999) 
and efficient consumer response (Svesson 2005). Such strategies are, however, still 
13% 
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25% 
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4% 
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dependent on accurate information, long-term trust and cooperation from all suppliers 
(Hoffman and Mehra 2000). In addition, previous studies have also found that in most 
occasions of OOS occurrence, the stock was actually in the stores but not on the shelves, i.e. 
‘phantom stocks’ (Ton and Raman 2010). The use of incentives to encourage desirable staff 
behaviour (e.g. accurate scans at checkouts) (Corsten and Gruen 2003; DeHoratius and 
Raman 2007) was also suggested, as was an increase in staff training to improve data 
quality related to stock levels and movement (Corsten and Gruen 2003; Hausruckinger 2006; 
Andres 2008). This study examines specific operational strategies adopted by the stores of 
the case supermarket chain to improve accurate execution of in-store processes. 
 
Previous studies have shown that the extent of OOS also varied due to managerial practices 
as well as determining what was to be measured (Gruen et al. 2002; Corsten and Gruen 
2003). It is common for retail stores to determine the OOS rate per category and then 
average this rate for reporting (Gruen et al. 2002). However, such an approach fails to look 
at the selection criteria of product categories, the frequency and timing of audits, the duration 
of investigations and the level of human error (Gruen et al. 2002). Managerial emphasis on 
OOS and OS management, such as number and quality of staff tasked to monitor stockouts 
and effect solutions, also influence in-store performance. Solutions to improve OSA have 
also gravitated towards the responsibility of top management whereby the key suggestion 
has been for top management to raise awareness of the importance of maintaining OSA in 
stores (McKinnon et al. 2007). ECR (2003) also proposed seven levers to improve OSA and 
achieve improved customer satisfaction, OSA and productivity of suppliers, retailers, depots 
and stores. However, ECR UK (2007) later stated that OSA was also affected by store 
location and size, company ranging strategy and supply chain infrastructure. This study 
investigates specific strategies adopted by stores of the case supermarket chain to achieve 
OSA in their stores. 
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Although there have been extensive previous studies undertaken to understand various 
aspects of managing OOS and OS occurrences, these studies have focused on specific in-
store processes, such as ordering (Clark 2004) or replenishment (Fisher et al. 2000), or on 
specific product ranges or categories, such as chilled orange juice (Trautrims et al. 2009) or 
beauty and health products (McKinnon, Mendes and Nababteh (2007). These studies did not 
investigate OOS and OS occurrences from a store operations perspective, i.e. when, where 
and how do OOS and OS occur in stores? Kotzab and Teller’s (2005) study was one of the 
few to investigate OOS occurrences via a complete grocery in-store logistic model. This 
study utilizes Kotzab and Teller’s (2005) model to investigate how in-store processes are 
executed and how stores of a supermarket chain manage OOS and OS occurrences. 
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 Research Questions 1.2
This thesis examines how stores of one supermarket chain in Singapore manage OOS and 
OS occurrences. Minimising the occurrences of both phenomena is expected to result in 
reliable OSA, an outcome commonly desired by supermarket chains (Grant and Fernie 2008; 
Corsten and Gruen 2003; Kucuk 2004; Kotzab and Teller 2005; McKinnon 2007; Fernie and 
Grant 2008). As pointed out in the previous discussion, OOS and OS events are not only the 
failings of in-store processes but also a host of other factors linked to the operations of these 
processes. Therefore, understanding how OOS and OS occurrences are minimised would 
necessitate an investigation into the manner in which factors triggering the occurrence of 
these two phenomena are managed, leading to the following overarching research question:  
 
How are OOS and OS occurrences managed in supermarket stores in Singapore?  
 
Due to the inextricable link between the management and causes of OOS and OS 
occurrences, a study into how OOS and OS occurrences are managed, as such, cannot be 
complete without an in-depth inquiry into how these events occur in the first instance.  This 
gives rise to the following sub-question:  
 
How do OOS and OS occur in supermarket stores? 
 
Understandably, studying how OOS and OS events are managed should not be confined to 
exploring how factors triggering their occurrences are managed. A comprehensive study 
should also examine the way supermarket stores handle these events when they occur, 
including the specific actions taken both during and after the event.  The need to also 
understand these operational tasks added three additional sub-questions to the study: 
 
How do supermarket stores deal with OOS and OS events? 
When OOS and OS occur, what action(s) do supermarket stores take? 
After the occurrences of OOS and OS events, what follow up action(s) are 
implemented? 
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Answers to the above research questions are expected to expose valuable operational 
insights to further extend the extant knowledge base on the management of OOS and OS 
occurrences.  
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 Context 1.3
Previous research on OOS, OS and OSA events in supermarkets has been based largely in 
the context of the retail environments in Europe and USA (Aastrup, 2009; 2010; Campo et 
al., 2000; Emmelhainz, 1991; Fernie, 2008; IGD, 2007). These studies share common 
characteristics of context, including geographical distance, levels of automated inventory 
processes and labour-related issues. This thesis focuses on supermarket chains in 
Singapore, which possesses a unique and intense level of competition brought about by the 
growth of increasingly modernized grocery retail outlets located in extremely close proximity 
to one another against a stable population1 (KPMG 2006). Singapore has a national culture 
that focuses on progress and prosperity by encouraging its citizens to be highly-skilled and 
businesses to strive for excellence, embracing technology and connectivity to the world 
(Singapore Media Fusion 2011). To ensure low unemployment rates 2  in the country, 
Singapore’s government established employment assistance schemes, such as CareerLink, 
operated by Singapore Workforce Development Agency (WDA) and its Distributed 
CareerLink Network (DCN) partners, involving Community Development Councils and the 
National Trade Union Congress (NTUC) – the sole national trade union in Singapore 
(Ministry of Manpower 2010).  The labour workforce in Singapore is also maintained by a 
Skills Development Fund (SDF) imposed by the government, where levies are collected by 
employers to subsidise employees’ skills improvement programs (Ministry of Manpower 
2010). Despite being nicknamed as the ‘little red dot’ (Othman and Chan, Singapore 2007), 
Singapore has many accolades, such as having the ‘Top postal agency in the world’ 
(Channel News Asia 2013), ‘Best infrastructure in the world’ (Rikvin 2012), ‘Top two most 
competitive cities in the world’. ‘Best business environment in Asia Pacific and the world’ and 
                                               
1 The number of modernised grocery outlets in Singapore had been increasing relatively rapidly, e.g. FairPrice’s 
supermarkets increased from 79 supermarkets in 2004 (The Straits Times 2004) to 93 supermarkets in 2010 
(NTUC Corporate website 2010). Population in Singapore grew from 4.401 million in 2006 (Department of 
Statistics Singapore 2008) to 5.077 million in 2010 (Department of Statistics Singapore 2013).  
2  According to a report ‘Singapore in Figures 2013’ prepared by Department of Statistics Singapore, 
unemployment rate in Singapore was only 2.2% in 2010. It was the lowest unemployment rate compared to 
selected countries and regions around the world in the same period – Australia (5.5%); Canada (8%); Hong Kong 
(4.3%); Japan (5.1); Republic of Korea (3.5%); New Zealand (6.7%); Taiwan (5.2%), United Kingdom (7.8%) and 
United States (9.6%).   
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being the ‘top 10 in Asia for most motivated workforce and most skilled’ (Future Ready 
Singapore (2013). Against this backdrop of industry best-practices, productivity and 
discipline, it was assumed that supermarket chains in Singapore would have more 
disciplined and stringent controls towards the management of OOS and OS in their stores. In 
addition, and on account of Singapore’s strict policing strategies, it was also believed that 
examining how stores managed OOS occurrences would offer a valuable context due to a 
reduced level of pilferage. 
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 Contribution and Significance 1.4
Raman et al. (2001) point out that execution is the missing link in retail operations. They 
argue that ‘operational execution can be improved quickly and dramatically if retail managers 
were to create awareness of the magnitude and impact of execution problems in their supply 
chain and learn from those stores that are currently executing well’ (Raman et al., 2001, 
p140). With a focus on how in-store processes are conducted and how OOS and OS causes 
are managed before, during and after OOS and OS occurrences, this study aims to shed 
light on the operational details of how OOS and OS events can be effectively handled. Using 
a case study approach which is well-suited to exploring ‘how’ questions (Yin 2003; 
Eisenhardt 1989), this study compares the in-store processes and OOS and OS 
management approaches of the high-OSA achieving stores versus their less well-performing 
counterparts to develop a best practice model of OOS and OS management. 
 
Extant literature on the management of OOS and OS occurrences generally lacks 
operational details. Many of the well-founded strategic recommendations, such as the ECR 7 
improvement levers (ECR Europe 2003), are easier said than done. Few studies have 
included the ‘extra’ operational tip that Ton and Huckman (2008) have in their study on the 
impact of employee turnover on operating performance. Ton and Huckman (2008) identify 
that process conformance is the key to reducing the effect of employee turnover on task 
performance, adding that discipline in implementing standardised policies and procedures 
are an effective means to lessen the impact. Without additional operational details, many of 
these OOS management recommendations become ineffective in practice because the 
manner in which they should be implemented is unclear to the retailer. Given the widespread 
execution problem that pervades the retail sector (Raman et al. 2001), a study that offers 
operational details on how OOS and OS occurrences are effectively managed has the 
potential not only to promote best industry practice but also contribute to building theories of 
OOS and OS management. This is what this study intends to achieve. 
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 Thesis Organization 1.5
This thesis is organised into six chapters. Chapter 2 will review the literature surrounding the 
areas of OOS, OS and OSA. It will present the concepts of OOS, OS and OSA, factors 
causing OOS, OS and OSA, followed by prescribed solutions and recommendations to 
manage OOS, OS and OSA. Chapter 3 will present the methodology used in this study. It 
will describe the process of case selection, data collection and the data analysis framework 
that divides the stores of the case supermarket into three groups based on the extent of their 
OOS occurrences. Chapter 4 will present the findings, beginning with the case supermarket 
chain’s background operational characteristics and followed by a within-group analysis. 
Chapter 5 will present the results of the cross-group analysis, focusing on the similarities and 
differences between the three groups and leading to the development of propositions. 
Chapter 6 will conclude the study, summarising the salient findings and their implications for 
theory and practice. Limitations of the study will be highlighted and directions for further 
studies outlined. 
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Chapter 2 Literature Review 
OOS is an extensively studied subject. According to Aastrup and Kotzab (2010), OOS has a 
research history in excess of 40 years, beginning with the study by A.C. Nielsen for the 
Nationals Association of Food Chains in 1968 (Progressive Grocer 1968). This Chapter 
assesses the mainstream literature on OOS, with the objective of identifying research 
opportunities to expand its knowledge base. It is divided into five sections, commencing with 
a discussion on the concepts and definitions of OOS and two of its allied concepts, OS and 
OSA, in Section 2.1. This is followed by a review of the root causes of OOS in Section 2.2, 
and the effects it has on retailers and manufacturers as well as on logistics and supply chain 
practices as a whole in Section 2.3. Section 2.4 examines consumers’ reactions to OOS, 
while Section 2.5 surveys the range of solutions suggested, including both prescriptive 
recommendations and empirically documented approaches found in practices. The chapter 
concludes with an analysis of the state of OOS knowledge, leading to identification of 
productive areas for further investigation. Figure 2-1 shows the five areas of concern in 
extant OOS research, around which this literature review has been organised.  Appendix A 
shows further details into the five areas of concerns.  
  
15 
 
 
 
Figure 2-1 Five areas of concerns in OOS research  
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 Concepts of OOS, OS and OSA 2.1
 Definitions 2.1.1
Out-of-Stock (OOS) 
An out-of-stock (OOS) situation is said to have occurred when customers fail to locate the 
desired product in the store (Gruen and Corsten 2007). This definition implies a customer 
expectation that the item will be available on the shelf as indicated, as Aastrup and Kotzab 
(2009) reiterate: ‘an OOS situation is (when) an item in store assortment that is not available 
for the customer on the shelf.’ (p.767). Ton and Raman (2010) label products that are 
physically in the store but cannot be located by customers as ‘phantom products’, because 
they are not placed in the designated shelf space. ‘Phantom inventory’ is therefore more 
than what is actually on-hand (Gruen and Corsten 2007). 
  
In fact, the definition of an OOS situation is not confined to the occurrence of phantom 
products. ECR Europe (2003) extended this definition of an OOS event to include ‘a product 
not found in the desired form, flavour or size, not found in saleable condition’ (p.8), again 
from the consumer perspective. This definition suggests that even if the desired product is 
available on-shelf, if it does not meet the expectations of the customer, it gives rise to an 
OOS situation. 
 
Gruen et al. (2002) define the incidence of OOS as ‘the number of times a consumer looks 
for the SKU (stock keeping units) and does not find it’ (p.11). In other words, OOS could also 
be interpreted as ‘an instance of an item being unavailable for sale intended’ (Gruen and 
Corsten 2007, p.11). 
 
There are many reasons why a product fails to appear at its stipulated location, e.g., it may 
be in other locations or storage areas or misplaced (Raman et al. 2001). Ton and Raman 
(2010) view OOS as a quality issue, arguing that misplaced stocks are essentially the result 
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of weak conformance quality and represent a ‘defect in conformance quality terms’ (2010, 
p.548) because the store failed to uphold its specifications.    
 
Over-Stocking (OS) 
The complement of OOS is over-stocking (OS); a situation which can quickly lead to 
challenges of space and escalating inventory holding costs (ECR UK 2003). Distribution 
centres pushing stocks to stores as well as poor shelf space allocation management tends to 
result in excess stocks being moved to back rooms, which have been branded as a breeding 
ground of OS (Fernie and Grant 2008; Aastrup and Kotzab 2009). OS can also occur when a 
product has a stipulated selling period but unknown demand, thereby resulting in increased 
returns to suppliers (Tsay 2001). Processing returns back up the channel involves extensive 
logistical and administration costs (Tsay 2001). Retail stores with excess stocks also 
experience higher risks of pilferage and inventory obsolesces, which could, in turn, lead to 
OOS occurrences (Chandra and Kumar 2001).  
 
When demand is uncertain, OS is often employed as a convenient option to hedge against 
OOS situations (Gertner and Rosenfield 1999), with the level of OS corresponding directly to 
the level of uncertainty, i.e., the lower the uncertainty, the lower is the need for OS. Aastrup 
and Kotzab (2010) also discuss the cost of OS and cost of understocking. The challenges, 
they state, are to measure and make these insights visible within the systems, and to ensure 
proper guidance on how these should be taken into account in different situations. Also, it is 
a challenge to make such a differentiated approach part of ordering and replenishment 
routines in stores and also in upstream logistics as both approaches require different 
ordering processes and replenishment policies respectively (Chopra and Meindl 2007; 
Aastrup and Kotzab 2009).   
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On-Shelf Availability (OSA) 
On-shelf availability (OSA) refers to situations where an item is available for sale on the shelf 
when a customer enters the store to purchase it (Chopra and Meindl 2007). In this sense, 
OSA is the inverse of OOS – the higher the OOS, the lower the OSA and vice versa (Gruen 
and Corsten 2007). OSA reflects effective in-store practices (Schary and Christopher 1979). 
OSA is also an indication of successful collaborations between retailers and producers 
(Walters 1977).  When customers experience reliable supply of stock on the display shelves, 
retailers enjoy store loyalty (Fernie and Grant 2008). Papakiriakopoulos (2012) added that 
because OSA builds brand and store loyalty, it provides economic importance not only to 
retailers but also to manufacturers. 
 
Morgan and Dewhurst (2007) argue that OSA is an index of what is actually on the display 
shelf versus what should have been on the display shelf, while Kucuk (2004) suggests that it 
is an indication of effective distribution and distribution channel management, which makes 
stocks continuously available in retail stores. Grant et al. (2006) views OSA as the 
performance of a successful supply chain where ’the last 50 yards’ (Fernie and Grant 2008 
p.293) of the chain actually distributes directly to the customers. 
 
A number of quantitative approaches have been used to examine OOS occurrences. Kang 
and Gershwin (2005) used analytical and simulation modelling to demonstrate how stock 
loss caused inventory inaccuracy, which eventually led to OOS occurrences. Corsten and 
Gruen (2003) and Aastrup and Kotzab (2009) used physical checks and retailers’ IT systems 
to identify root causes of OOS. Papakiriakopoulos et al. (2009) used a decision support 
system to detect products missing on display shelves based on heuristic rules. Aastrup and 
Kotzab (2010) adopted the concept of economic-order-quantity (EOQ) to optimise the cost of 
product availability, trading off the costs of over-stocking, understocking and demand 
uncertainty.  
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Previous studies have used various contextual factors to study OOS events, including store 
size (ECR UK 2007), store formats (ECR Europe 2003), number of SKUs (ECR UK 2007), 
number of available brands (Motes and Castleberry 1985), product category (food and non-
food), movements (McKinnon et al. 2007; van Woensel et al. 2007); delivery frequencies 
(Aastrup and Kotzab 2010) and information technology used (Rani and Velayudhan 2008; 
Grant and Fernie 2008). Gruen and Corsten (2002) looked at the extent and causes of OOS 
situations via a variety of measurements methods, participant profiles, product categories, 
duration of OOS, and daily as well as weekly factors. In 2007, they included manual audits, 
data from PoS system and perpetual inventory to examine duration and frequency of OOS 
occurrences.  
 
Measurement of OOS situations, OS and OSA helps retail stores to determine tangible (such 
as financial) and intangible (such as store loyalty) impacts on their performance. Results of 
the exercise can also help management to allocate resources correctly and focus on 
strategies to improve OSA. 
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 Root Causes of OOS situations, OS and OSA 2.2
  Causes of OOS situations 2.2.1
Over 40 years of research on OOS occurrences has revealed that the majority of causes 
arise from within the retailer store itself. For instance, Angerer (2004), in summarising a 
study conducted by the Coca-Cola Research Council (1996), noted that only 28% of 
stockout incidents were caused by upstream supply chain activities, with in-store processes 
accounting for 72% of the OOS occurrences. Likewise, cases reported in ECR Europe (2003) 
also indicated that only about 15% of OOS occurrences were traceable to the manufacturer, 
implying that some 85% of the OOS situations were the result of the retailer’s operations.  
 
Activities which influence OOS and OS occurrences within the store include planning of 
product range and assortment, establishment of a Planogram, shelf space management 
(Gruen et al. 2002; Corsten & Gruen 2003), replenishment activities (Fisher et al. 2000; 
Fernie & Grant, 2008; van Zelst et al. 2009),) and store-based ordering (Corsten & Gruen 
2003; Fox, Montgomery & Lodish 2004). Activities outside the store that influence OOS and 
OS occurrences include planning of transportation deliveries, back store management, 
inventory ordering activities of manufacturers, supplier management and the 
warehouse/distribution centre servicing the stores (Gruen et al. 2002; Clark 2004).  
 
Studies on OOS causes in retail stores have generally found that OOS occurrences are 
closely linked to the way in which in-store processes have been carried out (Kotzab and 
Teller 2005; Fisher et al. 2006), with the bulk of the problems – 35% excluding forecasting 
(Gruen & Corsten 2002) and 47% including forecasting  (ECR Europe 2003) – emanating 
from store ordering. In addition to process-related OOS occurrences, poor communication 
between headquarters and stores within the same retail chain and inadequately trained staff 
have also been identified as factors contributing to OOS situations, despite the existence of 
standard operating policies (Fernie and Corcoran 2011). Table 2-1 presents ECR Europe’s 
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(2003) and Gruen et al.’s (2002) findings of key root causes occurring with in-store 
processes, specifically in-store ordering, store replenishment and ‘delisting’ (of products or 
brands) by staff.  
 
Table 2-2 summarises the common causes of OOS situations occurring at the three major 
in-store processes of planning, ordering and replenishment.  
 
Table 2-1 Key causes of OOS occurrences in in-store processes 
 Gruen & Corsten (2002) ECR Europe (2003) 
Store ordering 47% (including forecasting) 35% (excluding forecasting) 
Total upstream causes 28% - 
Delisting by store staff - 30% 
In store but not on shelf 25% - 
Shelf replenishment - 12% 
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Table 2-2 Common causes of OOS and OS situations 
In-Store Processes Common Causes of OOS Situations References 
Planning 
• Inadequate space allocation 
• Delisting by store staff 
• Miscommunications between 
supplier and retailer 
• Incongruence between shelf 
capacity and replenishment 
frequency 
• Lack of product knowledge 
• Improper product list management 
• Inadequate management of 
product proliferation 
• Low planogram compliance 
• Poor in-store practices (e.g. hiding 
stock; inaccurate shelf-tagging) 
• High SKUs & inventory 
• Lack of enforcement to HQ 
policies 
• A.C. Nelson (1968) 
• Gruen et al. (2002) 
• Gruen et al. (2002) 
• Corsten & Gruen (2003) 
• Corsten & Gruen (2003); 
Abu-Shalback Zid (2004) 
 
• ECR Europe (2003) 
• McKinnon et al. (2007) 
 
• Corsten & Gruen(2003); 
Hariga et al. 2007 
• Gruen & Corsten (2007) 
• Gruen & Corsten (2007) 
 
 
• Ton & Raman (2010) 
• Ton & Raman (2010) 
Ordering 
• Inaccurate inventory information 
• Inaccurate product item data 
• Inaccurate demand forecasting 
 
• Issues with data capture & 
collection systems (e.g. inaccurate 
scans) 
• Orders placed too late & too little 
• Insufficient ‘store-educated’ staff 
• Gruen et al. (2002) 
 
• Corsten & Gruen (2003) 
• ECR Europe (2003); 
Gruen & Corsten (2007); 
Kang & Gershwin (2005) 
• Hausruckinger (2006); 
Clark, (2004) and Andres 
(2008) 
• Gruen et al. (2002); 
Campo et al. (2003) 
• Aastrup & Kotzab (2009) 
 
Replenishment 
• Disorganised back rooms 
• Incorrect shelf space allocation 
• Infrequent replenishment activities 
to store, shelf & storage 
• Miscommunications among 
warehouse, buyer & retailer 
• Insufficient manpower & high staff 
turnover 
• Gruen et al. (2002) 
• Waller et al. (2008) 
• Fisher et al. (2000); Gruen 
& Corsten (2007) 
 
• Gruen et al. (2002) 
 
• Aastrup & Kotzab (2009); 
Ton & Huckman (2008) 
 
 
 
23 
 
In-Store Processes – In-Store Planning 
In-store planning involves examining product ranges, product density, nature of packaging, 
new product introduction (McKinnon et al. 2007) and product list management, such as 
current products, discontinued products or products to be delisted by store staff (Corsten 
and Gruen 2003; ECR Europe 2003). According to McKinnon et al. (2007), in-store planning 
also encompasses product assortment management and shelf space management. In the 
context of supermarket operations, the aim of in-store planning of activities is to make 
available all SKUs important to consumers (McKinnon et al. 2007). Because stores are 
location-specific, in-store planning of product ranges and product assortment management 
differs between stores. 
 
Miscommunications between retailers and suppliers, and under-shipment by manufacturers 
have been identified as two main causes of OOS (Gruen et al. 2002). Incongruence between 
shelf capacity and replenishment frequency was another (Corsten and Gruen 2003). Poor 
management of product proliferation (Abu-Shalback Zid 2004; Corsten and Gruen 2003; 
Hariga, Al-Ahmari and Mohamed 2007) and lack of product knowledge (ECR Europe 2003) 
have led to OOS situations. The design and use of Planograms, which include product 
assortment, product promotion management (McKinnon et al. 2007; Quelch and Jocz 2012) 
and item management, also contribute to OOS occurrences.  Low Planogram compliance 
and poor in-store practices of hiding gaps and products and poor shelf-tagging accuracy 
have resulted in the occurrences of OOS (Gruen and Corsten 2007). When guidelines on 
item management are established, lack of enforcement could lead to OOS occurrences.  
 
While high product variety and inventory levels lead to increased sales, both elements have 
a negative effect on sales due to in-store logistics (Ton and Raman 2010). Firstly, high SKUs 
increase complication and perplexity in the retail stores’ operating environment (Hayes and 
Clarke 1986; Skinner 1974). Secondly, high product variety and inventory levels have been 
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found to increase stock, which is in the store but not on the shelves (Verhoef and Sloot 2006; 
Ton and Raman 2010). Fast-moving consumer goods have also been found to cost more to 
stores when OOS situations occur, compared to slow-moving stock (Gruen and Corsten 
2002). Planning activities at the Headquarters level, such as supplier selections, warehouse 
operations or distribution arrangements (which affect inbound logistics), also cause OOS 
and OS occurrences in stores (ECR Europe 2003; Fisher et al. 2006).  
 
In-Store Processes – In-Store Ordering 
Both Gruen and Corsten (2002) and ECR Europe (2003) have found that in-store ordering is 
one of the most significant causes of OOS occurrences. As retail stores’ operational 
decisions are highly dependent upon inventory records (Kang and Gershwin 2005), major in-
store ordering issues affecting stockout include inaccurate inventory information (Kang and 
Gershwin 2005), such as errors in product item data. Inaccurate inventory information leads 
to poor demand forecasting (Raman et al. 2001), both of which can result in insufficient 
orders, erroneous orders, late orders and late deliveries (Gruen et al 2002; Corsten and 
Gruen 2003; ECR Europe 2003; Gruen and Corsten 2007). 
 
One of the most common causes of inaccurate inventory information is scanning errors at 
the PoS in store (Hausruckinger 2006). Given that an important goal of checkout stations is 
to prevent long queues, and hence congestion, staff at the checkout stations are typically 
required to scan items quickly. Errors occur when an item is over- or under-scanned. The 
queue-saving practice of scanning different items of the same price only once, followed by 
recording the total number of such is a typical cause of inventory inaccuracy in retail stores 
(Gruen and Corsten 2007; Raman, DeHoratius and Ton 2009). Product mis-identification 
due to very similar packaging (which results in staff scanning only one of the items with the 
remaining items recorded only in number to obtain the total amount) is yet another common 
cause of scanning error that has a significant effect on inventory accuracy (Gruen and 
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Corsten 2007; Raman, DeHoratius and Ton 2009). Incorrect product identification due to 
wrong labels and bar codes affixed by suppliers is a further source of errors (Gruen and 
Corsten 2007).  
 
Inaccurate inventory levels have also been found to be caused by a number of other factors, 
including:  
• poor store and distribution centre replenishment processes (Gruen et al. 2002);  
• merchandising or product proliferation, a typical cause of confusion in order picking at 
distribution centres (Corsten and Gruen 2003);  
• bad store practices, e.g. hiding stock (Corsten and Gruen 2003);  
• poor information about promotions (McKinnon et al., 2007), which reduces forecasting 
accuracy and results in poor execution of store-based ordering activities;  
• mismanagement of inventory process, e.g. placing orders too late or ordering too little 
for promotional items (Gruen et al. 2002; Campo et al. 2003);  
• frequent staff turnover (Raman et al. 2001a and 2001b); and 
• lack of ‘store educated employees’ (Aastrup and Kotzab 2009). 
 
Other regular causes of errors in inventory records include stock loss – especially unknown 
loss (ECR Europe 2003) – transaction error, inaccessible inventory or ‘phantom products’ 
(Raman et al.2001b) and incorrect product identification. Stock loss an also be caused by 
product shrinkage due to pilferage (Miller 1997; Turcsik and Summerour 2001; Verhoef and 
Sloot 2006), damage, expiration or spoilage (Philp 1995; Tonglet and Bamfield 2004; Amato-
McCoy and Deena 2009).  
 
In-Store Processes – In-Store Replenishment 
In retail operations, in-store replenishment process is constantly challenged by three main 
issues: inadequate shelf space allocated to accommodate expected demand for specific 
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products; irregular replenishment frequency; and back room disorganisation which prevents 
staff from moving stocks effectively out onto display shelves (Fisher, Raman & McClelland 
2000; Gruen et al. 2002; Fernie and Grant 2008).  
 
According to Gruen et al. (2002), shelf space allocation is normally determined by the size of 
a case pack3 and not by the turnover rate of the product. With case pack size being used to 
allocate shelf space, any excess stock or large case packs that do not fit on the display 
shelves are stored in the back room (Waller, Tangari and Williams 2008; Eroglu, Williams 
and Waller 2013). Both Waller, Tangari and Williams and Eroglu et al. have shown that this 
approach can result in higher risks of stockout, if replenishment of shelves from back rooms 
are not timely or regular, giving rise to the ‘backroom logistics effect’.  
 
Placing stocks that cannot be accommodated on shelves in the back room causes back 
room dysfunction. Gruen and Corsten (2007) argue that there is a ‘positive correlation of 
backroom inventory and shelf OOS’ (p9). Disorganised back rooms could result in longer 
replenishment lead time due to more time taken to search for the required stock (Waller, 
Tangari and Williams 2008). However, this does not suggest that a well-organised back 
room necessary leads to better replenishment performance. Gruen and Corsten (2002) 
found that retailers with well managed small back rooms and systematic transport networks 
were still unable to improve the quality of their store replenishment process.  
 
Corsten and Gruen (2003) also identified a number of factors that can hinder in-store 
replenishment performance, sowing seeds for potential OOS occurrences. These include 
errors during receiving, poor organisation of shelf replenishment activities, inconsistency in 
adherence to Planograms as well as inventory shrinkage due to damage and theft. Other 
factors that can impact the replenishment process include merchandising, shelf-filling and 
                                               
3 The determination of case pack size has financial and operational implications for both suppliers and retailers 
(Eroglu et al. 2013). There are also logistical considerations factored into the determination of a case pack size 
such as size of pallet, type of material handling equipment and carrying capacity of transportation modes used. 
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replenishment speed and lack of availability checks (McKinnon et al. 2007; Hariga et al. 
2007; Laine 2010). ECR Europe (2003) further indicates that missing shelf-edge labelling, 
absence of established processes to signal replenishment, and orders erroneously deleted 
could affect replenishment activities. Poor communication or miscommunication amongst 
warehouse staff, purchase manager and store manager about promotional activities and 
price changes have also been identified as challenges to on-shelf activities and are potential 
causes of OOS situations (Waller et al. 2008). Reiner et al.'s (2013) study on in-store 
logistics processes for managing dairy products observed that there were different levels of 
efficiency for different store formats. They found that small hybrid store formats, e.g., small 
hypermarkets, performed less efficiently compared to supermarkets and hypermarkets, due 
to factors such as delivery delay and damage to (dairy) products (Reiner et al. 2013). 
 
In addition, Aastrup and Kotzab (2009) point out that insufficient manpower and high staff 
turnover both have an effect on operations quality, specifically in the case of in-store 
ordering and in-store replenishment activities. In a similar vein, Raman et al. (2001b) state 
that that new employees, who are less familiar with stores’ product and replenishment 
processes, tend to make more mistakes when moving items from storage to display shelves. 
Trautrims (2011) examined retailers’ management of their in-store replenishment 
management systems and identified four types of replenishment interactions – operations-
focused, store-based, customer care-focused and outlet-based, that segmented the extent of 
interactions between employees and their replenishment management systems (See Table 
2-3). Trautrims’s (2011) study also found that employees’ frequency of interactions with the 
replenishment management systems resulted in different impacts on in-store processes. 
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Table 2-3 Four Types of Replenishment Interactions 
Type of Replenishment Interaction Description of Replenishment Interaction 
Operations-focused 
‘Centralised and standardized’ (p.270) design to 
ensure efficient processing and consistency in 
methods processing customer orders. 
Store-based  
Dependent upon shop floor employees’ ‘local 
knowledge and judgement’ (p.270). 
Frequent interactions permitted to improve accuracy of 
store data and orders. 
Customer care-focused Interactions to assist with customers’ orders. 
Outlet-based 
Little or no interactions with the replenishment 
management system. Floor staff replenished shelves 
with what was delivered to the store, with little or no 
input towards type of products to be delivered. 
Source: Trautrims (2011) 
 
Format of Stores 
Store size can influence store format, i.e., whether the store will be set up as a supermarket, 
a discount store, a traditional grocery neighbourhood store, a convenience store, a 
warehouse store or a hypermarket (Uusitalo, 2001). According to Uusitalo (2001), small 
stores offer convenience, accessibility, familiarity of product range, store layout and intimacy; 
therefore store staff gain store familiarity much faster. Conversely, while large stores offer 
bulk purchase discount opportunities and availability of product range and convenience in 
terms of ‘one-stop shopping’, store staff require longer periods in these larger stores to 
achieve store familiarity. Store formats (Burt and Spark 1994; 1995), marketing policies and 
consumer shopping behaviours (Messinger and Narasimhan 1997) often influence the range 
of products sold and their price levels. These latter factors affect store operations (e.g. on-
shelf replenishment process) and contribute to OOS situations (Messinger and Narasimhan, 
1997).  
 
Warehouse/Distribution Centres 
Mis-pickings at distribution centres can also lead to OOS occurrences. Missing roll cage 
labels, wrongly positioned roll cages and not using scanners in picking processes at 
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warehouses have been cited as common causes of in-store OOS occurrences (Ettouzani et 
al. 2012). 
 
Shrinkage 
Shrinkage can be caused by theft, administrative errors, and damage caused by expiration 
and inappropriate handling of products (Tonglet and Bamfield 1997). Inventory shrinkage is 
a common cause of inaccurate inventory information in grocery stores (Tonglet and Bamfield 
1997; Chapman, Harrison and Beck 2003; Bamfield 2004; Chapman and Templar 2006; 
Howell and Proudlove 2007), and is a result of two types of causes: known and unknown 
(Chapman et al. 2003; Beck 2004; Kang and Gershwin 2005). Seen as an indication of 
process failure, inventory shrinkage is considered a “system issue that extends across a 
business from design, through planning to operational execution” (Chapman and Templar 
2006, p860), requiring broader contextual investigation in order to identify where 
improvements should be focused (Beck 2004; Chapman and Templar 2006).     
Known Causes 
Shrinkage can be caused by theft committed by internal parties (e.g. store employees) or 
external parties (e.g. customers and vendors). Internal theft is considered a known cause of 
stock loss, e.g. losses that are identified by store staff and noted into an inventory 
management system (Beck 2004; Kang and Gershwin 2005). External theft (committed by 
customers or vendors) is also considered as a known cause of stock loss, e.g. customers 
helping themselves to stock and vendors pushing aside stocks for private consumption while 
carrying out stock management at the store (Kang and Gershwin 2005). Other known 
causes of shrinkage include process failures (Beck 2004), such as administrative error 
(Howell and Proudlove 2007) and goods labelled ‘unavailable for sale’ due to spoilage, 
expiration or damage (Bamfield 2004; Kang and Gershwin 2005). 
30 
 
Unknown Causes 
Unknown stock losses that are undetected by staff and system may include undetected theft 
or consumed food (Chapman et al. 2003; Beck 2004; Kang and Gershwin 2005).  Another 
example of unknown stock loss is when a discrepancy between goods ordered and goods 
received is undetected by the receiving staff. As such, inventory information would not reflect 
actual inventory levels (Kang and Gershwin 2005).   
 
  Causes of OS 2.2.2
OS events are caused by inaccurate inventory information and the tendency of distribution 
centres to push stocks to stores in order to meet store demand as well as order picks for 
home shopping demand where stocks at stores are picked by store staff to process online 
orders (Fernie and McKinnon 2003; Fernie and Grant 2008). OS also occurs when a product 
has a stipulated selling period with unknown demand, where retail stores deliberately 
overstock to hedge against demand uncertainty (Tsay 2001; Fernandes, Gouveia and Pinho 
2010). Excess inventories also cause OS due to congestion in the supply chain and lack of 
synchronisation between the replenishment processes of supply chain members (Waller et 
al. 2008). 
 
  Causes of OSA  2.2.3
According to Pal and Byrom (2003), there are five factors affecting OSA in stores: (1) 
systems that control stock ordering, store display, and stock rotation; (2) standards that 
determine the level and quality of service within the shopping environment; (3) right stock 
being offered at the right time, right price, right place; (4) right space utilisation that 
maximises return on investment; and (5) the right staff to manage day-to-day store and 
department operations to replenish shelves, advise and support customers. 
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Inaccurate inventory information causes retail store staff to delay placement of orders or 
order insufficient stocks, thereby hindering retail stores from achieving OSA (Walters 1977; 
ECR UK 2007, Fernie and Corcoran 2010). Furthermore, higher inventory levels do not 
necessarily result in higher sales. In fact, high levels of inventories can lead to poor OSA due 
to congestion in back rooms, thus preventing stocks from getting replenished on time (ECR 
Europe 2003).  
 
Characteristics of product categories have also been found to affect OSA in retail stores 
(Corsten and Gruen 2002; ECR Europe 2003). There are two category characteristics – 
demanding categories (e.g. detergents and ice cream) and less demanding categories (e.g. 
cosmetics and hair care) (ECR Europe 2003). Products within the demanding categories 
have high levels of expectation on supply chains where time to market is critical and special 
storage or handling are critical to their saleable conditions (ECR Europe 2003). Less 
demanding categories tend to have more stable demand expectations, less product 
proliferation and less pressure on shelf life (ECR Europe 2003).  
 
Promotional items face higher demand than non-promotional items but also face higher OOS 
occurrences when supply fails to meet increased demand (ECR Europe 2003; Ettouzani et 
al 2012). Accuracy of product demand forecasting is therefore important to ensure that all 
promotional processes have been considered. According to ECR Asia Pacific (2011), 
promotions and advertisements affect the OSA of retailers with higher SKUs more than 
retailers with lower SKUs. This is because retailers with higher SKUs have more 
sophisticated promotional processes involving several channel members and as such, any 
late changes can cause confusion across parties, thereby resulting in mistakes and poor 
OSA (Ettouzani et al 2012).  
 
Inaccurate ordering practices also result in weak OSA in retail stores (Fox et al. 2004; 
Hausruckinger 2006). The impact of inaccurate ordering affects OSA, since deliveries are 
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linked to store ordering schedules but not shelf replenishment (Hausruckinger 2006). This 
means that retail stores struggle to achieve OSA when all three activities (order schedules, 
replenishment schedules and delivery schedules) are not linked (ECR Europe 2003). 
Another inaccurate ordering practice is related to irregular order frequency and inaccurate 
order quantities as these affect the duration of OOS occurrences and OSA respectively 
(Corsten and Gruen 2002; Hausruckinger 2006; ECR UK 2007; Ettouzani et al 2012).  
 
Supplier availability and performance have also been found to affect OSA. Grant and Fernie 
(2008) found that retail stores that lack focus on OSA and collaboration with suppliers were 
less capable of achieving OSA. Supplier availability was one of the main root causes of OSA 
according to ECR Asia Pacific (2011), and the fact that there were not enough suppliers 
close to Wal-Mart stores was  revealed as one of the reasons the company struggled to 
keep their shelves fully stocked (Dudley 2013).  
 
Varying levels of attitudes towards achieving OSA from headquarters and store staff cause 
store staff to be inept in resolving OOS issues at retail stores, and this in turn affects their 
OSA abilities (Fernie and Corcoran 2010). Untimely updates of orders at headquarters 
cause distribution centres to become congested, thereby causing OOS at store level 
(Ettouzani et al 2012). Distribution centres have also been found to affect the OSA of retail 
stores. Inaccuracy of inventory information, mis-pickings due to human error and OOS 
occurrences in distribution centres have exacerbated inaccurate in-store ordering and OSA 
(ECR Asia Pacific 2011; Ettouzani et al 2012; Papakiriakopoulos 2012). OOS situations of 
consumers’ favourite brands are an indication of poor distribution and in-store operations 
(Kucuk 2008).  
 
Effective in-store replenishment requires the correct number of products to be slotted onto 
the display shelves at the right time (Hausruckinger 2006; ECR UK 2007), and retail stores 
without established replenishment triggers experience OSA challenges (Corsten and Gruen 
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2002). Grant (2012) stated that as logistics and supply chain activities have become more 
complex, replenishment activities outside the retail stores have improved. This is not the 
case, however, for in-store replenishment. 
 
Other less commonly discussed but still important factors that affected OSA include store 
formats, where supermarkets are observed to perform better than hypermarkets due to their 
smaller selection of goods, more creative use of space and higher, fast-moving SKUs (ECR 
Europe 2003).  
 
OSA levels can vary on different days of the week because display shelves are stocked 
depending on store traffic and delivery schedule as well as replenishment processes (ECR 
Europe (2003). Papakiriakopoulos (2012) asserts that OOS rates can vary according to the 
day of the week or even the time of day, which affects OSA. Fernie and Grant (2008) found 
that picking orders for online home shopping at the stores exacerbated the ‘last 50 yards’ 
issue and Ettouzani et al (2012) found thirty-two causes that affect the OSA of promotional 
products, which they grouped into eight themes for retailers and manufacturers. The eight 
themes relevant to retailers are: demand fluctuation and forecasting; communication and 
collaboration; store discipline and replenishment; information technology; timescale; 
distribution; process and production. Grant (2012) states that depleting stocks in the ‘last 50 
yards’ is recurrent and perhaps due to a ‘divide’ observed between channel members. 
However, 85% of issues related to OSA seem to occur within the store environment (ECR 
Europe 2003) and retailers’ failure to allocate sufficient resources to in-store processes such 
as staffing levels for replenishment activities, also attributes to low OSA (McKinnon et al. 
2007). According to ECR Europe (2003), management’s failure to properly execute in-store 
processes also results in OOS occurrences, as does lack of training for retail store staff to 
resolve OOS issues and understand the implications of poor OSA (such as the importance 
of accurate checks in stores to avoid transferring incorrect information upstream (Ettouzani 
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et al 2012)). From the review of OOS, OS and OSA, it can be observed that the three 
phenomena share similar causes, and are therefore closely interlinked.  
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 Effects of OOS on Retailers, Manufacturers and LSCM Practices 2.3
Corsten and Gruen (2003) argue that OOS is a risk to the entire supply chain and can be 
divided into four areas: 
 
(1) Retailer shopper loss risk. This risk occurs when shoppers permanently switch  
     stores after experiencing an OOS situation. All things being equal, stores with a  
     lower overall OOS levels have a net customer gain. 
 
(2) Retailer sales loss risk. This risk is a combination of three possible OOS effects:  
     consumers purchasing the OOS item from a competitor store, consumers  
     cancelling their purchase of the item, and consumers substituting the OOS item  
     with a smaller and/or cheaper item. Combining the estimated lost sales from these  
     three effects and multiplying the result by the extent of OOS yields an  
     estimate of the percentage of the retailer's total gross sales lost from OOS items. 
 
(3) Manufacturer shopper loss risk. This occurs when consumers decide to switch  
     to a competitor's brand within the same category for all subsequent purchases. 
 
(4) Manufacturer sales loss risk. This risk stems from consumers substituting the  
     OOS item with a competitor's item or cancelling a purchase. 
 
The impact of OOS situations is not confined to the lost sales of the OOS item alone. From 
an operations and supply chain management perspective, OOS distorts inventory 
information which in turn affects ordering and replenishment. At the same time, rectification 
of OOS items demands use of additional resources, which could be avoided if processes 
were in place to manage OOS occurrences. In short, OOS occurrences lead to logistics and 
information inefficiencies as well as order-fulfilment failures across the entire supply chain. In 
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this sense, OOS situations not only disappoint customers, but also increase costs along the 
supply chain (Gruen and Corsten 2007; Quelch and Jocz 2012). 
 
From a services delivery perspective, an OOS item reflects service failures on a number of 
fronts, decreasing both customer satisfaction and store and brand loyalty, while increasing 
shoppers’ costs. Lastly, from a marketing and sales forecasting perspective, the presence of 
OOS items distort the baseline on which demand forecasts are made, thereby creating 
bullwhip effects further up the supply chain. 
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 Consumer Response to OOS Situations 2.4
The effect of OOS occurrences on retail stores would be inconsequential if OOS had little 
effect on consumers because the ultimate objective of a product supply chain is for 
consumers to complete their purchases at the retail stores. When a product is out of stock, 
there is an immediate loss of revenue, not only to the retail store and its suppliers (Schary 
and Christopher 1979), but also to the manufacturers (Gruen et al. 2002), who, like retailers,  
suffer losses in terms of sales, product loyalty and store loyalty (Corsten & Gruen 2003). 
Supply chain costs increase due to inaccurate inventory levels, wasteful activities and poor 
overall customer service levels (Anderson, Fitzsimons & Simester 2006), and stores that 
regularly experience OOS occurrences face declining customer patronage and even 
avoidance from major suppliers (Gruen et al. 2002; ECR Europe 2003). 
 
Unsurprisingly, in addition to research which looks at the extent and root causes of OOS 
occurrences, a second stream of research in the literature concentrates on consumer 
reactions to OOS situations. Emmelhainz et al. (1991) argue that understanding consumer 
responses to OOS situations helps retail stores design their in-store logistics processes to 
reduce OOS occurrences and ease the impact of OOS events on store performance. 
 
Previous studies on consumers’ responses to OOS situations have identified six common 
behavioural responses: (1) switch store; (2) switch item; (3) delay or postpone purchase; (4) 
cancel purchase completely; (5) switch category; and (6) switch brand (Peckham 1963; 
Schary and Christopher 1979; Emmelhainz et al 1991; Sloot et al. 2005). According to Gruen 
and Corsten (2002), when faced with an OOS situation, between seven and twenty-five per 
cent of shoppers choose not to purchase the item on that shopping trip, while twenty-one to 
forty-three per cent shopped elsewhere, depending on the product category. An earlier study 
of grocery shoppers in London by Schary and Christopher (1979) indicated that the 
proportion of customers electing to purchase an OOS item from another shop could be as 
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high as forty-eight per cent. When shoppers do not manage to complete their shopping at a 
store due to one or more of the intended purchases being in an OOS situation, customers 
experience dissatisfaction (Krafft et al. 2006; Schary & Christopher 1979). When they 
abandon their purchase of the OOS item or switch stores, the loss to the store may not be 
limited to sales loss on that occasion but also impact future sales (Anderson, Fitzsimons and 
Simester 2006).   
 
Three main factors have been found to closely associate with variations in consumer 
response to OOS occurrences (See Table 2-4) – product variables, consumer characteristics 
and situational variables (Schary and Christopher 1979; Emmelhainz et al 1991; Campo et al 
2000; 2004; ECR UK 2003; Sloot et al. 2005; Rani and Velayudhan 2008; Zinn and Liu 2008; 
Trautrims et al. 2009).   
 
The different types of product variables yield different consumer reactions (e.g. OOS of 
convenience goods cause consumers to switch brands or packaging, whereas OOS of 
emergency goods would cause consumers to switch stores to ensure purchase) (Campo et 
al. 2000). 
 
Different consumer variables influence consumer reactions to OOS incidences (e.g. 
consumers who are ‘time-poor’ or who live a fair distance from the store tend to switch 
brands or packaging in order to complete their shopping trip) (Dupre and Gruen 2004). 
 
Situational variables can cause customers to react differently. For instance, in shopping trips 
undertaken for leisure, consumers may postpone the purchase of OOS item, whereas if the 
shopping trip is to fulfil a specific quantity of products, when faced with OOS of the required 
items, customers may change brands or switch stores to ensure that their purchases are 
complete (Campo et al. 2004).  
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Table 2-4 Factors affecting customer reactions to OOS. 
Factors that Cause 
Variations to 
Customer Reactions 
to OOS 
Descriptions References 
Product Variables 
• Convenience Goods 
• Shopping Goods  
• Specialty Goods  
• Emergency Goods 
Emmelhainz et al.(1991); Campo 
et al. (2000); Fitzsimons (2000); 
Svensson (2002) 
Hedonic versus utilitarian/functional 
nature 
Campo et al. (2000) 
Availability of pack sizes Campo et al. (2000) 
Assortment alternatives 
Campo et al. (2004); Kucuk 
(2008); Miranda & Jegasothy 
(2008) 
Item loyalty Campo et al. (2004) 
Preferred package size Campo et al. (2004) 
Consumer Variables 
Proliferation of retail brands Schary & Christopher (1979); ECR Europe (2003) 
Demographics and lifestyles Schary & Christopher (1979); Emmelhainz et al (1991) 
Store loyalty in general, including the 
tendency to concentrate purchase in 
one store 
Emmelhainz et al (1991); Campo 
et al. (2000) 
Store distance in terms of travel time Campo et al. (2000) 
Specific outlet preference/loyalty Campo et al. (2000) 
Trust in store of choice Campo et al. (2000); ECR Europe (2003) 
Time pressure ECR Europe (2003); Campo et al. (2004) 
Commoditisation of product brands ECR Europe (2003) 
Desire for ‘one-stop’ shopping ECR Europe (2003) 
Store loyalty Campo et al. (2004) 
Shopping attitude Campo et al. (2004) 
Shopping frequency Campo et al. (2004) 
Situational Variable 
If OOS item is highly time-dependent Emmelhainz et al (1991); Campo et al. (2000); Sloot et al. (2005) 
Specific purchase occasion Campo et al. (2000) 
Specific quantity required Campo et al. (2000) 
Time of purchases Campo et al. (2000) 
Time available for purchases Campo et al. (2000); Zinn & Liu (2001) 
Attitudes towards shopping Campo et al. (2000); Rani & Velayudhan (2008) 
Type of shopping trip Campo et al. (2000) 
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Of the five behavioural responses to an OOS situation, switching stores and cancelling 
purchases completely are the most damaging to stores, undermining store loyalty 
(Emmelhainz et al 1991; McKinnon et al. 2007). To prevent consumers from switching stores 
or cancelling purchases, Anderson et al. (2006) suggests that stores should adopt 
approaches that encourage consumers to switch brands or sizes so that they will continue 
with their purchases at the store. Offering discounts to encourage back orders was one such 
example. Aastrup and Kotzab (2010) suggest that retailers should look at product categories 
(hedonic and utilitarian) and brand issues separately, as they both affect OSA.  
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 Solutions and Recommendations to Deal with OOS Events 2.5
Previous studies and publications in OOS, OS and OSA situations have shown that 
minimising the occurrences of OOS and OS, and therefore optimising OSA, requires 
successful execution of retail logistics processes (Salmon 1989; Raman et al. 2001; Kotzab 
and Teller 2005; Fisher et al. 2006; Fernie and Grant 2008). Salmon (1989), in his 
discussions on ‘key success factors’ (p.372) in optimising retailing performance, mentions 
the importance of sound logistical skills to avoid ‘too much inventory and too many stockouts 
as well as excess inventories in one store when they are needed in another.’ (p.374). This 
view is shared by Mangan and Christopher (2005).  
 
On the other hand, Fisher et al.’s (2006) empirical study on which store operating policies 
result in successful execution, found that the role of employees is important in store 
execution because most store employees perform a variety of tasks (such as transferring 
inventory from the back room to the display shelves, conducting inventory audits, monitoring 
adherence to Planograms and maintaining security against shoplifting). Getting management 
to adopt a culture of ensuring OSA and putting relevant processes in place (e.g. aligning 
supply chain activities, such as transportation schedules, with store processes) to esure 
availability in stores is also important in improving OSA (Fernie and Grant 2008). 
 
  Inventory Management 2.5.1
According to Balakrishaan, Pangburn and Stavrulaki (2004), highly visible inventories, 
including having multiple display locations, stimulate demand for a variety of reasons – the 
notion of the product being popular, assurance of future product availability and ease of 
purchase access. On-shelf availability of psychic stock – ‘retail display inventory’ (Larson 
and DeMarais 1999 p499) – also stimulates demand and leads to increased sales (Larson 
and DeMarais 1999).  Furthermore, visibility of stocks’ physical location “is a cornerstone of 
inventory management.” (Quelch and Jocz 2012, p. 80) 
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To ensure display shelves are adequately stocked, effective inventory management and 
replenishment processes are required (Chandra & Kumar 2001; Hausruckinger 2004). For 
example, manufacturers and producers need to collaborate with retailers to ensure that 
shelves are stocked in ways that achieve shopper satisfaction (Hausruckinger & Hasse 
2003). Manufacturers, producers and retailers need to work together (e.g. by providing easy 
access to real-time, accurate information about inventory levels and promotions) to 
continually improve inventory management processes in order to achieve sustainable 
operational accuracy (Lowson 2001). Retailers should also identify the various dimensions of 
customer satisfaction and factor them in to priority store performance measures (Blose, 
Tankersley and Flynn 2005).  
One possible approach to improve OSA is to consider measures such as filling empty 
display shelves with items that present similar characteristics to the OOS item but of a 
different brand, thus reducing the impact of OOS items (Emmelhainz et al. 1991). Retail 
stores could pay special attention to increasing product variety so as to encourage 
consumers to continue with their purchases, by carrying ‘at least two different brands of the 
same variety and size, as well as two different varieties of the same size and brand’ 
(Emmelhainz et al. 1991, p.145). While this approach has not been empirically tested, recent 
studies have suggested that product attributes and substitution should be considered for this 
reason (Campo et al. 2004; van Woensel et al. 2007). The effectiveness of the above 
approach, i.e. stocking different brands of same variety and size and two different varieties 
of same size and brand, is subject to product characteristics (e.g. hedonic versus functional), 
product purchase frequency (e.g. regular versus occasional purchase) and availability of 
acceptable alternatives in product assortment (Emmelhainz et al. 1991; Campo et al. 2004). 
Increasing product variety to enable consumers to complete their purchases does, however, 
come with a trade-off – increased inventory risks (the higher the inventory holding costs, the 
higher the number of phantom products (Ton and Raman 2010)) and increased complication 
and complexity in the retail store’s environment (Skinner 1974). Walter and Grabner (1975) – 
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suggesting that an ability to distinguish between critical and non-critical items based on 
consumer response is essential. Van Woensel et al. (2007) also argue that knowledge on 
consumer buying behaviour could help determine the aggregation level in the ordering 
process and that incorporating customer behaviour in inventory management policies may 
improve store performance by minimising OOS occurrences. 
Similarly, Aastrup and Kotzab (2010) state that although consumer reactions to OOS items 
have been studied to measure economic effects, these responses have not been adopted to 
manage OOS rates for different product categories. Aastrup and Kotzab (2009) argue that 
‘for some items it might be more profitable to work with a certain OOS level’ (p.157). In their 
2010 study, they suggest adopting Economic Order Quantity (EOQ) principles to optimise 
product availability by following three guidelines: ‘cost of overstocking, costs of 
understocking and demand uncertainty’ (Aastrup and Kotzab 2010, p.157), where ‘cost of 
overstocking’ includes all implicated costs involved in holding excess (e.g. risk of 
obsolescence and pilferage), ‘cost of understocking’ represents lost sales, and ‘demand 
uncertainty’ refers to uncertain product demands, especially those of promotional items. By 
combining the EOQ principles with insights from consumer response to OOS events, 
Aastrup and Kotzab (2010) demonstrate how the costs of understocking could be used to 
direct attention to items that had the ‘most significant business impacts’ on retailers when 
OOS situations occurred (e.g. cost of understocking high-turnover items).  
  
  In-Store Planning 2.5.2
Product assortment planning, rationalisation of product range, identifying best product mix, 
efficient assortment management (EAM) and permanent assortment reductions (PAR) have 
been suggested to help reduce problems caused by increased product variety and inventory 
levels (ECR Europe 2003; Corsten and Gruen 2003; Campo et al. 2004). However, 
increased product variety and inventory levels drive up levels of phantom stocks (Ton and 
Raman 2010) and hence increase the risks of both OOS and OS occurrences. To manage 
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the implications of product proliferation, micro-marketing strategies have been suggested, 
e.g. adapting the marketing mix to the local market (Quelch and Jocz 2012) in which the 
store outlet operates. With information gathered from PoS data and store loyalty cards, 
retailers and manufacturers could identify SKUs’ performance profiles (e.g. turnover rate) in 
their respective stores and locations (Quelch and Jocz 2012). Henceforth with this strategy, 
allocation of store space across product categories becomes location-specific and store 
format-specific (Campo, Gijsbrechts, Goossens and Verhetsel 2000; Quelch and Jocz 2012). 
The role of merchandising and correct use of Planograms are purported to reduce OOS and 
OS situations as well as optimising shelf allocation and management (ECR Europe 2003; 
McKinnon et al. 2007). In short, focusing on a relatively small number of SKUs could be an 
effective strategy in lowering lost sales due to OOS (Gruen and Corsten 2007). 
 
In relation to product assortment, both Taylor and Fawcett (2001) and Aastrup and Kotzab 
(2010) recommend identifying ‘hot’ or high turnover items with the most significant 
‘contributions’ to lost sales due to OOS in order to minimise OOS and OS occurrences. 
While some of these items may be inexpensive, they are normally sold in large units, and 
thus are capable of contributing to high stockout costs (DeHoratius and Raman 2003). 
Ranking items and stores based on their turnover and performance, as well as risks of OOS 
and OS, has been suggested as a means of quantifying losses in both areas (Gruen and 
Corsten 2007). The results of this ranking process should be formalised to continuously 
benefit from OOS reductions (Gruen and Corsten 2007). 
 
Segmentation of products based on item, brand and categorisation in terms of their 
importance to OSA could enhance specific in-store processes and reduce the cost of 
understocking (Aastrup and Kotzab 2010). Aastrup and Kotzab (2010) suggest that such 
targeted measurements and segmentation should be factored in the inventory planning 
process to serve as a general guide for stores.  
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Che, Chen and Chen (2012), who investigated the effects of OOS situations on consumers’ 
SKU preferences and price sensitivity, found that (1) consumers’ price sensitivity tends to be 
underestimated when product unavailability was not accounted for in a discrete choice 
model; (2) in categories with a high level of SKU share concentration, consumer preference 
for a SKU is reinforced when facing OOS of other similar-in-attribute, familiar SKUs; and (3) 
in categories characterised by short inter-purchase time, consumer preference for a SKU is 
attenuated when it is frequently stocked out. Che, Chen and Chen (2012) contend that their 
findings offer retailers valuable insights into how OOS situations can affect category revenue 
and market shares of SKUs in periods following OOS incidents. 
 
  In-Store Ordering 2.5.3
Suggestions to overcome OOS occurrences due to in-store ordering function have revolved 
around accurate data capture and recording to ensure accurate inventory forecasting (Gruen 
and Corsten 2002; ECR Europe 2003; Corsten and Gruen 2003; Hausruckinger 2003; Clark 
2004; Yun et al. 2005; McKinnon et al. 2007). Other measures to improve forecasting 
accuracy and in-store ordering include using automatic ordering systems, automatic 
availability measures, EDI, internet and real-time ordering, increasing frequency of stock 
counts and reconciliation activities, engaging with suppliers to achieve seamless flow of 
information relating to inventory levels and orders, and considering adoption of inventory 
management operational strategies, such as vendor management inventory (VMI) and 
collaborative, forecasting, planning and replenishment (CFPR) (Lowson 2001). Collaborative 
store ordering, where suppliers and retailers share real-time, daily information through 
shared PoS data over an internet platform (Pramatari and Miliotis 2008) and improving 
promotion management by regular communication on promotional activities between 
manufacturer and retailer (ECR Europe 2003; Papakiriakopoulos 2010) have also been 
suggested. 
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  In-Store Replenishment 2.5.4
Two in-store replenishment improvement strategies that are commonly recommended are 
managing stock movements from back rooms onto display shelves (Gruen et al. 2002; 
Trautrims et al. 2011; Trautrims et al. 2012) and allocating adequate on-shelf space for 
product display (Hariga et. al. 2007; Fernie and Grant 2008; Aastrup and Kotzab 2009; 
Dudley 2013). Corsten and Gruen (2003) contend that decisions on category tactics and 
shelf space allocation and frequency and quantity ordering and replenishment should be 
linked to achieve a sustainable on-shelf availability management process. They advocate 
three strategic pylons of ‘process responsiveness, operational accuracy and incentive 
alignment’4 to resolve the root causes of OOS situations (Corsten and Gruen 2003, p.611). 
In terms of operations, Kotzab and Teller (2005) suggest the use of store-specific, 
sequenced, slotted roll-cages to reduce replenishment lead time and improve replenishment 
performance, although such practices may pose challenges for stores with limited aisle 
space. 
 
Gruen and Corsten (2007) suggest two methods involving process and product design to 
minimise the chances of OOS occurrences. The first suggestion is called store-friendly 
delivery (Gruen and Corsten 2007), which involves designing processes to load pallets and 
products onto trucks in product groups, facilitating offloading and transporting to shelves with 
minimal in-store transportation and handling. The second approach is to develop shelf-ready 
packaging (SRP) by designing products that are packaged in a store-ready merchandised 
unit which permits easy identification, easy opening and easy placement onto shelf and easy 
disposal. Although SRP could impact the cost structure of a product due to industrial 
investment or additional outer packaging cost, pilot projects by some European retailers, 
such as ASDA, Tesco, Sainsbury, and Carrefour, in collaboration with many suppliers and 
                                               
4 Specific suggestions for Corsten and Gruen’s three remedies of process improvements, operational accuracy 
and incentive alignment have been illustrated in Appendix A. 
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service providers have indicated that SRP significantly reduces handling costs and increases 
in-store productivity, OSA, and product recognition on shelf by shoppers (ECR Europe 2007). 
 
  Retail and In-Store Management 2.5.5
Corsten and Gruen (2003) suggest three areas of focus – process improvement, operational 
accuracy and incentive alignment – to reduce OOS and OS occurrences in store. In terms of 
process improvement, they state that retailers should identify products of variable turnovers 
and focus their efforts on increasing shelf space for fast turnover products to minimise OOS 
situations. Technology in the form of automatic ordering systems, electronic data 
interchange (EDI) and internet and real-time ordering should be embraced to improve 
forecasts and ordering frequency and mitigate the ‘bull-whip’ effect. Retailers should also 
work closely with suppliers to reduce inventory in the supply chain, since high inventory 
levels correlate with higher OOS rates. With lower inventory levels, retailers can improve 
management of their supply chains and have better control of where inventories should be 
maintained. Corsten and Gruen (2003) also point out that streamlining process from 
receiving to the continuous replenishment of shelves with multiple deliveries helps increase 
store productivity and inventory accuracy. 
 
The second area of focus – improving operational accuracy – emphasises embracing 
technology to establish automatic measurement and detection of product availability as well 
as monitoring item turnover rate (Corsten and Gruen 2003). Automatic measurement and 
detection of product availability enables staff to prioritise their in-store activities, while an 
enhanced understanding in item velocity helps provide useful information to design systems 
to trigger replenishment ‘alerts’. Corsten and Gruen (2003) also suggest targeting inventory 
recording, focusing on removing inaccuracy inventory information, such as ‘corrupted’ PoS 
data arising from poor scanning by checkout staff. Placing ‘intelligent tags’ on each stock 
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keeping unit (SKU) was one of the measures suggested to increase inventory control 
accuracy (Corsten and Gruen 2003). 
 
To improve incentive alignment, Corsten and Gruen (2003) suggest that retailers offer 
incentives to store managers so that they embrace an attitude towards achieving OSA by 
ordering adequate inventories and reducing shrinkage. They also suggest that incentives 
should be extended to promote closer collaboration between buyers and store managers, as 
the latter have better knowledge of their customers’ buying behaviour. Understandably, 
buyers’ procurement decisions are based on purchase negotiations, profit margins and 
incentives tied to volume performance but if combined with store managers’ insight on 
customer buying behaviours, stores would be more inclined to adhere closely to their 
company’s intended product offerings (Corsten and Gruen 2003). To improve OSA, retailers 
should therefore factor that objective, i.e. focusing on availability, into the respective roles 
and responsibilities of store staff (Corsten and Gruen 2003).  
 
One specific issue which Corsten and Gruen’s (2003) highlighted was the introduction of 
new technologies to help store managers better manage OSA. They suggest that store 
managers employ technologies (e.g. inventory management systems) to extend the 
capabilities of both themselves and their store staff, also recommending that staffing be 
scheduled and aligned with ‘replenishment peaks and shopper peaks’ (p.614). Finally, for 
incentives to be ‘attractive’ and sustainable, they propose that retailers should engage in a 
paradigm shift towards consistent availability, preaching not just to the store staff but to all 
supply chain partners.  
 
The role of human factors in the execution of in-store processes have also been highlighted 
by a host of OOS studies (Raman et al 2001; Gruen et al 2002; Kotzab and Teller 2005; 
Aastrup and Kotzab 2010; Trautrims et al 2012). While improvements in staff performance in 
the execution of in-store processes can minimise OOS and OS events, management have to 
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take the lead to focus on strategies that address OOS and OS events as well as continuous 
OSA (Gruen et al. 2002; Svensson 2002; ECR Europe 2003; McKinnon et al. 2007; Fernie 
and Grant 2008; Aastrup and Kotzab 2009). Retail managers should use incentives to 
encourage accurate execution of in-store activities and factor in OOS, OS and OSA 
measurements in regular employee appraisals (Svensson 2002; ECR Europe 2003). 
Adequate staffing levels and having a motivated, reliable, ‘store-educated’ workforce could 
improve in-store ordering and replenishment activities, thereby improving store OSA 
performance (Taylor and Fawcett 2001; Aastrup and Kotzab 2009). 
 
Another perspective relating to how staff performance can improve OOS occurrences, OS 
and OSA is process conformance. Ton and Huckman’s (2008) study into the impact of 
employee turnover on performance shows that the degree of process conformance affects 
stores ability to manage their OOS, OS and OSA challenges. Ton and Huckman (2008) 
purport that store performance, measured by profit margin and customer patronage is 
related to employee turnover and affected by management style at the store level. They 
conclude that execution and degree of process conformance to in-store logistical operations 
could increase accuracy in activity performance, thereby improving OSA in stores. 
 
Raman et al.’s (2001) study into execution being the missing link in retail operations shows 
that despite standard information systems and monetary incentive structure being used in 
stores of a retail chain, errors at key in-store processes (e.g. replenishment and sales 
processes at stores and distribution centres, merchandising and inventory management) 
continue to result in incorrect inventory records and misplaced SKUs in stores. In the same 
study, the researchers state that execution problems of processes within the stores and 
distribution centres were extensive amongst the retailers that participated in their 
investigations. In addition, store design, with specific features, such as store size, number of 
back rooms as well as other storage areas influenced the level of effectiveness in the 
execution of processes within the store and distribution centres (Raman et al. 2001), and  
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different store performances varied despite the presence of standard systems and structures 
in the stores. Raman et al. (2001) infer that the main causes of difference in performance 
between stores are attributable to store management and labour. In their study, for example, 
the researchers observed that vendors supplying stocks directly to the stores were more 
careful to ensure correct deliveries versus those supplying stocks to the distribution centres 
because vendors found store managers more stringent in checking inventory receipts 
compared to staff receiving supplies (Raman et al. 2001). In the case of merchandising and 
inventory management, Raman et al.’s investigations revealed that greater variety and store 
inventory results in higher inaccurate inventory records and misplaced SKUs. DeHoratius 
and Raman (2008) contend that these factors create an operating environment that induced 
employees to make mistakes, making process conformance a challenge. In line with this 
observation, Reiner et al.'s (2013) study reveals that inefficiencies occur due to retail 
management's failure to provide a conducive environment to allow logistics activities to meet 
expected store performance. 
 
Another reason supporting Raman et al.’s (2001) argument that store management and 
labour are the main causes of difference in store performance is that many in-store 
processes, such as shelf replenishment, are carried out manually. Store staff (both store 
management and labour) play a crucial role in store performance, especially in the context of 
managing OOS events. Raman and Ton (2008), for instance, examined the impact of 
employee turnover on store performance and found that stores with high process 
conformance, i.e. close adherence to standard operating procedures, are less affected by 
staff turnover than stores with low process conformance. Raman and Ton (2008) reasoned 
that familiarity of task performance resides in the staff and not in standard operating 
procedures. Stores with low process conformance thus experience greater impact with 
employee turnover due to loss of consistency in tasks performance. Raman et al. (2001) 
also found that stores with higher turnover of employees stationed on the display floor area 
recorded more phantom stocks (Ton and Raman 2010). 
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DeHoratius and Raman (2007) point out that store managers are integral to retailing 
operation. Apart from ensuring store performance and maintaining customer service levels 
by generating sales, store managers play a critical role in controlling shrinkage. They found 
that increasing penalties to store managers for shrinkage results, unsurprisingly, in 
increased efforts to prevent shrinkages.  
 
A 2003 study by ECR Europe indicates that improving communications between store 
managers and suppliers on promotional events could improve on-shelf activity and reduce 
OOS occurrences. Retail stores that perform well have efficient supply chains as well as 
close collaborations with channel members to lower both OOS situations and inventories 
(ECR Europe 2003). Gruen and Corsten (2007) state that store managers with intimate 
knowledge of their customers’ demands can provide valuable assistance in demand 
forecasting compared to a central forecasting team. Trautrims et al (2012) draw on Mangan 
and Christopher’s (2005) ‘T-shaped skills profile’ model, arguing that logistics managers 
must not only be well-versed in specific logistics management skills, but also possess a 
comprehensive knowledge of related areas, such as activity-based costing or business 
process engineering. They also suggest that logistics personnel operating within stores 
should be aware of their performance influence on logistical operations outside their stores.  
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 Literature Limitations 2.6
OOS and OS occurrences have been widely found to be caused by execution failures within 
the store environment, in particular in-store logistical processes (Gruen et al. 2002, Corsten 
and Gruen 2003, Gruen and Corsten 2007, McKinnon et al. 2007, Aastrup and Kotzab 2009). 
The main suggestions provided by these studies centre on operational improvement, such 
as use of technology to detect and resolve process failures (Clark 2004; Hausruckinger 2006; 
Andres 2008), incentive alignment, e.g. using incentives to encourage accurate execution of 
in-store activities (Raman et al. 2001; Svensson 2002; Corsten and Gruen 2003; ECR 
Europe 2003), and emphasis on human factors, e.g. training staff to improve data quality 
(Raman et al. 2001; Corsten and Gruen 2003; DeHoratius and Raman 2007; Ton and 
Huckman 2008). These suggestions typically refer to broad areas of focus, offering little or 
no specific activity or operational details on how they should be implemented. For instance, 
Corsten and Gruen (2003) suggest that staff should be trained to improve quality but do not 
go further into which training methods to be used and how often should training (or re-
training) be carried out.  This study will look at strategies and methods used to manage OOS 
and OS occurrences in supermarket stores in Singapore. 
 
Previous studies have investigated different aspects of in-store processes, such as shelf 
space allocation and management (Yang Chen 1999); in-store merchandising and store 
attractiveness (Kucuk 2004); replenishment (Gruen and Corsten 2007) and collaborative 
store ordering (Pramatari and Miliotis 2008), to understand their effects on OOS and OS 
occurrences, and to offer suggestions to minimise OOS and OS and optimise OSA. However, 
these studies were largely fragmentary with little efforts made to link different causes to each 
other. In other words, causes of OOS, OS and OSA were identified independently and there 
were very limited discussions on how causes of the respective events relate to each other. 
As Aastrup and Kotzab (2010) argued, to minimise OOS occurrences, consumer reactions to 
OOS situations, and the root causes of OOS, OS and OSA issues should be jointly 
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discussed. This study explores the factors that cause OOS and OS in supermarket stores 
and examines how supermarket stores deal with OOS and OS events to maintain OSA. 
 
Previous studies have looked into the use of standard operating procedures and process 
conformance to improve the execution of in-store processes (Raman et al. 2001; Fisher et al. 
2006; Ton and Huckman 2008). These studies analysed store-level data, e.g. management 
of store-level SKUs (Raman et al. 2001), stock level in-store (Fisher et al 2006) and store 
level performance (Ton and Huckman 2008), to gain an in-depth understanding of store 
management and store execution of processes. However, these studies analysed OOS 
situations after their occurrence (e.g. ‘Zero-Balance Walk’ (Raman et al. 2001; p.149)) to 
identify OOS items and adjust HQ system inventory levels (Raman et al. 2001)). While 
measures were recommended, e.g. process conformance (Raman et al. 2001) to improve 
store operations and mitigate the negative effects of staff turnover, how these measures 
impacted store execution of in-store logistical processes was not addressed. Another area 
that had limited discussion was the influence of a store’s operating environment upon store 
management. Raman et al. (2001) mentioned that replenishment activities were affected 
during high traffic periods, but did not discuss how in-store processes under different in-store 
operating environments (e.g. high customer traffic versus low customer traffic periods) were 
managed. This thesis will look at when and where OOS and OS occurred in-store as well as 
what actions were taken after their occurrences and whether the actions vary under different 
in-store operating environments. 
 
In summary, managing OOS and OS occurrences at supermarkets is challenging because 
OOS and OS causes could stem from a range of factors that have different impacts on 
different stores, even within a single supermarket chain. Despite having standardised 
operating procedures and monetary incentives, internal factors, such as headquarters and 
senior store management’s lack of focus on OOS and OS occurrences, execution failures, 
staff performance, staff interactions with store systems, extent of customer service and in-
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store operating environment, and external factors, such as intensity of competition, can 
cause considerable performance variation. It is therefore the intention of this study to 
understand how stores of a single supermarket chain manage OOS and OS occurrences in 
the context of Singapore, where there is intense competition (Food Export Association of the 
Midwest USA 2013). 
 
  
55 
 
Chapter 3 Methodology 
There are two dominant approaches in business research: the qualitative approach and the 
quantitative approach (Yin 2009; Eisenhardt 1989; 1991; McCarthy and Golicic 2005; 
Gimenez 2005). Determining which method is suitable is dependent upon three 
circumstances: ‘(a) the research questions posed, (b) the extent of control the investigator 
has over actual behavioural events and (c) the degree of focus on contemporary as opposed 
to historical events’ (Yin 2009, p.8). Saunders et al. (2003) add that the mining of data and 
subsequent methods of analysis distinguish the type of research approach necessary to 
address the research questions. 
 
Quantitative research is suited to studies where questions of ‘what’ and ‘how many’ are to be 
addressed (Fernie and Grant 2008; Trautrims et al. 2009; Campo et al. 2004). It is adopted 
where the event needs to be identified and the frequency of the occurrences of this event is 
required for predictive purposes (Yin, 2009; Hammersley 2012). In contrast, qualitative 
research is suited to research studies aimed at understanding contemporary, ‘real world’ 
happenings (Miles and Huberman 1994; Yin 2009; Ghauri and Grønhaug, 2005; 
Hammersley 2012). Hammersley (2012) defined qualitative research as ‘a form of inquiry 
that tends to adopt a flexible and data-driven research design, to use relatively unstructured 
data, to emphasize the essential role of subjectivity in the research process, to study a small 
number of naturally occurring cases in detail, and to use verbal rather than statistical forms 
of analysis’ (p.12). The common methods used for data collection in qualitative research 
include unobtrusive and participant observations, analysis of archival records and open, as 
well as semi-structured, interviews (Miles and Huberman 1994; Yin 2009; Ghauri and 
Grønhaug, 2005; Hammersley 2012).  
 
Circumstances leading to OOS and OS occurrences are highly complex. OOS and OS 
situations can occur due to myriad factors, including the level of sophistication of the 
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distribution systems (Hausruckinger 2006), the distribution channels used (Kucuk 2004), 
store formats and product category roles (Campo et al. 2000), performance of suppliers 
(Kotzab and Teller 2005), in-store operations processes (Corsten and Gruen 2003), degree 
of process conformance (Fisher et al. 2006; Ton and Huckman 2008), store management 
and staff turnover (Ton and Huckman 2008). The complex interactions of these factors 
warranted the use of an interpretivist, inductive, qualitative approach to examine how in-
store logistical processes were managed to minimise OOS occurrences in supermarket 
stores. To obtain ‘actual’ accounts of the mitigation measures employed and the manner in 
which they were implemented in the selected supermarket stores, semi-structured interviews 
and unobtrusive observations were used in this study.  
 
This chapter presents the qualitative case study methodology adopted in this study, 
beginning with a discussion, in Section 3.1, on how the research design was determined. 
This is followed by a discussion on how the case supermarket was selected and on the 
methods used to collect data for this study in Sections 3.2 and 3.3 respectively. The 
approach in which the data was analysed is presented in Section 3.4. 
 
 Research Design 3.1
Following Saunders et al.’s (2003) ‘The research process onion’ (see Figure 3-1), this study 
adopted interpretivism as its research philosophy. Interpretivism philosophy is common in 
psychological research where it is usually related to the importance of interpreting human 
behaviour (Bakker 2010). Studies into social phenomena require an understanding of social 
environments where humans’ everyday activities are interpreted to make sense of their 
actions (Blaike 2004). As such, the main objective of interpretivist research is to figure out 
the meaning of human actions, which are influenced by social roles and the context within 
which these social actions take place (Saunders et al., 2003). In social sciences, 
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interpretation of subtleties of human interactions and actions via case studies is a common 
research approach (Bakker 2010).  
 
Figure 3-1 ‘The research process onion’, adapted from Saunders et al. 2003 (p.83) 
 
The interpretivist approach is commonly adopted to explore phenomena that occur in 
complex and unique environments (Saunders et al. 2003). Supermarkets operate in a 
complex and competitive market environment, striving to achieve optimum OSA of an 
extensive range of products and services at the lowest possible price (Anand, 2009). 
Maintaining OSA is a challenge due to operational issues that could emerge from inside the 
stores, such as inaccurate planning of in-store activities (Gruen and Corsten 2003; Fernie 
and Grant 2008; ECR Europe 2003), as well as from issues arising from outside the store, 
such as inaccurate deliveries due to inaccurate inventory information at manufacturers and 
suppliers (ECR Europe, 2003; Kotzab and Teller, 2005). This study used the interpretivist 
approach to explore how social actions, manifested through operational processes at 
supermarket stores, were implemented in a complex (supermarket) environment to deal with 
issues surrounding the occurrences of OOS and OS events.  
 
Interpretivism is usually associated with the inductive approach, where the aim is to 
understand the case scenario from which to extract theories (Saunders et al. 2003). 
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Inductive research is commonly used when little is known about the topic (Yin 2009; 
Eisenhardt 1989), and when the context where the phenomenon had occurred is considered 
a factor in the study (Saunders et al. 2003). The adoption of the inductive approach led to 
the use of semi-structured interviews and on-site observations as its primary modes of data 
collection (Saunders et al, 2003). 
 
This research adopted the case study approach to explore why and how OOS and OS 
occurrences were managed in supermarket stores. Unlike laboratory experiments that 
isolate phenomena from context, case studies emphasise the rich, real-life context in which 
the phenomena emerge (Voss et al. 2002; Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007). The episodic 
occurrences of OOS and OS in supermarket stores and their management are complex 
phenomena that require the support of rich stories to develop theoretical propositions. Case 
studies utilise a variety of data sources, including interviews, observations and archival 
records (Eisenhardt 1989), which are very effective in capturing rich, empirical data 
(Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007). Voss, Tsikriktsis and Frohlich (2002) noted that the case 
study approach has been increasing as a significant research method in operations 
management as the nature of operations evolve due to intense changes in technology and 
emerging managerial strategies. Ellram (1996) confirmed that case studies were most 
effective in exploring how organisations address challenges related to supply chain 
management. 
 
Two options were considered when designing this study. The first was to conduct a multiple 
case study of selected stores within two different supermarket chains as a means to 
compare and contrast their OOS and OS management practices. The second was to 
conduct a case study of all stores within one supermarket chain to examine between-store 
similarities and differences. The first option posed two challenges: determining how many 
stores and how best to sample a sub-set of stores to serve as cases from each of the two 
supermarket chains; and the relative difficulty of getting agreement from two supermarkets to 
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participate in the study, compared to getting only one to participate. While both challenges 
were not insurmountable, the sampling of stores from two supermarket chains could prove 
problematic. Being a qualitative study, the sampling should not be based on random 
sampling (Saunders et al. 2003). Rather, it should be purposive sampling (Saunders et al. 
2003). One of the objectives of the research was to explore why some stores within the 
same chain were better able to manage their OOS issues while others might be less capable, 
given that both were expected to have the same chain-wide operations procedures to follow. 
Without any knowledge on the performance of the individual stores pre-interview, sampling 
of stores based on effectiveness of OOS management strategies used could prove tricky. 
 
The second option also had its own set of issues. One of these was that only one 
supermarket chain would be investigated, which might be limited in offering replication logic 
as part of cross-case comparison. The argument against this limitation was that the second 
option may involve only a single supermarket chain; the stores within the supermarket chain 
were the units of analysis. In this sense, it was a single case study with multiple embedded 
units of analysis. The individual stores were multiple cases, similar to distinct experiments 
that offer replications, contrasts, and extensions to emerging principles (Yin 2009).   
 
A further issue with the second option was that the number of stores involved could go as 
high as 97 (i.e. the number of stores which one of the five big supermarket chains in 
Singapore had at the time of data collection), depending on which supermarket chain 
eventually agreed to participate. Weighing all the issues that beset both options, the decision 
was made to go with the second option, though the number of stores to investigate might 
turn out to be more than in the case of the first option. Besides, confining the study to stores 
of the same supermarket chain had the advantage of ‘constancy’, as all the stores were, 
presumably, subject to the same chain-wide standardised operating procedures (also known 
as General Standard Operating Procedures (GSOP)) and business policies. Holding such 
factors like product assortments, staff training and other in-store processes constant would 
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also allow attention be directed to examining differences in management approaches toward 
process conformance and to the manner in which chain-wide operations procedures were 
implemented. It is noteworthy to point out that Ton and Huckman (2008) also opted to study 
stores of the same chain in their study of the impact of employee turnover on process 
conformance, arguing that this method had the benefit of examining ‘longitudinal 
observations of stock level performance across sites that are owned and operated by the 
same parent company’ (p.57).  Raman et al. (2001) also argued that differences in 
processes and performance at different stores within the same retail chain could enhance 
understanding on how execution could be improved. 
 
 Case Selection 3.2
 Context 3.2.1
The context for this study was supermarkets in Singapore. Singapore’s food and retailing 
industry consists of around 3,000 retail stores of various formats (see Figure 3-2 and Figure 
3-3): supermarkets, hypermarkets, departmental stores, convenience outlets and provisional 
shops (USDA Foreign Agricultural Service 2012). There are also around 1300 other 
specialty food and drinks retail outlets that are part of the food and retailing industry (USDA 
Foreign Agricultural Service 2012). There used to be five key players (see Figure 3-4) in the 
Mass Grocery Retail industry in Singapore: NTUC FairPrice (locally owned), Dairy Farm 
International (from Hong Kong), Sheng Siong Supermarkets (locally owned) and Carrefour 
(from France) (USDA Foreign Agricultural Service 2012). Four of the main players (NTUC, 
Cold Storage, Shop n Save and Sheng Siong) had a total of over 650 outlets of various 
formats among them. Carrefour used to (only) operate hypermarkets in Singapore and shut 
down operations in Singapore at the end of 2012 (Singapore Business Review 2012). Shop 
n Save was rebranded as Giant stores by Dairy Farm International in April 2013 (Kham 2013) 
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Figure 3-2 Percentage breakdown of retail stores based on coverage in Singapore (Source: USDA 
Agricultural Service 2010, p.10) 
 
 
Figure 3-3 Estimated market shares in the food retail market coverage in Singapore (Source: USDA 
Agricultural Service 2010, p.11) 
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Figure 3-4 Annual sales in US$ of major supermarket retailers in Singapore (Source: USDA 
Agricultural Service 2012)  
*subsidiaries of Dairy Farm International 
 
Other than the four major grocery chains, there are other smaller grocery and food and drink 
outlets (which also retail a limited range of fast-moving groceries), totalling around 800 
stores island-wide. With a small land size, geographical distances between retailers, 
suppliers and competitor supermarkets are therefore relatively short, suggesting that the 
retail grocery market in Singapore is a keenly contested one. 
 
 Supermarket Chain 3.2.2
All five major supermarket chains were invited to participate in the study, with the hope that 
at least one would accept the invitation. After several rounds of contact and persuasion it 
became apparent that three supermarket chains would not be participating, though there 
was no formal refusal. One particular supermarket chain was very forthcoming and gave 
high-level access to all its store outlets. With such an unusual opportunity of access (Yin, 
1994; Eisenhardt 1989), this case supermarket became the selected case by default. 
* 
* 
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Another attractive feature of the case supermarket was that it had 23 stores in total, which 
was a manageable size for purposes of data collection and analysis. 
 
 The Case Supermarket Chain 3.2.3
For confidentiality reasons, the case supermarket chain will be called ‘FS’ in this thesis. The 
case supermarket chain was one of the five (5) main players in Singapore’s Mass Retail 
Grocery industry (USDA Foreign Agricultural Service 2012). FS was a very progressive 
company, investing heavily in technology and industry best practices. The company adopted 
a three-fold strategy – (1) retaining customers through competitive pricing; (2) expanding 
business to gain advantage from scale economies; and (3) keeping abreast with creative 
technologies and distribution infrastructure to keep pace with industry best practices (FS’s 
corporate website 2010; Business Monitor International 2010).  
 
FS operated 23 outlets (22 supermarkets and one hypermarket). Their stores were scattered 
throughout the five Planning regions5 of Singapore – North, North-East, West, East and 
Central (see Figure 3-5): four in the North of Singapore, seven in the West, three in the 
South, seven in the East and two at the Central part of Singapore. All 23 FS’s stores 
participated in the study. 
 
Figure 3-5 URA Draft Master Plan 2008 presented in five regions of Singapore (Chye 2008) 
 
                                               
5 Singapore is demarcated by the Urban Redevelopment Authority of Singapore to facilitate urban planning 
efforts (Urban Redevelopment Authority 2012) 
64 
 
FS segmented its stores into three categories based on store size and the SKUs carried. 
Category A stores were sized between 25,000 square meters (sqm) and 45,000 sqm and 
offered 16,000 to 30,000 SKUs. There were five stores under this category and each had 
more than one level (floor) of operations, equipped with back storage rooms (also referred to 
as back rooms). Four out of five stores from Category A had designated loading/unloading 
areas.  
 
Category B stores were sized between 10,000 sqm to 33,000 sqm and offered 6,000 to 
20,000 SKUs. Some Category B stores were single-storied and equipped with small back 
rooms. Six out of seven stores from Category B had designated loading/unloading areas.  
 
Category C stores were of size ranging from 4,000 sqm to 9,000 sqm and offered 3,000 to 
12,000 SKUs. They were normally located in densely populated, old housing estates and the 
majority of them had very small back storage rooms. Only one out of seven stores from 
Category C had designated loading/unloading areas.  
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 Data Collection 3.3
 Sources of Information 3.3.1
Multiple methods were used in this investigation to collect data and obtain rich information 
for within and cross analysis as well as to facilitate triangulation of collected evidence 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Stake 2003). Primary data was obtained through face-to-face interviews 
and on-site field observations. Secondary data was obtained from research and trade 
publications as well as FS’s annual reports and websites. A number of industrial websites 
(e.g. Business Monitor International, Datamonitor Plc., USDA Foreign Agricultural Service 
and Food Export Association of the Midwest USA) containing information on the food and 
retailing industry of Singapore were also consulted. 
 
Primary Data – Face-to-Face Interviews 
Semi-structured, face-to-face interviews were conducted at the store and Head Office of FS 
Supermarket to collect data on how the case supermarket chain operated and how its store 
outlets managed both OOS and OS situations. Interview questions were designed to obtain 
information to find out how FS outlets managed their inventory with a specific focus on OOS 
and OS prevention. The interview questions delved into areas including inventory 
management, stores’ relationship with their Head Office warehouse, stores’ relationship with 
suppliers, manufacturers, producers and trading companies, OOS and OS occurrences in 
stores, and stores’ ordering policies (refer to Appendix 3.1 for the Interview Protocol used).  
 
The first interview was conducted at the case supermarket chain’s Head Office with its 
Managing Director (MD). The interview was conducted in both Mandarin and English in the 
presence of the MD’s secretary. Whenever the MD expressed business terms in Mandarin, 
his secretary would help to translate them into English. The interview session lasted over 
two and a half hours and questions concerning FS’s business strategies and store 
operations dominated the interview. Questions on how FS managed its warehouse 
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processes to support all the stores were also posed. The MD was very open with his 
responses and revealed how the company’s philosophy and culture influenced business 
strategies, distribution operations, store operations, employee welfare and, in turn, how 
these business strategies influenced in-store logistical operations.  
 
The second interview was conducted in the same location with the MD. At the beginning of 
the interview, a transcript of the previous interview was reviewed to ensure validity and 
accuracy of the responses in that they had been accurately translated and transcribed 
(Kvale and Brinkmann 2009). The interview questions in the second session focused 
primarily on in-store logistical operations. Again, the MD was very open with his responses 
and he showed and discussed a recent consultancy report which benchmarked FS with the 
other main Mass Retail Grocery industry players in Singapore. The MD also showed 
documentation used at the stores, such as receipt orders of fresh meat, vegetables and 
fresh seafood, to explain their inventory management processes. Sections of the interviews 
(both first and second) with the MD that were unclear were sent back to him for clarification. 
To ensure prompt responses, long distance telephone calls (i.e. from Melbourne to 
Singapore) were made a few days after posting the interview transcripts. 
 
Store managers were the original target persons for the semi-structured interviews at FS’s 
stores. However, when the store manager was unavailable (e.g. on annual leave or on sick 
leave or at a meeting with HQ), another senior member in the store management team (e.g. 
store assistant managers, acting assistant managers, store executives or store supervisors) 
would be interviewed. All interviews were conducted at the store premises during store 
opening hours. The length of each interview ranged from one and a half to two and a half 
hours. The interview questions focused on obtaining insights on in-store logistical operations 
as well as the management of relationships with HQ and suppliers. The manner in which 
OOS and OS occurrences were managed using GSOPs and SSOPs dominated the 
discussion. The interviewees were generally enthusiastic about sharing their in-store 
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logistical operational challenges and how they managed OOS and OS occurrences in their 
stores. 
Table 3-1 lists the organisational positions of the interviewees at the 23 stores. At one of the 
stores, the HQ’s Assistant General Manager (AGM) was having a meeting with the store 
manager at the time of the scheduled interview. The AGM volunteered to participate in the 
store interview. Therefore, at store E-4-A, the AGM and its store manager jointly participated 
in the interview.  
 
Table 3-1 Organisational positions of interviewees at the 23 stores  
Store ID Organisational Positions 
E-4-A AGM and Manager  
E-5-B Manager and Acting Assistant Manager 
E-1-B Manager and Supervisor 
N-1-C Manager and Assistance Executive 
W-5-C Acting Manager and Acting Assistant Manager 
E-2-B, E-7-BC, W-6-B, W-7-B Manager  
S-2-A, E-3-B, C-1-C, C-2-C Assistant Manager 
N-3-A Acting Manager 
N-2-A, N-4-C, E-6-B Acting Assistant Manager 
W-4-A Executive 
S-3-C Assistant Executive 
S-1-C, W-1-C, W-2-B, W-3-C Supervisor 
 
Primary Data – On-site Field Observations 
In addition to the semi-structured interviews, on-site observations were conducted at the 
stores in the form of a guided tour to obtain information that could not be covered via 
interviews (Veal 2005; Yin 2009). These on-site observations, which were conducted post-
interviews, also enabled ‘directness’ (Robson 1997, p.310), i.e. ‘real life’ happenings in the 
‘real world’ (Robson 1997, p.310), to be observed. Observation is a method commonly used 
in qualitative research to find out what is going on in a scenario (Robson 2002).  
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Guided tours around and inside the stores were conducted by store managers, to observe 
in-store logistical operations ‘in action’, such as receiving of goods, on-shelf replenishments 
from different storage locations and the management of returns and damaged goods. The 
guided tours lasted around two hours on average and provided opportunities to obtain 
additional information which could not be covered in interviews (Yin 2009). The guided tours 
provided insights on an extensive array of activities occurring at the receiving dock, the store 
aisles and back storage room. These activities not only helped clarfiy many aspects of the 
in-store operations described by the interviewees but also provided exceptionally rich 
operational information not achievable through interviews (Voss et al. 2002; van Donselaar 
et al. 2007).  
 
The guided tours were in the form of a walkabout at each store with the store managers 
providing an introductory briefing about store operations and stocking processes. During the 
walkabouts, observations on all aspects of in-store processes were noted: receiving (from 
HQ as well as suppliers of fresh foods, such as confectionery, fruits and vegetables, fresh 
meat, seafood and live seafood), on-shelf replenishment (from receiving to shelves, from 
suppliers of chilled foods, from shelf tops to display shelves, from back room onto display 
shelves), management of promotional stock, back room logistics, inventory checks via 
physical walkabouts, store order placements process, store staff interactions and 
collaborations with chilled foods, fresh meat and seafood suppliers. Staff performing value-
adding services (VAS), such as repackaging of fresh fruits, vegetables, fresh meat and 
seafood, were also observed. In most instances, the store manager would ask that we 
proceed to either a quiet aisle within the store, or a quiet area outside the store, to continue 
the interview. This would allow the store manager to continue to monitor store operations 
during the interview. Additional guided tours to specific in-store areas were also conducted 
after the interviews, to clarify issues discussed during the on-site observations. For example, 
after interviewing with store manager of E-A-4, we returned to the returns processing station 
to seek further clarification on processes occurring at that specific station. 
69 
 
Secondary Data 
Secondary information about the case supermarket chain was obtained from FS’s corporate 
website, investment reports from Singapore banks, websites of national newspapers and 
industry-related reports prepared by international research companies.  
 
FS’s corporate website provided much of the information about the company background, 
including its history, financial data, distribution networks, product assortments, product 
promotions and store formats. Investment reports from leading banks provided FS’s 
investment portfolio, balance sheet, sizes of each store and development of the business. 
National newspapers provided information about certain stores’ changes, such as 
refurbishment into new store layout, unique product assortment of certain stores and 
supermarket chain competition in general. Industry-related reports prepared by international 
research companies, such as Euromonitor International and Business Monitor International 
Ltd, provided relevant statistics on the retail industry in Singapore as well as the recognition 
of FS in Singapore’s Mass Grocery Retail Industry. 
 
  
70 
 
 Data Analysis 3.4
 Data Analysis Framework 3.4.1
This study aimed to explore the mitigation measures adopted by FS’s stores to manage the 
occurrences of OOS and OS, focusing on the way those measures were implemented, the 
circumstances surrounding their selection and implementation, and the relative effectiveness 
of the approaches employed to implement the measures. Because of the complexity of the 
information involved with OOS occurrences store-wide as well as the number of stores 
investigated (23 in all), two issues confronted the data analysis. The first was how to parcel 
up the data so that the information could be systematically dealt with across all stores. The 
second was how to present the rich information on management of OOS and OS 
occurrences for all stores in a simple, yet comprehensive manner without engaging in 
repetitive discourse. 
 
To address the first issue, Kotzab and Teller’s (2005) grocery retail in-store logistics model 
(see Figure 3-6), which depicts activity flow in a supermarket, was used as a framework to 
systematically summarise the main causes of OOS and OS occurrences at different sections 
of the stores, together with the management strategies adopted by the store in each of the 
sections. By summarising the flow of in-store logistics activities of all FS’s stores in a similar 
manner, the relationships between these activities in different parts of the stores could be 
readily perceived. Additionally, the complexities surrounding the occurrence and 
management of OOS and OS situations in-store were also simplified. It is noteworthy to 
mention that Kotzab and Teller’s (2005) model was empirically validated in a study on in-
store logistics processes of dairy products in 200 stores in the Austrian grocery retail 
industry.  
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Figure 3-6 A grocery retail in-store logistics model (Kotzab and Teller 2005, p.597) 
 
The second issue was resolved by dividing all the FS stores into three groups based on the 
extent of their OOS occurrences. In the semi-structured interviews with store managers, all 
stores were asked to give an estimate of the ‘extent of OOS occurrences’, based on either 
the estimated value of sales lost attributable to an OOS situation or the number of items (as 
a percent of all shelved items) where an OOS label had to be put on the shelf to inform 
customers in a day. Of the 23 stores surveyed, four did not provide any information relating 
to either piece of information, despite repeated reminders. The typical responses were: “We 
are too busy and haven’t got the time to check the information” or “We did not have records 
of that information.” Of the 19 that provided information on the extent of OOS occurrences, 
all gave data in terms of the estimated monetary value of sales lost attributable to OOS 
occurrences in 2010. Four of these 19 stores further offered an estimate of the number of 
items (as a percent of all shelved items) where an OOS label had to be put on the shelves in 
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a day to inform customers. This latter information was referred to as the store’s estimate of 
‘the percentage of times an OOS situation occurred.’ 
 
Using the given information on OOS occurrences, the ‘extent of OOS occurrences’ was 
computed in terms of monetary value of lost sales attributable to OOS occurrences as a 
percentage of the monetary value of total SKUs in the store. The computation procedure for 
estimating the extent of OOS occurrences in each of the 19 stores is presented in Appendix 
B. Because four of the 19 stores also provided an estimate of the ‘percentage of times an 
OOS situation occurred’, the computed ‘extent of OOS occurrences’ was cross-checked with 
the store estimated figure. Table 3-2 shows that the computed percentage corroborated well 
with the estimated figures given by the store, which, indirectly, validated the computed 
figures. 
 
Table 3-2 Comparison of store-estimated OOS occurrences and computed ‘Extent of OOS     
                 Occurrences’ 
Store Store Estimated OOS Occurrences (%) 
Computed ‘Extent of OOS Occurrences’ as 
per Appendix B (%) 
N-3-A 2-3% 3.11% 
E-1-B About 20% 18.70% 
E-5-B About 1 % 0.83% 
W-6-B About 4% 6.32% 
 
The computed ‘extent of OOS occurrences’ ranges from 0.2% to 18.7%, with a mean value 
of 3.8% and a median value of 2.4%. In reviewing the plot of these occurrences (see Figure 
3-7), it was decided to divide the 19 stores into three groups: low OOS occurrence, medium 
OOS occurrence and high OOS occurrence. The ‘extent of OOS occurrences’ thresholds for 
dividing the three groups were < 2%, 2% - 4%, and >4%, which were arrived at after 
examining the characteristics of the stores with OOS occurrences between 1.5% and 2.5% 
(i.e. stores E-6-B, W-5-C, W-4-A and W-3-C) and between 3.0% and 5.5% (i.e. stores N-3-A, 
N-4-C, W-7-B, S-2-A and S-3-C). The number of stores in the three groups, low, medium 
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and high, was respectively, 8, 4, and 7. Only the 19 stores which could be classified 
according to their ‘extent of OOS occurrences’ were used in this study. 
 
 
Figure 3-7 Extent of OOS occurrences by store 
 
 
 Within-Group Analysis 3.4.2
Within-group analysis focused on examining operations of the three groups of FS stores. 
First, the operational characteristics of the stores in each of the three groups were examined 
closely to understand the manner in which in-store logistical activities were carried out. This 
was followed by plotting the stated causes (by store managers) onto Kotzab and Teller’s 
(2005) model to locate the occurrences of OOS and OS at various stages of the in-store 
logistical process and to get a sense of where the causes occurred within the stores of the 
three groups.  
 
The manner in which FS’s GSOPs and SSOPs were implemented to manage each of the 
causes of OOS and OS occurrences was next examined, including the steps taken when 
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processes stipulated by the GSOPs and SSOPs were not adhered to. The stages where 
GSOPs and SSOPs were implemented were also plotted onto the stages of in-store 
logistical processes, as displayed in Kotzab and Teller’s (2005) model. The GSOPs and 
SSOPs were then grouped into three stages to indicate how they were implemented: before, 
during and after the occurrences of OOS and OS. This was followed by looking at how 
stores from the three groups managed the occurrences of OOS and OS in their respective 
stores. Examination of these factors provided an understanding into the extent of their 
impact on in-store logistical operations.  
 
From the interviews, there were indications that store managers were rather influential in 
deciding how OOS and OS occurrences were managed, despite the presence of GSOPs 
and SSOPs. Therefore, in the three groups of stores, store managers’ influence on the range 
of products to be retailed and on store operations were examined. Based on store managers’ 
accounts of parties responsible for causing OOS and OS occurrences, four main parties 
were identified: store staff, HQ, suppliers and customers. Stores’ relations with these four 
main parties were subsequently examined to understand how they were engaged in the 
management of OOS and OS occurrences. Preliminary findings on similarities and 
differences in management of OOS and OS occurrences in the stores provided guidance to 
the next step of the study: cross-group analysis. 
 
 Cross-Group Analysis 3.4.3
Cross-group analysis is where polar types (e.g. stores with Low Incidence of OOS and OS 
versus stores with Medium and High Incidences of OOS and OS) are analysed to identify 
similarities and differences in OOS and OS management (Eisenhardt 1989; Miles 1994; 
Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007).  According to Eisenhardt (1989), cross-case analysis 
compels investigations to drive down initial findings to unearth findings from different 
perspectives. In this study, cross-group analysis was used to establish possible reasons on 
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why, despite the implementation of GSOPs and SSOPs, the performance outcomes of OOS 
and OS management differed amongst stores.  
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 Validity Issues 3.5
Establishing validity is a key concern of case study research (Yin, 2009). This study 
employed a number of strategies to ensure the following validity issues were dealt with at 
both the data collection and analysis stages (see Table 3-3): 
 
Table 3-3 Validity of study and findings 
Test Case Study Tactic1 Phase of Research in Which Tactic Occurs 
Construct Validity 
• Use multiple source of evidence. 
• Establish chain of evidence. 
 
 
 
• Have key informants review draft 
of case study findings. 
• Interviews and on-site field 
observations at all 23 stores. 
• Field notes from on-site field 
observations and critical event 
records to supplement interviews. 
• Transcript of interviews with MD 
verified by MD. Verbal summary of 
key case findings reviewed by 
interviewees. 
Internal Validity 
• Use pattern matching. 
• Build explanation. 
• Address rival explanations. 
• Engage logic models. 
• Matched key concepts developed 
from MD interviews with those 
identified at interviews with store 
management team. 
• Cross-referenced emergent OOS & 
OS management constructs with 
extant literature. 
External Validity • Use replication logic in multiple case studies. 
• Used same interview protocol for 
all 23 stores. 
Reliability • Use case study protocol. • Used same interview protocol for all 23 stores. 
Source: 1. Based on Yin (2003, p.35) 
 
 Construct Validity 3.5.1
Construct validity ensures that adequate and effective means have been established for the 
concepts being studies (Yin 2009). This study established construct validity by using multiple 
methods of data collection. Face-to-face interviews and unobtrusive, on-site field 
observations were used to collect rich data on in-store operations and OOS and OS 
management. Interview transcripts and interpretations of key findings were communicated to 
interviewees. Guided tours of HQ warehouses and all 23 stores post-interview allowed 
additional opportunities to clarify unclear areas (Silverman 2001; Yin 2009). 
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 Internal Validity 3.5.2
Internal validity is where causal relationships are identified and explained (Miles and 
Huberman 1994; Yin 2009). It is typically addressed using open coding of interviews 
(Strauss and Corbin 1998; Charmaz 2006) and thematic analysis of coded results to identify 
key themes, which then lead to pattern-matching (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill 2003; Veal 
2005; Yin 2009; Joffe 2011). Here, this method was adopted to illustrate which themes were 
significant in the description of phenomena being investigated. In this study, the information 
for each store within each of the three OOS-occurrence groups was analysed systematically 
using Kotzab and Teller’s (2005) model to identify a set of OOS management concepts, 
which were then compared with those of other stores in the grocery chain. Similarities and 
differences across the stores and across the three groups were also identified and cross-
validated with findings from extant literature to ensure internal validity. 
 
 External Validity 3.5.3
The intention to generalise findings is the main objective of external validity, i.e. the ability to 
apply findings in contexts dissimilar to the studied context (Ghauri and Grønhaug 2005; Veal 
2005; Yin 2009). In this research, which used a case study approach, the intention was not 
to generalise the findings in relation to other similar contexts but to contribute towards 
building new theories.  
 
According to Yin (2009), ‘analytic generalization’ (p.38) can be established in multiple case 
studies using replication logic. Analytic generalization refers to a situation where a previously 
identified pattern is matched with empirical findings of the case study (Yin 2009). Replication 
logic may be claimed when ‘two or more cases are shown to support the same theory but do 
not support an equally plausible, rival theory’ (Yin 2009, p.39). In this study, replication logic 
was established by comparing the OOS management practices of the stores both within and 
between each of the three groups.  
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 Reliability 3.5.4
Reliability tests look at the repeatability of the investigation process (Voss et al. 2002; Veal 
2005; Yin 2009). In addition, the main objectives of reliability are to minimise 
misunderstandings and predispositions (Yin 2009). In this study, information reliability was 
achieved via the use of a standard interview protocol, secondary data and on-site guided 
tours ‘to record observations consistently’ (Neuman 2003 p184). The standard interview 
protocol was used in the interview process with senior management of all 23 stores within 
the supermarket chain. Secondary data on case supermarket chain was collected from case 
supermarket chain’s corporate website, industry-related reports prepared by international 
research companies, websites of national newspapers and investment reports from leading 
banks in Singapore. On-site guided tours on all aspects of in-store processes of the 23 
stores were also noted.  Convergence of evidence from multiple sources of evidence led to 
the creation of a case study database (Yin 2009) post-interview in the form of a large Excel 
spread sheet of thirty-one pages, complete with photos illustration. In addition, data collected 
went through several rounds of analysis and discussions with primary PhD supervisor to 
'minimise errors and biases in the study' (Yin 2009). 
 
 Conclusion 3.5.5
This study is a qualitative research into stores of a single supermarket chain to explore both 
how and why OOS and OS occur. The stores of the case supermarket were studied to 
understand how they managed OOS and OS occurrences in the context of Singapore where 
the country’s national business culture is well-known for its stringent management towards 
excellence in business. As this is a single case study in a specific context, the study aims to 
achieve “analytic generalization’ (Yin 2009; p. 15) towards theory building in the area of OOS, 
OS and OSA. In addition, the study provides implications relevant to theory building and 
management practices in the contexts of OOS, OS and OSA.  
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Chapter 4 Findings and Analysis 
This chapter presents the case findings. The focus is on the manner in which the three 
groups of stores, i.e. stores with low, medium, and high OOS and OS occurrences, managed 
their in-store OOS and OS situations. All three groups of stores were from the same 
supermarket chain and shared many common operational characteristics, including the 
general standard operation procedures (GSOP) prescribed by the headquarters (HQ), which 
all stores are expected to follow. These common operations characteristics provide a 
backdrop against which differences in OOS and OS management can be readily discerned. 
For these reasons, this chapter is organised into five sections, beginning with an overview of 
the chain-wide operations characteristics in Section 4.1. This is followed by a discussion of 
the major common factors that could result in OOS and OS occurrences in-store in Section 
4.2. These common factors include those external to the individual stores, such as picking 
and delivery errors made by HQ; errors occurring in stores due to their physical location and 
store layout; errors inherent in the legacy data capturing systems of the chain and issues 
relating to the use of barcoding; and errors due to supplier’s negligence. The remaining three 
sections (Sections 4.3 to 4.5) are devoted to describing the range of OOS and OS 
management approaches employed by the three groups of stores. The presentation 
highlights the distinctive features of the approaches employed by the three groups, and 
culminates in a summary discussion that pinpoints the key differences between their OOS 
and OS management styles. 
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 FS’s Operational Characteristics  4.1
 Overview 4.1.1
Operating in an intensely competitive environment (USDA Foreign Agricultural Service 2012), 
FS’s in-store logistics activities were designed with a view that ‘customers are boss’. FS 
regarded achieving reliable OSA as an important key performance indicator for all its stores. 
To meet its customer-centric operational goal, FS employed a range of technologies, 
including bar coding and radio frequency hand-held scanning systems or personal digital 
assistants (PDAs) (see Figure 4-1) for its receiving, ordering and inventory management 
functions; point-of-sale (PoS) system at its checkout stations; and electronic pricing display 
units (see Figure 4-2) for its shelved items.  
 
 
Figure 4-1 Hand-held PDAs used for in-store ordering 
 
Figure 4-2 Visual Display Units (VDUs) 
 
The chain had a central warehouse of 9,300 sqm equipped with a limited two-level racking 
system. The majority of the stocks were block-stacked due to high turnover. About 70% of 
the suppliers delivered directly to the individual stores, while the remaining 30% delivered to 
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the central warehouse. The warehouse had twice-daily despatches to all stores. At the time 
of the semi-structured interviews, FS was building a new warehouse, five times larger than 
the existing central warehouse. Once completed, daily despatches would increase to five 
times daily, thus reducing the need for storage space at individual stores. 
 
To encourage store staff to maintain reliable OSA, the HQ of FS offered continuous staff 
training and development for all its store employees. The training was intended to equip its 
store employees with the requisite skills to manage OSA as an important element in their 
daily work responsibilities. Outstanding performance was rewarded in the form of bonuses 
and internal promotions. Poor performance, on the other hand, resulted in verbal warnings, 
followed by letters of disciplinary actions.  
 
FS practised a culture of quality supplier relationship management to foster a high level of 
trust with its suppliers, and took steps to ensure that its suppliers would obtain complete and 
timely payments. In return, FS expected its suppliers to deliver as per agreement. To 
minimise the likelihood of service failures, FS imposed monetary penalties of S$100-S$300 
per occurrence on suppliers with persistent service failures. 
 
FS’s HQ established general standard operating procedures (GSOPs) to assist individual 
stores to manage OOS and OS occurrences. These GSOPs included procedures on 
receiving, ordering, replenishment, supplier management and basic level of customer 
service. Without exception, all the stores had customised some GSOPs to fit their own 
operating environments and to cover localised operational concerns that led to occurrences 
of OOS and OS. For instance, FS’s GSOP stated that receiving staff was to key to hand-held 
PDA of any shipment anomalies. This procedure could be executed if the store had a 
designated loading and unloading area (see Figure 4-3). However, the procedure could not 
be adhered to for stores with mobile loading and unloading areas (see Figure 4-4). 
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Figure 4-3 An example of a designated loading/unloading area 
 
Figure 4-4 An example of a mobile loading/unloading area 
 
FS’s in-store processes, from planning, to ordering, receiving, replenishment and returns, 
will be discussed in the next five sub-sections. 
 
 In-Store Process 4.1.2
In FS’s stores, in-store planning activities included product planning, inventory ordering, 
receiving, replenishment (storage areas and display shelves) and returns. In-store planning 
also covered support processes, such as product assortments (HQ product list combined 
with localised assortment), value-adding services (e.g. re-packaging and services of a 
butcher or fishmonger), shelf space allocation and management and promotions 
management.  
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Product Planning and Space Allocation 
Although FS’s in-store planning did not involve the use of Planograms, plans were designed 
to meet two objectives: to optimise customer requirements and display floor space. Standard 
product assortment offered in each of the 19 stores consisted of both ‘wet and dry shopping 
options’ (FS Corporate website 2011), which included an extensive assortment of live, fresh 
and chilled produce, such as live seafood, meat, vegetables, and fresh and preserved 
condiments normally found in wet markets. Other product categories offered in the stores 
included consumer packed foods, beauty and healthcare products, household cleaning 
products and related accessories. Some stores also offered electronic products and Do-It-
Yourself (self-assembled) furniture to meet the specific needs of customers. In 2009, stores 
located in residential areas of mixed income levels began to offer cuisine cuts of fresh 
produce, a range of organic foods and imported wine, beer and other alcohol. 
 
Individual stores also offered a varied range of value-added services (VAS), such as re-
packaging of loose items (e.g. biscuits, condiments, fruits and vegetables). The larger stores 
tended to offer services normally found in wet markets, such as de-scaling of fish and 
special handling for halal meat.   
 
“Many of our customers are from the younger generation where they prefer to shop for fresh 
groceries in a clean and dry environment. Traditional wet markets, well, tend to be wet and 
smell of different types of meat. So we provide similar produce and services, such as 
butchering and cleaning of fishes that are also offered in wet markets but in a dry and much 
cleaner environment. But we have find new ways to attract them (customers) because the 
newer wet markets are starting to pay more attention to their ambience (e.g. displaying fresh 
meat in chilled cabinets to keep meat fresh and their stalls free of ‘fresh-meat-smell’) in order to 
attract customers back to them and away from us.” Manager, E-2-B 
 
Shelf space allocation and management were conducted at HQ. New brand manufacturers 
or producers had to liaise with buyer and merchandiser at HQ if they wanted FS to distribute 
their brand and products. It was also common for customers to approach store managers 
with requests to stock products found from another supermarket chain, providing samples in 
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the form of product packaging or pictures. Store managers would then forward the 
information to the HQ buyer or merchandiser to identify the manufacturer or producer. Upon 
identification, the HQ buyer would proceed to invite the identified manufacturer or producer 
to submit an application for FS to distribute their products in the stores.  
 
“Most products offered in our stores are stipulated by HQ. But we do offer products that our 
customers have requested. Usually they come with wrappings, packaging or pictures and ask 
us to stock it because want to complete their shopping in just one store. It is good that they 
want to shop just with us. But as you can see, we don’t have a lot of space. Therefore, it is a 
challenge for us to meet every customer’s request for their favourite assortment. But we do try 
– we use consignment-based distribution, which means we bring in one shipment and we tell 
our customers to buy them while stocks last. So far, it has been alright. We managed to please 
most of our customers without the need of renting more space.” Manager. E-5-B 
 
There were two types of product promotions in the stores, one organised by suppliers, and 
the other by the store. Product promotions organised by the suppliers were managed by HQ. 
Suppliers had an administrative discussion with HQ on product promotions and then HQ 
conveyed the information to the stores. Suppliers that delivered direct to stores worked 
closely with store managers on the operational procedures of their product promotion. 
Promotions organised by the stores tended to be ad-hoc and were managed by store 
managers with the dual aims of stimulating movement of slow-moving stocks and of creating 
space in the stores.  
 
“Whenever HQ pushes stocks to us, we will organise ad-hoc events to promote those stocks so 
that we can maintain order in our back room and not over-stack the display shelves.” 
Supervisor, E-3-B 
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Promotional products were commonly displayed in shelves located in high-visibility areas 
within the store. However, aisle spaces were also been used to accommodate several 
promotions running simultaneously.  
 
“With promotional items, we had to be vigilant because most of them were block-stacked at the 
end of aisles or along the aisles. Very often, products could fall due to customers taking stock 
from behind or bottom of the stack, thereby causing the stacked items to be unstable. That is 
why we don’t block stack promotional items very high to avoid injuries and damage…Yes, 
some customers can be unreasonably particular with what they pick from the stacked items. 
For example, with shampoos – they would open to smell the contents. If they liked the smell 
and decide to buy the shampoo, they would proceed to search the entire stack for a bottle with 
the highest level of shampoo.” Manager, E-1-B 
 
Inventory Ordering 
Inventory ordering was conducted in two ways: manual and automated. Under the manual 
inventory ordering process, stackers6 were required to maintain paper-based records of 
products under their responsibilities. Stackers were also required to obtain additional 
information on inventory levels, and sale records of products under their charge as well as 
those of other stores under the chain from HQ’s Purchasing Department. Under the 
automated process, stackers tracked and monitored stocks via hand-held PDAs when 
replenishing display shelves. In addition, stackers conducted physical checks at display 
shelves to ensure adequate stock levels of their allocated products.  
 
FS adopted two strategies to achieve accurate and timely in-store ordering – fixed-order 
quantity ordering and ‘Warehouse 99’. Under the fixed-order quantity re-ordering strategy, a 
pre-set stock level was assigned to all SKUs in the stores. When stocks reached the set 
stock levels in the PoS system, the inventory management system triggered re-orders to 
replenish stock levels. ‘Warehouse 99’ was a virtual warehouse established by HQ to 
facilitate stock level adjustments. Historically, stackers completed forms to reflect 
                                               
6 Stackers were store staff responsible for replenishing display shelves. Each stacker was allocated a few 
shelves to manage, monitoring the stock levels and turnover of product assortments under different brands. 
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discrepancies in stock levels. Whenever such discrepancies were resolved, additional forms 
were filled out to document the outcomes of the investigations. As the process was time-
consuming and tedious, HQ decided to establish a virtual warehouse (referred to as 
Warehouse 99) to streamline the process. However, monitoring of stock levels was not 
confined to the automated re-ordering process. While the automated re-ordering system 
managed stock levels, physical checks of display shelves via walkabouts were conducted by 
store supervisors and store managers at regular intervals throughout the day. In addition, 
when stackers noticed stocks on the display shelves were low or empty, they checked for 
stock levels in the inventory management system as well as in Warehouse 99. When stock 
levels were low, stackers informed the store managers, who then checked if the system had 
triggered re-orders for the affected products accordingly.  
 
“The system is supposed to trigger orders when the stock levels reached their pre-set levels 
but sometimes, there were mistakes in the scans, either at receiving or at the checkout stations. 
The automatic re-ordering systems don’t work properly due to inaccurate information. So we 
have to investigate and then correct the stock levels in the system so that it can do its job. 
That’s why we cannot rely just on the system. We have to perform manual checks (on stock 
levels) as well.” MD 
 
Receiving and Replenishment  
In-Store receiving was conducted in makeshift or designated areas, typically at the back of 
stores. The process began with stocks received, being placed inside a painted yellow box to 
inform staff that the stocks were ready to be processed. Receiving staff used hand-held 
Radio Frequency (RF) scanners, which doubled as PDAs, to scan the barcode of each item 
in different types of packaging, such as carton boxes or cardboard trays. With generic orders, 
the bar code of each item was scanned and the staff would indicate on the touch-screen of 
the scanner that x amount of the scanned bar code had been received. In mixed-SKU orders, 
the barcode of each item was scanned separately. After scanning, stocks were pushed into 
the store or into the back room. With deliveries from the HQ warehouse, store staff were on-
hand to help move the stocks into the store or into the back rooms. With deliveries from 
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suppliers, the chain’s practice was for the suppliers’ drivers or their assistants to place the 
stock inside the store, on the aisle(s) where they would be displayed. Store staff would then 
replenish the stocks in their respective locations, i.e. on the display shelves and/or storage 
spaces above display shelves. 
 
“Our staff will push the stocks into the store when HQ delivers. But for supplier deliveries, either 
the driver or their helper will push the stocks into the store. Our staff will then replenish the 
shelves. But whenever it rains, or if the driver is alone, we will ask our store staff to help push 
stocks inside the store. After all, we don’t want the carton boxes to get wet and we want to 
prevent congestion in the receiving area…it is a win-win situation.” Supervisor, C-2-C 
 
In-store replenishment of stocks occurred on a daily basis. Some stores replenished display 
shelves at different times of the day. Stores with ample aisle spaces replenished display 
shelves during operating hours, while smaller stores replenished display shelves only during 
off-peak times to ensure safety and to avoid disrupting customers. Some stores replenished 
three times per day – one hour before and one hour after opening hours, as well as during 
off-peak periods.  
 
Replenishment of ambient foods and non-food items was carried out on a daily basis. There 
were two deliveries from HQ warehouse – once in the morning with deliveries of orders 
received the night before, and one in the afternoon with deliveries of orders received in the 
morning. Suppliers of ambient foods were permitted to deliver their stocks between 7am and 
4pm each day. Replenishment was conducted as soon as deliveries from both HQ 
warehouse and suppliers were received.  
 
The flow of replenishment for deliveries from HQ and suppliers is illustrated in Figure 4-5. S1 
indicates deliveries from suppliers. Upon completion of the receiving process, stock was 
pushed by suppliers to the aisles where they were replenished on their respective display 
shelves (S2). Excess stock was stored on top of the display shelves (S3). Stock delivered 
from HQ warehouse to stores with no back stores was replenished directly onto the display 
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shelves (HQ-D1). Stores with no back rooms used roller cages to store HQ-delivered stock 
(HQ-R1), and stock from these roller cages was used to replenish the display shelves (HQ-
R2). HQ-B1 indicates HQ-delivered stock to be moved to stores’ back rooms. Replenishment 
of display shelves were conducted with stocks retrieved from back rooms (HQ-B2). Excess 
stock from replenished display shelves was moved to the top of the shelves, as indicated by 
HQ-D2, B3 and R3.  
 
When a product’s allocated display shelf required replenishment, stackers replenished from 
the top of the shelves as indicated by ToDS in Figure 4-5. When there was no stock of the 
OOS item, stackers would place a yellow ‘out-of-stock’ label over the product’s price label as 
they retrieved stocks from back rooms or roller cages. When there were no stock of the OOS 
item within the stores’ premises (i.e. not in storage areas or other display shelves), four 
practices were used by the store: (1) to keep the OOS item display shelves empty; (2) to 
leave the yellow OOS label on price label; (3) to remove the OOS item’s price label and (4) 
to expand the display of neighbouring substitute products or replace the empty shelves with 
promotional substitute products. 
 
“When a shelf is empty and there are no stocks above the display shelf, we will put a yellow 
label to cover the price label of OOS item. Regular customers know that my staff is taking 
replenishment stock from the back room. So they normally shop for other items and come back 
a few minutes later. Customers who are unfamiliar with the yellow label will ask our staff and 
we will explain to them.” Acting Manager, W-5-C 
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Figure 4-5 Replenishment flows from different sources of storage 
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Returns Processing 
FS had a relatively liberal product-return policy. All stores accepted returns from dissatisfied 
customers, so long as a receipt accompanied the returns. The reason(s) for returns was 
secondary. Procedurally, returned products were packed into plastic bags, labelled and 
placed in mobile shelves near the receiving area (see Figure 4-6). Once recorded, the 
returned products were sent back to either the concerned suppliers or HQ for evidential 
purposes. 
 
“Our returns policy is common in that if you have the receipt, we will exchange the product for 
you or give you a refund. Usually we ask customers why they return and use it as feedback to 
the suppliers. But it also depends on the product. Once we had a customer who bought a 
watermelon from our store, came back with the watermelon all cut up and complained it wasn’t 
sweet enough. So we invited him to select a watermelon where one of our staff cut it and 
offered to the customer for tasting. Lucky for us, the one he chose was sweet enough for him 
and so we exchanged the watermelon.” AGM, E-4-A 
 
     
Figure 4-6 Returns management in FS’s stores 
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 Antecedents of OOS and OS in stores 4.2
OOS and OS occurrences were noted by store management but were not measured. The 
majority of the causes of OOS and OS were human-related and technology-linked. 
 
“Our product range is very wide because our customers expect it. As such, we will have many 
similar products and products with similar packaging. Therefore, mistakes at the cashiers are 
common, especially when the queues are long and cashiers are pressured to quickly scan the 
items.” MD 
 
Each of the 19 store managers had different attitudes towards OOS and OS occurrences. To 
gain a better understanding on ‘where’ and ‘how’ OOS and OS occurred within the stores, 
factors causing OOS and OS were clustered into four areas of concern: headquarters, store 
outlets, suppliers, and the data capture systems used. 
 
 Headquarters 4.2.1
Errors made at HQ had significant ramifications on store operations. With order-picking at 
the HQ warehouse, wrong picks in product, quantity and packaging led to delivery errors. 
Stores could only amend their own records and report back to HQ; the incorrect deliveries 
would still have to be accepted by the stores.  
 
“We will also check deliveries from HQ because they have delivered wrong products or under 
deliver. It is because we check; we could also identify which stocks were being pushed to our 
store. Complaint? Of course we complained to HQ but it still happens. So we establish 
additional checks from our side and then amend the inventory records accordingly.” Acting 
Assistant Manager, N-3-A 
 
The stores, in general, viewed inventory management at HQ as ‘poor’, due to inaccurate 
forecast of fresh produce, under ordering, missing orders and stocks being pushed to the 
stores to clear space in the central warehouse. When goods were ordered, a Purchase 
Order (PO) was generated, which, upon delivery, was converted into a Good Inward 
Document (GID) so that payment to the correct suppliers could be arranged accordingly. 
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However, this process was not consistently carried out at HQ. There were instances where 
POs were not converted to GID in a timely manner, causing discrepancies in the stores’ 
inventory records. While many factors contribute to delays in conversion (e.g. where HQ 
staff were too busy or where clarification was required due to incorrect details on 
documentation), the underlying cause was poor staff diligence.  
 
“We submit the information (about errors in deliveries) to HQ and ensure our records are 
updated. But when the next load (delivery) comes, we see that there are mistakes. We called 
HQ and they said they haven’t had time to update. Therefore, we have to accept the ‘wrong’ 
deliveries, adjust our records and if necessary, quickly make space to accommodate the 
excess stocks of some items, and put in urgent delivery of OOS items.” Manager, N-1-C 
 
Returns from stores were not diligently updated in the HQ system and this led to inaccurate 
information in the HQ and stores’ systems. When store orders were not delivered, HQ 
compensated the affected stores accordingly. However, during peak seasons, such as 
Chinese New Year, when records were not updated on time or were lost, HQ did not 
compensate the affected stores. 
 
“When HQ doesn’t deliver our orders properly, we record down and tell them. Sometimes, they 
bring the missing orders in the next trip. If they don’t, they have to compensate us. But during 
holidays, like Chinese New Year or Hari Raya, where everybody is very busy and there are 
missing orders, we have no time to tell them immediately. But eventually when we do, they 
would say they are too busy or lost the document, so we get no compensation. What to do, no 
choice, just have to adjust our records.” Store Manager, E-5-B 
 
 Store Outlets 4.2.2
The accounting process at the stores required store staff and suppliers to conduct physical 
counts of the stock. Errors that occurred during this process (e.g. when both store staff and 
suppliers made errors in their stock keeping records), caused inaccurate information in the 
inventory system. 
 
Single-storey stores located at residential areas experienced a significant challenge with 
their in-store operations due to limited space and store layout. For example, some of these 
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stores had aisle spaces so narrow that only basket shopping (see Figure 4-7 and read Box 
4-1) was possible. As such, replenishment activities conducted during operating hours in 
such stores had to be done very quickly with erroneous consequences, such as putting the 
wrong products on the display shelf or putting the products in the wrong shelf space. 
Incidence of products damage during replenishment was also higher amongst these stores.  
 
 
  
Figure 4-7 Narrow aisles affected replenishment 
 
The receiving process also encountered many errors because different barcodes, item 
barcodes and packaging barcodes were scanned at this stage. Errors that typically occurred 
included scanning cartons with supplier packaging and scanning products with similar 
packaging. In addition, GSOP stated that incorrect receipts had to be recorded on PDAs, yet 
the stores recorded them manually. The original intention was to update the system in real-
time but this was omitted due to pressure to reduce or prevent congestion at the receiving 
area. The situation was exacerbated at stores with no designated goods receiving or ‘private’ 
(away from pedestrian movement) area for receiving activities (see Figure 4-8 and read Box 
4-2). Another challenge faced by such stores was heavy rain, which caused both staff and 
(delivery) drivers to seek shelter, thereby delaying the receiving process. As suppliers were 
allowed to deliver stocks between 7am to 4pm on a daily basis, this also posed a problem at 
the receiving stations when too many deliveries arrived at the same time, and caused 
congestion.  
Box4-1 
“Our store is very small and we have so many SKUs. 
So suppliers of chilled products will usually come 
very early in the morning to stock up their products 
and quickly go to other small FS stores. When HQ 
deliveries arrive, the driver and another HQ delivery 
staff would quickly offload the stocks in front of our 
store. As they offload, we have to quickly stack the 
boxes into roll cages and if not enough roll cages, we 
block stack in an unsheltered open space in front of 
the store temporarily. When customer traffic is low, 
we quickly move the stocks into the store. But during 
rainy season, we can’t use the unsheltered space 
and so we had to block stack on the walkway…yes, 
we had to work ‘super’ fast because we’re worried 
residents complain.” Assistant Store Manager, C-1-C 
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Figure 4-8 Example of stores without private areas for receiving activities 
 
OS at stores were common and caused by both internal factors (e.g. HQ warehouse pushing 
excess stocks onto stores) and external factors (e.g. unsuccessful product promotions). To 
manage OS occurrences, stores with back rooms had to quickly reorganise their back rooms 
to accommodate the stock. When more space was needed, a system of mobile storage 
equipment (e.g. roller cages, mobile racks and shelves) was adopted. Stores with no back 
rooms relied heavily on these mobile storage equipment, not only as extended display 
shelves but also to manage OS occurrences. 
 
A common cause of OOS and OS occurrences at stores was pilferage: theft of loose items, 
such as fruits, vegetables and condiments; theft of packaged goods and theft committed by 
‘professionals’. Most stores had more than four entries/exits points, so it was easy for theft to 
occur, despite the existence of CCTV and strategically-located internal security staff (senior 
store staff doubling up as security officers).  
 
“There will be some people, mostly ‘aunties’ (middle age to elderly housewives), who will cook 
curry or something and they only need one onion or chilli, so they come into the store and put a 
chilli in their pocket and walk out.” Store Executive, S-1-C 
 
“We often see customers go to the fresh fruits area, put grapes into a bag and while they are 
shopping in the store, they also eat the grapes. By the time they reach the cashier, they only 
pay for the remaining grapes in the bag.” Acting Assistant Manager, E-5-B 
 
Box 4-2 
“As you can see, this is our receiving 
area (store manager pointing to a small 
open area alongside the store). We 
cannot have too many people here as 
residents will complain our deliveries 
block the walkway and also, the 
(delivery) drivers normally park illegally. 
So we have to process the stock very 
quickly.” Store manager, W-4-A  
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Serious cases of pilferage were conducted by ‘organised crime syndicates’ (term coined by 
SS store managers), where higher-value items were stolen by the coordinated efforts of 
gangs comprising of foreigners on tourist visas. While GSOP stated that thieves had to be 
detained and police be contacted, it did not prescribe how to handle the situation safely. It 
was here that cohesiveness of all store managers was observed. When one store manager 
successfully apprehended organised crime in their store, the effective tactics used were 
shared with other stores immediately via personal calls to each other. FS store managers 
would meet informally on a regular basis to exchange experiences on their respective store 
operations to improve their SSOPs accordingly.  
 
“We experienced a string of ‘broad daylight robbery’ where we had groups of tourists, normally 
from China, coming in and stealing expensive items, such as perfume, cologne, small 
electronic products. Normally, they come into the store in a group of 4-5 people where 1 person 
will use pocket knife to cut out the security tag while the others position themselves as look 
outs and to block line-of-sight of staff.” Assistant General Manager, E-4-A 
 
 
Another example of ‘professional’ thieves at work was situations when a ‘customer’ had paid 
for their purchases but walked back into the store and put unpaid items into their shopping 
bags.  
 
FS adopted a range of strategies to minimise pilferage in stores. The most common 
approach used in all stores was to reward employees who apprehended culprits. A second 
approach common among stores that rented external space at store-front as display area 
was to station staff in the display area outside the store where products were placed in 
mobile carts and shelves. CCTV equipment installed in stores could only monitor entrance, 
exits and corners within the store but not the outside areas. In some stores, a cashier was 
stationed outside but most stores required customers to pay only at checkout stations at 
store exits. The member of staff stationed in the extended areas (see Figure 4-9) was 
normally the store manager, who was equipped with a two-way hands-free communication 
system that all staff, except the cashiers, also carried. The number of staff stationed outside 
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increased as the area became busy. However, only the store managers typically kept watch, 
while other staff would be replenishing stock in the outside area.  
 
 
Figure 4-9 Display shelves outside the stores 
 
In-store ordering process required accurate information input from other in-store activities, 
such as receiving, frequent inventory checks and reconciliation, as well as product scanning 
at the checkout stations. Misplaced items, goods written off and damaged goods, if not 
tracked diligently, affected the accuracy of information. Misplacement of goods and write-offs 
also led to errors in inventory errors and occurred where stocks were found at the ‘wrong’ 
place, such as a bag of mince pork found amongst instant noodles or a bottle of shampoo 
found amongst bottles of cooking oil. Stackers, supervisors and store managers were tasked 
to locate misplaced items and returned them to their respective shelves, but such activities 
were time-consuming, especially at larger stores. Damaged goods, such as an opened Tetra 
Pack drink, which could not be sold, had to be written off. Sale of fresh durians had the 
highest risk of being written off because of the way in which they were sold. Customers 
selected unopened fresh durians (see Figure 4-10) and handed them to store staff who 
would break them open (durians are selected based on the smell, colour and taste of the 
fruit) and pack the durian meats into small Styrofoam take-away boxes (see Figure 4-11) 
when the sales were concluded. However, if a customer decided not buy the durians after 
opening, store staff would re-pack the opened durians and retail them at a discounted price. 
Unsold, opened durians were disposed of at the end of day. 
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Figure 4-10 Durians 
 
Figure 4-11 Durians repacked in Styrofoam take-away boxes (Source: StinkySpikes 2009) 
 
Another factor affecting in-store ordering was inaccurate forecasting, and the forecasting of 
certain products was particularly challenging. For example, the sale of fresh meat, 
vegetables and fruits was very difficult to monitor, as stocks were ordered and received by 
weight. The entire carcass of a pig, for example, was normally delivered to the stores, where 
the carcass would be cut into pieces, placed in Styrofoam trays, shrink-wrapped and sold 
(see Figure 4-12). Information pertaining to the customers’ purchase was manually keyed 
into a stand-alone price-tag-printing machine. Although the price-tag listed the price, date 
and weight complete with a barcode, the PoS system would only scan the price and not the 
weight of the packed food, so OS of these food groups was common. Unsold stock was 
normally sold at a discounted price and any remaining old stock at closing time was 
discarded accordingly.  
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Figure 4-12 Whole pig carcass ‘processed’ into cuts and pre-packed for sale 
 
“Fresh meat stock is one of the hardest to forecast because we don’t order and sell by piece. 
Although we sell by weight, it is still not very accurate. For example, we sell live frogs. We don’t 
order by weight. We just tell the supplier how many frogs to deliver every day. A customer 
picks three live frogs and then, our staff clean the frogs, weigh them, key in details (items 
purchased are frogs and their weight) of the ‘processed’ frogs into a price tag printing machine. 
While it is printing the price tag, our staff will pack the ‘processed’ frogs into a plastic bag, stick 
the newly printed tag onto the bag so that customer can pay at the checkout station. The price 
tag will list the description of the content, i.e. frogs, weight and price of the ‘processed’ frogs. 
Therefore, how do you reconcile what you ordered and what you sold? It is hard. Another 
example is the fresh vegetables. We order and sell by weight. But during transportation, some 
vegetables may be bruised and cannot be sold. Again, what we ordered and what we sold, it 
will never match. So we just have to base our orders on past orders and estimate from there.” 
Store Executive, W-4-A 
 
Errors in data collection activities included under/over scans at checkout stations, especially 
during peak times; items sold but still ‘appearing’ in the inventory system and error scans 
due to similar packaging. For example, a customer may have picked five packets of different 
flavoured instant jelly mixes, where the packaging for all flavours was the same, except for a 
round sticker (1.5cm in diameter) affixed at the top right corner of the packet (see Figure 4-
13). In this instance, if a cashier scanned one packet and multiplied by five, a stock level 
error would occur, because the customer did not buy five packets of the same flavour. 
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Figure 4-13 Sticker indicating flavour on packets of jelly crystals 
 
“The cashiers were supposed to scan every item. But there were times, especially when there 
were long queues at the checkout stations, cashiers have under scanned products, especially, 
products with similar packaging but have different flavours. For example, customer brought 12 
canned drinks where the prices of each can were the same. Instead of scanning number of 
cans per flavour, cashier scans one can and keyed in number of cans for the purchase. When 
that happens, the stocks for the other un-scanned cans would become inaccurate.” Manager, 
E-1-B 
 
 Data Capture Systems  4.2.3
The user interface of FS’s data capture systems was frequently mentioned as a major cause 
of OOS and OS at stores. Although standard training were provided to all system users, 
errors still emerged due to the work attitudes of staff, especially during peak periods, where 
lines at the checkout stations were long. If an error scan occurred at a checkout station, it 
was the cashier’s responsibility to correct the mistake in the PoS system and quickly resume 
processing customers’ purchases. However, this GSOP was not diligently adhered to by 
cashiers in certain outlets, due to unfamiliarity with the system and pressure to reduce queue 
time at checkout stations. Such errors distorted the information captured by PoS, in turn 
affecting the accuracy of inventory forecasting. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sticker indicating 
flavour 
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“When a cashier made an error in the PoS system, only we (store manager or assistant 
manager or acting manager) can over-write the system so the error can be amended. If errors 
were made during peak shopping time, we become very busy because we have rush around to 
the affected checkout station to over-write the system so that customers don’t have to wait too 
long to pay. We’ve had situations where impatient customers left their filled baskets at the start 
of the checkout stations and walked out. So that wasn’t good for the store. We try our best to 
be quick but there are eight checkout stations here and only two of us (who can over-write PoS 
system). We just do what we can.” Assistant Manager, S-2-A 
 
Most stores also experienced problems with the accuracy of item barcodes and barcodes 
related to various types of packaging. Problems experienced with barcodes of canned drinks, 
such as sodas and beer, were frequently mentioned. For example, a can’s individual 
barcode was often used in the ordering process, despite the fact that canned drinks could be 
sold both as individual cans (see Figure 4-14), or packaged into six, 12 and 24 cans. To 
entice customers to make bulk purchases, canned drinks sold in a tray of six (see Figure 4-
15), a carton tray of 24 (see Figure 4-16) or a carton box of 24 (see Figure 4-17) were given 
attractive bulk purchase discounts. At the checkout area, if a customer purchased a pack of 
6 cans, the GSOP required that the cashier scan the barcode of one can and then key into 
the PoS system that a six-pack was purchased. The PoS system then applied the bulk 
purchase discount accordingly. In reality, the PoS system might not do this and the cashier 
then had to call the supervisor to over-write the system and to key in the discount manually. 
The newer stores had their systems updated and overcame such problems, but this problem 
remained common among older stores.   
 
 
 
Figure 4-14 Sale of individual canned drinks 
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Figure 4-15 Sale of six canned drinks wrapped in brand packaging 
 
 
Figure 4-16 Sale of 24 canned drinks shrink-wrapped on cardboard tray 
 
 
Figure 4-17 Sale of 24 canned drinks in a carton box 
 
Problems with the in-store PoS systems were experienced by all FS stores, and store 
managers from the larger stores (e.g. N-2-A, N-3-A, S-2-A, E-4-A and W-4-A) had 
collectively approached HQ to collaborate in resolving problems with the PoS system.  
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“There are definitely issues with our PoS and HQ’s system. Many of the conflicts at checkout 
stations are caused by different information in our system and HQ’s…HQ’s list of bar code was 
different from ours in the PoS so we had to call them (HQ) regularly. When the store is busy, 
we simply have no time for such confusion. Therefore, something had to be done to improve 
the situation…it is very frustrating….Some of the managers from other stores shared the same 
feelings with us…sometimes we catch up at the pub and we share stories. So there will be a 
few of us (store managers) going to HQ with some ideas on how to improve the design of the 
system.” Store Manager, E-4-A 
 
 
 Suppliers 4.2.4
Supplier performance and deliveries also affected OSA of products in stores. Under- and 
over-packing of cartons, incorrect barcodes, incorrect deliveries and documentation were 
commonly cited as indicators of poor supplier performance. Errors also occurred when 
suppliers sent incorrect orders to the stores due to their failure to update the information on 
their systems. Senior management stipulated penalties to address problems with supplier 
performance in packaging and deliveries, but these penalties were not consistently applied 
(E.g. some store managers did allow suppliers to return the correct deliveries to the stores 
within the same day. By doing so, suppliers could bring accurate delivery confirmation 
documents back to their offices.). 
 
“When suppliers delivered incorrect products or quantity, HQ wants us to issue fine for the 
errors because our sales would be affected. But we give them (another) chance. Humans are 
not perfect…so we told them if they could deliver the correct orders before 4pm (suppliers’ 
daily delivery window to stores was between 7am to 4pm), we wouldn’t issue fines to them. 
These days, we don’t even have to say it as they already know what to do if they delivered the 
wrong products or quantity.” Manager, E-1-B 
 
The release of product barcodes from suppliers was another cause of inaccurate inventory 
information. Suppliers were required to submit a list of product barcodes to HQ before HQ’s 
operational hours and then HQ would release the list of product barcodes to all stores to 
update their PoS system before opening hours. Updates to the list of product barcodes 
(caused by promotional changes or reactions to suppliers’ competitors’ changes) had to be 
103 
 
communicated to HQ in real-time and HQ would then email the updated list of barcodes to 
the stores, followed by a phone call alert to store. Problems emerged when the list and 
changes to the list were not released in time by HQ or the suppliers or both.  
 
“Sometimes we have arguments with our customer about price differences, especially when 
the product is on promotion. The customer tells us the item is supposedly on offer but our PoS 
still lists the original price. Sometimes, our customer has to tell us the promotional price – (it is) 
so embarrassing. Most of the time, the customer tells us the truth. But sometimes, they lie and 
in order to avoid congestion at the cashiers’, we just accept what they say. Nowadays, we have 
no choice but to ask the customer to wait while we check the price … not good for customer 
service.” Store Executive, W-3-C 
 
 
 
  
104 
 
 Store with Low Occurrence of OOS (Low-OOS) 4.3
 Store Characteristics 4.3.1
Of the eight stores with low OOS occurrences, five were located at the East of Singapore, 
with sizes ranging from 4,300 sqm to over 40,000 sqm. Store formats in this category 
comprised of single storey, single storey with mezzanine floor, 2-level and 3-level 
supermarkets (Refer to Table 4-1 for additional characteristics of stores with low-OOS). The 
average age of these stores was seven years and based on the number of SKUs carried and 
the floor space of the stores, this group had an average of 0.74sqm per SKU. The extent of 
OOS occurrences averaged less than 1% (0.96%) in this group. Pilferage and poor staff 
diligence were the most common causes of OOS occurrences in low-OOS stores. Most 
stores characteristics (e.g. age, location, size, number of SKUs) within this group were 
heterogeneous except that they all had back rooms.  
 
 
 In-Store Processes  4.3.2
The majority in-store processes of low-OOS stores are summarised in Table 4-2. In-store 
planning of product assortments and types of VAS offered were similar in all stores in this 
group, where wet market produce, grocery, beauty and health categories were amongst the 
most common items and repackaging of confectionery and fresh produce was provided. In-
store ordering and receiving were practised in accordance to GSOPs and all stores in this 
group replenished their display shelves with stocks stored on the tops of display shelves and 
in back rooms.  
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Table 4-1 Characteristics of low-OOS stores  
Store ID N-2-A E-2-B E-3-B E-4-A E-5-B E-6-B W-5-C C-2-C 
Average or 
Generalised 
Characteristics 
for Group 
Store Format S-2 S-2 SS S-2 SS-M S-3 SS-R SS-R NA 
SKUs ± 20,000 ± 8,000 ± 10,000 ± 30,000 ± 15,000 ± 20,000 ± 8,000 ± 6,000 ± 15,000 
Size (sqft) ± 41,000 ± 19,000 ± 13,000 ± 31,000 ± 10,000 ± 33,000 ± 5,800 ± 4,300 ± 20,000 
Back room Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Receiving Area Designated Designated Makeshift Designated Designated Designated Makeshift Makeshift NA 
Age 10 11 10 3 7 6 3 6 7 
Nbr. of staff in one 
Internal Security 
Team (IST) 
13 11 7 12 11 8 7 5 9 
% of OOS 1.00 0.30 1.00 0.25 0.83 1.50 1.50 1.30 0.96 
Top 3 Common 
Causes of OOS 
and OS 
• Pilferage 
• Store records 
not updated 
• Error scans due 
to similar 
packaging 
• Pilferage 
• Error scans due 
to similar 
packaging 
• Under/Over 
scans 
• Suppliers' list of 
barcodes do not 
match HQ's list 
barcodes 
• Pilferage 
• System design 
issue 
• Pilferage 
• Damage & 
Written Off 
goods 
• Misplaced items 
• Pilferage 
• Wrong 
packaging 
• Wrong product 
& quantity 
• Pilferage 
• Incorrect 
receipts 
• Inaccurate 
forecast of fresh 
foods 
• Pilferage 
• Error due to 
similar 
packaging  
• Store keeping 
error 
• Pilferage 
• Incorrect 
receipts 
• Inaccurate 
forecast of fresh 
foods 
• Pilferage  
• Poor staff 
diligence 
Location 
Characteristics 
• Within a central 
neighbourhood 
shopping area 
• Surrounded by 
small family-
owned 
provisional 
stores  
• Majority of 
customers from 
low income 
group and also 
Malaysians 
working in 
Singapore but 
reside in Johor 
Bahru* 
• Amongst 
residential flats 
• Customers from 
low to middle 
income group* 
• Amongst 
residential flats 
• Customers from 
low to middle 
income group* 
• Many foreign 
workers from 
India and China* 
• Open 24hours 
• Amongst 
residential flat 
• Customers from 
low to middle 
income group* 
• Standalone old 
building 
• Deliveries easily 
affected by rain 
as receiving 
area not 
sheltered, poor 
road conditions 
resulted in 
‘puddles’ formed 
in receiving area 
• Customers from 
middle income 
group* 
• Refurbished old 
shopping centre 
• Customer from 
middle income 
group* 
 
• Void deck of a 
residential block 
• Heavily 
dependent on 
external storage 
space (i.e. 
extensive use of 
mobile storage) 
• Customers from 
low income 
group* 
• Void deck of a 
residential block 
• Heavily 
dependent on 
external storage 
space (i.e. 
extensive use of 
mobile storage) 
• Customers from 
low income 
group* 
NA 
NOTE: 
S-2 = Supermarket with two levels S-3 = Supermarket with three levels SS = Single storey SS-M = Single storey with mezzanine floor SS-R = Single storey below residential block 
Designated = Loading/unloading bays or sheltered areas Makeshift = At the back of store or quiet end of store, limited shelter 
*As advised by store respondents 
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Table 4-2 In-store process of low-OOS stores 
Store ID N-2-A E-2-B E-3-B E-4-A E-5-B E-6-B W-5-C C-2-C 
In-Store Plann 
Product 
Assortment ing: 
• Wet market 
produce 
grocery 
• Beauty & 
health 
• Electronic 
goods 
• Imported beer, 
wine & other 
alcohol 
• Wet market 
produce 
• Grocery 
• Beauty & 
health 
• Pre-packed 
fresh produce 
• Grocery  
• Beauty & 
health 
• Wet market 
produce 
• Grocery 
• Beauty & 
health 
• Imported beer, 
wine & alcohol 
• Pre-packed 
fresh produce 
• Grocery 
• Beauty & 
health 
• Wet market 
produce 
• Grocery 
• Beauty & 
health 
• Electronic 
goods 
• Wet market produce 
• Pre-packed fresh produce 
• Grocery 
• Beauty & health 
In-Store 
Planning: 
Types of VAS 
Re-packaging of fresh produce and 
biscuits 
Re-packaging of 
biscuits 
Re-packaging of 
fresh produce 
and biscuits 
Re-packaging of 
biscuits 
Re-packaging of 
fresh produce 
and biscuits 
Re-packaging of biscuits 
In-Store 
Ordering 
GSOPs adhered, Hand-held PDAs used 
In-Store 
Receiving 
GSOPs adhered, Hand-held PDAs used 
In-Store 
Replenishment: 
Types of 
Storage7 
• Top of display shelves 
• Sponsored storage boxes 
• Back room 
• Top of display 
shelves 
• Back room 
• Top of display 
shelves 
• Sponsored 
storage boxes 
• Back room 
• Top of display 
shelves 
• Sponsored 
storage boxes 
• Stairwells 
• Back room 
• Top of display shelves 
• Mobile racks 
• Roller cages 
• Back room 
 
 
  
                                               
7 See Figure 4-18 for pictures of types of storage adopted in low-OOS stores.  
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Figure 4-18 Types of storage used by low-OOS stores 
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 Locations and Causes of OOS and OS in Stores with Low OOS 4.3.3
Figure 4-19 maps occurrences of OOS and OS occurring at different stages in the flow of in-
store processes at low-OOS stores on to Kotzab and Teller’s (2005) in-store logistical 
process model. This figure also summarises the GSOPs and SSOPs designed to address 
the occurrences of OOS and OS at the respective stages of in-store processes. 
 
Stores with low-OOS experienced most causes of OOS and OS due to errors caused by 
staff, which in turn affected accuracy of the PoS system at checkout stations. To make 
space for new stocks from suppliers, HQ’s warehouse often pushed stocks onto the stores, 
and as a result, stores had to improvise ways to manage OS incidents. One method 
commonly used by low-OOS stores was to place excess stocks in roller cages when back 
rooms were full. Although this method helped to contain excess stocks, its downside was 
that stackers, who had forgotten about these stocks after replenishing display shelves with 
stocks in back rooms, placed new orders after stocks became low in the back room. OS 
occurred again when new stocks arrived and stocks stored in roller cages were rediscovered. 
Poor supplier performance, such as incorrect deliveries, caused incorrect stock levels 
thereby impacting on the quality of in-store replenishment activities as well as in-store 
ordering. Poorly maintained information related to stocks (such as updated list of barcodes 
or promotional activities not timely communicated), caused confusion about products’ prices 
at checkout stations. Such confusion resulted in incorrect information being recorded at PoS.  
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Figure 4-19 Locations and causes of OOS & OS in low-OOS stores 
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 GSOPs and SSOPs of Low-OOS Stores 4.3.4
GSOPs and SSOPs to manage the occurrence of OOS and OS at respective stages of in-
store processes are summarised in Tables 4-3 to 4-7.  
 
From Tables 4-3 to 4-7, it can be seen that managers of this group of stores generally 
adhered closely to the GSOP established, in order to address OOS and OS occurrences 
consistently at all three stages (i.e. before, during and after).  
 
Before OOS Occurrence 
At each stage of occurrence, most store managers in the group were proactive in minimising 
errors in in-store processes, such as positioning themselves at checkout stations to be on 
stand-by to help cashiers should any confusion arise. Most store managers also made 
personal calls to major suppliers to encourage accurate deliveries. 
 
During OOS Occurrence 
While GSOPs stipulated that only store managers were to resolve issues, such as correcting 
error scans at checkout stations, some stores (e.g. E-3-B and N-2-A) included store 
executives as being responsible for resolving such issues. This flexibility of responsibility 
permitted store executives to assist if the store manager was unavailable. Thus, the issue 
were resolved faster and congestion at checkout stations was prevented.  
 
After OOS Occurrence 
If the cause of OOS or OS occurrence could be identified as attributable to staff’s lack of 
familiarity with store systems due to language inadequacy, the store manager provided 
systems training in Mandarin to help improve understanding. However, formal written 
warnings to staff with consistently poor performance were issued if such poor performance 
continued after training. While this strict approach was adopted by most store managers in 
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this group, a small number of store managers preferred to use counselling and 
encouragement as a means to correct inappropriate behaviour.  
 
With regard to supplier errors, store managers in this group typically adopted personal 
communications and a collaborative approach to ensure that suppliers made correct 
deliveries and updated information in their inventory systems after the discovery of errors. 
They also worked closely with HQ on incorrect deliveries as well as updating data on their 
intranet systems.  
 
In summary, most characteristics of stores in this group were heterogeneous. Store 
managers adopted a strict and proactive approach towards staff behaviour and advocated 
specialised training to improve staff performance when necessary. Store managers also 
used a proactive stance, via personal communications, to ensure suppliers and HQ 
warehouse performed the expected follow-up actions to update deliveries and stock 
information in their systems.  
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Table 4-3 GSOPs and SSOPs to address causes that occurred at checkout stations in low-OOS stores 
 BEFORE DURING AFTER 
CAUSES GSOP SSOP GSOP SSOP GSOP SSOP 
Cashier scan error. • Cashier trained to scan each 
item.  
• Factors scan accuracy 
performance into 
remuneration. 
C-2-C SM stood at checkout 
stations to keep close watch on 
their cashiers (only two check 
out stations) in order to 
minimise such an error. 
SM to overwrite PoS so cashier 
rescans item(s). 
• E-3-B & E-5-B SM or SE 
would overwite error. 
• N-2-A, E-4-A & E-6-B SE 
would overwite error. 
Cashier to be counselled or 
disciplined. Sent for further 
training if necessary. 
• E-2-B SM issued verbal 
warning followed by letter.  
• Staff diligence was a serious 
issue with this store. 
Customer returns or exchange 
products not updated in PoS. 
Cashier updates system by 
rescanning returned items and 
scanning exchanged items 
C-2-C SM handled returns or 
exchanges, took new items & 
task cashier to rescan to 
update records. 
• Error was undetected until 
inventory levels in system 
indicate discrepancy. 
• Immediate investigation 
followed into cause of 
discrepancy. 
 Cashier to be counselled or 
disciplined. 
E-2-B SM issued verbal 
warning followed by letter. 
Error scans due to similarity in 
packaging 
Cashier trained to scan each 
item. 
C-2-C SM positioned at 
checkout stations. 
SM to overwrite PoS so cashier 
rescans item(s). 
• E-3-B & E-5-B SM or SE 
would overwite error. 
• N-2-A, E-4-A & E-6-B SE 
would overwite error. 
Cashier to be counselled or 
disciplined. 
C-2-C SM issued verbal 
warning. 
 
Item scanned & sold but 
system still lists available 
• Physical inventory reconciled 
with inventory in system on a 
weekly basis. 
• Immediate investigation when 
records show discrepancy. 
 SM to confirm item is sold and 
then adjusted record in system. 
 System problems were 
currently being reviewed by SM 
at time of interview. 
 
PoS only detects item bar code 
& not packaging bar code. 
Thus bulk purchase discount 
not awarded. 
System problem currently 
being reviewed by SM at time 
of interview but Cashier 
advised to be diligent to pick up 
occurrence. 
 Cashier to manually overwrite 
the PoS and keyed in bulk 
discount. 
• C-2-C SM had to approve 
before cashier could 
overwrite. 
• E-3-B & E-5-B SM or SE to 
approve before cashier could 
overwrite. 
• N-2-A, E-4-A & E-6-B SE to 
approve before cashier could 
overwrite. 
System problems were 
currently being reviewed by SM 
at time of interview. 
 
Bar code on packaging do not 
merge with list of bar code in 
PoS (list is uploaded by HQ). 
SM to collaborate with HQ to 
ensure list of barcodes are 
updated. 
N-2-A, E-4-A & E-6-B SM calls 
HQ. 
 
• SM to call HQ immediately. 
• At the same time, Cashier to 
manually key in bar code on 
packaging into PoS in order 
to continue the sale. 
 SM to collaborate with HQ to 
ensure list of barcodes were 
updated. 
N-2-A, E-4-A & E-6-B SM 
called HQ. 
Product write-off/Damaged 
goods. 
• Efficient handling of products.  
• Only good condition items are 
displayed. 
• E-2-B has a special space 
right next to store, similar to a 
void deck but dedicated case 
supermarket to sort & repack 
fresh produce – prices are set 
based on quality.  
• N-2-A, E-5-B & E-6-B has a 
dedicated area (around 
5mx5m) behind the store 
• If CPG, items would be 
processed by receiving staff 
as returns.  
• If fresh produce, incident is 
reported to SM. 
 Review handling or packaging 
of products if appropriate. 
 
 
SM = Store Manager  SE = Store Executive  CPG = Consumer Packaged Goods 
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Table 4-4 GSOPs and SSOPs to address causes that occurred at stage before checkout station (customers’ baskets) in low-OOS stores 
 BEFORE DURING AFTER 
CAUSES GSOP SSOP GSOP SSOP GSOP SSOP 
Consume before payment 
– common in fresh fruits 
section 
Staff to be diligent to spot 
such incidence. 
• E-2-B had 11 staff as 
their Internal Security 
Team (IST), N-2-A had 
10, E-3-B had 7, E-4-A 
had 12, E-6-B had 10 
 W-5-C had 7 & C-2-C had 
5.  
• N-2-A, E-2-B, E-3-B, E-4-
A, E-5-B & E-6-B printed 
out pictures of regular 
unreasonable shoppers 
and habitual thieves and 
pinned them onto notice 
board in SM office to help 
staff spot them. 
Encourage ‘thief’ to pay for 
products consumed. 
 Staff to be praised and 
rewarded for being diligent. 
 
Pilferage/Theft Staff to be diligent to spot 
such incidence. 
• E-2-B had 11 staff as IST, 
N-2-A had 10, E-3-B had 
7, E-4-A had 12, E-6-B 
had 10, W-5-C had 7 & 
C-2-C had 5.  
• N-2-A, E-2-B, E-3-B, E-4-
A, E-5-B & E-6-B printed 
out pictures of regular 
unreasonable shoppers 
and habitual thieves and 
pinned them onto notice 
board in SM office to help 
staff spot them 
Apprehend and escort to 
SM office, encourage ‘thief’ 
to pay for stolen item. If 
not, contact police. 
 Staff to be praised and 
rewarded for being diligent. 
 
Organised retail crime Staff to be diligent to spot 
such incidence. 
E-2-B had 11 staff as IST, 
N-2-A had 10, E-3-B had 7, 
E-4-A had 12, E-6-B has 
10, W-5-C had 7 & C-2-C 
had 5.  
Apprehend and escort to 
SM office, contact police. 
 Staff to be praised and 
rewarded for being diligent. 
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Table 4-5 GSOPs and SSOPs to address causes that occurred at receiving stations in low-OOS stores 
 BEFORE DURING AFTER 
CAUSES GSOP SSOP GSOP SSOP GSOP SSOP 
Error scans Receiver trained to scan 
only item bar code. 
Scans to be checked 
with records on PDA. 
N-2-A, E-2-B, E-4-A, E-
5-B & E-6-B have 
dedicated receiving 
sections. 
Error is undetected until 
inventory levels in 
system indicate 
discrepancy.  
 • Staff responsible was 
to be counselled and 
sent for retraining if 
necessary.  
• If it occurred again, a 
warning letter would 
be issued. 
• E-5-B & W-5-C 
receiving staffs were 
gently reminded to be 
more careful. 
• N-2-A SM repeated 
training in-house in 
Mandarin to enhance 
understanding. 
 
 
Table 4-6 GSOPs and SSOPs to address causes that occurred at HQ warehouse of low-OOS stores 
 BEFORE DURING AFTER 
CAUSES GSOP SSOP GSOP SSOP GSOP SSOP 
Changes in packaging 
and bar code not timely 
communicated 
• Any changes in 
packaging and 
barcodes to be 
announced at store 
opening.  
• If change occur during 
opening hours, SM to 
inform all cashiers.  
• SS replace shelf 
display tags if 
necessary. 
 SM to inform cashiers 
of changes and 
simultaneously, SS to 
remove shelf display 
tags until new ones are 
available to be 
displayed. 
N-2-A, E-4-A & E-6-B 
SE to inform cashiers. 
SM/SE to ensure 
changes in packaging 
and barcodes were 
communicated 
accordingly. 
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Table 4-7 GSOPs and SSOPs to address causes attributable to suppliers of low-OOS stores  
 BEFORE DURING AFTER 
CAUSES GSOP SSOP GSOP SSOP GSOP SSOP 
Wrong product Stores to share 
information to ensure 
accuracy in both parties’ 
systems. 
• W-5-C & C-2-C SMs call 
suppliers to ensure correct 
deliveries. 
• N-2-A, E-2-B, E-3-B, E-4-A, 
E-5-B & E-6-B SM calls 
major suppliers to 
encourage accurate 
deliveries 
Penalty for incorrect 
deliveries. However, if on 
good terms, allow supplier to 
correct delivery within the 
same day. 
W-5-C & C-2-C SMs 
permitted same day to 
correct delivery. 
 
• Remind suppliers the 
importance of accurate 
deliveries.  
• If occurrences are high, 
feedback to HQ so that 
official warning can be 
issued. 
 
W-5-C & C-2-C SMs called 
suppliers to ensure correct 
deliveries. 
 
Short-packed/wrong 
quantity 
Stores to share 
information to ensure 
accuracy in both parties’ 
systems. 
• W-5-C & C-2-C SMs call 
suppliers to ensure correct 
deliveries. 
• N-2-A, E-2-B, E-3-B, E-4-A, 
E-5-B & E-6-B SMs call 
major suppliers to 
encourage accurate 
deliveries 
• Accept quantity and allow 
supplier to bring the 
remaining quantity within the 
same day.  
• Otherwise, raise 
documentation to note split-
delivery.  
W-5-C & C-2-C SMs 
permitted same day to 
correct delivery. 
 
• Remind suppliers the 
importance of accurate 
deliveries.  
• If occurrences are high, 
feedback to HQ so that 
official warning can be 
issued. 
 
W-5-C & C-2-C SMs called 
suppliers to ensure correct 
deliveries. 
 
Supplier error packaging Receiver/Stacker to be 
diligent to spot such 
incident. 
• W-5-C & C-2-C SMs call 
suppliers to ensure correct 
deliveries. 
• N-2-A, E-2-B, E-3-B, E-4-A, 
E-5-B & E-6-B SMs call 
major suppliers to 
encourage accurate 
deliveries. 
 
• If serious error, report to SM 
& stacker remove affected 
items from display shelf. SM 
contact supplier immediately.  
• If minor, cashier to note error 
when scanning affected 
items.  
• If necessary, supplier to 
delivers affected items with 
correct packaging 
immediately. 
W-5-C & C-2-C SMs 
permitted same day to 
correct delivery. 
 
• Remind suppliers the 
importance of accurate 
deliveries.  
• If occurrences are high, 
feedback to HQ so that 
official warning can be 
issued. 
 
W-5-C & C-2-C SMs called 
suppliers to ensure correct 
deliveries. 
 
Suppliers’ list of bar code 
mixed up 
Receiver to be diligent to 
spot such incident. 
• C-2-C SM calls suppliers to 
ensure correct deliveries. 
• N-2-A, E-2-B, E-3-B, E-4-A, 
E-5-B & E-6-B SMs call 
major suppliers to 
encourage accurate 
deliveries 
• SM call supplier for correct 
list to be sent to HQ, who will 
then upload into PoS.  
• SM to obtain a copy of the 
list and overwrites PoS with 
correct bar code when 
necessary. 
 SM to feedback to supplier 
and collaborate to work on 
putting in checks to spot 
such incidents. 
 
N-2-A, E-2-B, E-4-A, E-5-B 
& E-6-B SMs called 
supplier. 
 
Suppliers affix wrong bar 
code on products 
Receiver to be diligent to 
spot such incident. 
• W-5-C & C-2-C SMs call 
suppliers to ensure correct 
deliveries. 
• N-2-A, E-2-B, E-3-B, E-4-A, 
E-5-B & E-6-B SMs call 
major suppliers to 
encourage accurate 
deliveries. 
Receiver to reject affected 
consignments. Considered 
error delivery and effect 
penalty. However, if on good 
terms, allow supplier to correct 
errors within the same day. 
W-5-C & C-2-C SMs 
permitted same day to 
correct delivery. 
• Remind suppliers the 
importance of accurate 
deliveries.  
• If occurrences are high, 
feedback to HQ so that 
official warning can be 
issued. 
 
• W-5-C & C-2-C SMs 
called suppliers to ensure 
correct deliveries. 
• N-2-A, E-2-B, E-3-B, E-4-
A, E-5-B & E-6-B SMs 
called major suppliers to 
encourage accurate 
deliveries. 
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 In-Store OOS and OS Management 4.3.5
Store Managers’ Influence on Range of Products 
 
As the product list was issued by HQ, all FS’s stores basically offered a similar range of 
products, varying between 60 to 80 per cent of HQ-listed products. The remaining 
percentages of products were provided to meet local market environment or customers’ 
requests.  
 
“…60% of the product categories and assortments we offered in our store were prescribed by 
HQ. They know which products were popular (in Singapore) so we just follow their list. 
However, we have been operating in this neighbourhood for over 10 years, so we have local 
knowledge and experience (requests from regular’ customers for items not on HQ product list). 
Therefore, 40% of our product categories were for customers in this store (location).” Acting 
Assistant Manager, N-2-A 
 
Store Managers’ Influence on Store Operations 
 
With in-store operations, GSOPs were adopted with minor customisations due to customer 
requirements, requests and the respective store managers’ expectations of their in-store 
performance. For example, the acting Assistant Manager of N-2-A expected stackers to 
ensure display shelves ‘looked’ fully stocked, i.e. bottles had to be placed to the edge of 
display shelves, with products’ front facing forward (see Figure 4-20). If there were 
insufficient bottles to fill the display shelf, bottles had to be moved to the edge. The space 
behind the bottles was deliberately left empty to help staff identify which items needed 
immediate replenishment. Display shelves that were not fully stocked were considered 
unacceptable by store managers of some stores (see Figure 4-21). This SSOP was 
implemented because customers provided feedback that they ‘liked’ to see well-stocked and 
neat display shelves. However, the Assistant Manager of C-1-C instructed stackers to fill 
empty spaces with other stocks to optimise space (see Figure 4-22). It was then the 
responsibility of stackers to remember which stock was placed at those ‘floating’ locations. 
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The different approaches and expectations towards on-shelf availability and display affected 
the efficiency of replenishment activities.  
 
Store managers in this group experienced varied levels of pilferage. To manage inventory 
shrinkage caused by pilferage, various methods to increase security levels were established. 
 
 
Figure 4-20 Display shelves to be fully stocked 
 
 
Figure 4-21 Display shelves not fully stocked 
 
Figure 4-22 Shelf space being optimised 
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Store managers of single storey stores appointed staff to ‘double-up’ as security personnel, 
while the two- and three-storey supermarkets as well as the hypermarket used a 
combination of security teams and CCTV to monitor customer and staff activities. 
 
“We use our CCTV cameras to monitor customers shopping in our hypermarts. As the store 
has different stories, sometimes, it takes time for us to get to the thief. So we take a screen 
shot of the thief, print out the image and put it on the notice board in our office so that all 
employees can keep an eye out for such people. … By doing this, we can point out the 
‘regulars’ who keep stealing our goods.” Acting Assistant Manager, N-2-A 
 
Stores’ Relations with Store Staff 
Store managers in this group maintained a strict compliance with HQ’s approach towards 
staff lapses in performance. The store managers and supervisors did not hesitate to 
reprimand staff when mistakes occurred frequently. 
 
“We all work as a team. Therefore, everyone must be responsible and do their job properly. 
Otherwise, customers will complain or we may have to compensate customers for our 
mistakes”. Assistant Store Manager, C-2-C 
 
“All of us (store management levels) have done stacking and replenishment before we come to 
this position. So we know how the process is and what can be done to ensure good 
performance. That is why when staff make mistakes, we quickly investigate to see what is the 
cause of the mistake – is it because they don’t know the process or they are too lazy to follow 
process. We train when we need to, we scold when we have to.” Store Manager, E-5-B 
 
As mentioned in Chapter Three, the case supermarket chain had no set procedures to 
calculate either the cost of OOS and OS or the duration of OOS. However, store managers 
maintained a firm control on staff who committed mistakes that had implications to OSA, 
especially on high turnover products. In fact, one of the criteria for staff performance 
appraisal was the ability to minimize the number of mistakes that had a direct impact on 
inventory record. 
 
“Receiving is very important. If my staff makes mistakes, it will affect the inventory records of 
my store. If there are always mistakes, HQ will issue a “please explain” letter and that is not 
good for the performance record of my store.” Acting Assistant Manager, E-6-B  
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Stores’ Relations with Headquarters (HQ) 
Store managers in this group maintained close reporting relationships with HQ, working with 
specific colleagues at HQ to discuss matters related to inventory levels, in-store ordering and 
incorrect deliveries (product or quantity) from HQ.  
 
“If there is a problem, we just call HQ. We will follow up with an email. But we normally call 
them first to see what happened and discuss how to resolve the matter. Usually, a phone call 
can settle everything…and it is fast. Sometimes, we also have to know ‘who’ to call…and then 
everything will settle very quickly.” Store Manager, E-5-B 
 
The timely provision of the list of products and their barcodes was one of the causes of OOS 
and OS in stores. Despite store managers’ regular communications with HQ, delays 
persisted in getting the list of product barcodes, as well as updates on the list before stores 
opened for business.  
 
“Sometimes, there are arguments at the cashier because the customer argues with the cashier 
on prices. The newspaper says it is on discount but because we didn’t get the list on time, our 
system still shows the original price. We then have to quickly call HQ to verify and then charge 
the customer the correct price. Every time HQ don’t give us the list (of updated barcodes), we 
experience such problems. We have spoken to HQ several times on this and they always 
blame the suppliers (for being late).” Manager, E-4-A 
 
“……because we know HQ is not always on time to give us the list, so we run around the store 
to update price tags and our system as soon as we get updates. It is tiring but blaming is not 
going to help. So we help ourselves to minimize customers’ conflict. As our store is big, it is 
actually good exercise for us too so we don’t mind doing it. But it gets difficult when the store is 
very busy.” Acting Assistant Manager, N-2-A 
 
Stores’ Relations with Suppliers 
Store managers in this group worked closely with their suppliers. In addition to access to the 
FS’s inventory systems, they communicated with their suppliers regularly to investigate 
errors and resolve conflicts, and when necessary, they approached suppliers’ sales 
representatives and discussed product promotions and customers’ feedback on their 
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respective products and brands. It was also observed that store supervisors in this group 
helped suppliers’ sales representatives to replenish or arrange stock on display shelves. 
  
“Sometimes, when customer traffic is low, we will help suppliers as they replenish stocks. While 
helping them, we would chat with them about the status of their company, about any new 
upcoming products or promotions. We do this to maintain good relationship with them. You see, 
these suppliers also ‘service’ our competitors. So with good relationships…if anything happens, 
for example, we need urgent stocks, they would put in extra efforts to meet our requirements. If 
the supplier was new to our store, we will also help them…guide them on how we want our 
display shelves to look. In our opinion, if we help them, (in hope) they will help us back. 
Suppliers were also happy to share product knowledge with us because they know if one of 
their products was OOS, we would promote substitute products or flavours or packaging (from 
the same supplier) to them. Suppliers were also aware that if their competitor brand was OOS, 
we would promote their products as substitutes. They also knew we tend to promote new 
products to our regular customers. So in a way, we are helping them (suppliers) to create 
awareness of their products.” Manager, E-2-B 
 
However, despite such efforts, stores in this group still experienced noticeable errors caused 
by suppliers, such as incorrect deliveries and incorrect barcodes on packaging. These errors 
caused inaccurate information in the inventory systems of the stores as well as those of the 
suppliers. 
 
“Despite working closely with our suppliers, we still experienced inaccurate deliveries. Each 
time it (e.g. incorrect deliveries) happens, we would call the affected suppliers for clarification 
and we found that the information on our systems don’t match those at suppliers’ information 
system. I think problem will require some time to get it right. We will just have to continue to 
work closely with our suppliers.” Manager, Acting Assistant Manager, E-6-B  
 
Stores’ Relations with Customers 
Store managers in this group were diligent in ‘spotting’ customers that seemed to need their 
assistance or advice on products or brands. As the checkout stations were located near the 
entrances of the stores, store managers in this group proactively stationed themselves near 
the checkout stations, and attempted to greet customers entering the store. But it was their 
diligence in helping customers with product assistance that constituted the majority of their 
dealings with customers. 
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“We have a lot of China foreign workers shopping at our store after their shift work. As they are 
unfamiliar with the brands common in supermarkets in Singapore, very often they would ask us 
for recommendations. In addition, they will ask us to recommend the cheaper range of food 
products and household items as well.” Manager, E-3-B 
 
“My store is small so I know where the stocks are very quickly. Quite often, the maids 
(domestic helpers) would come with two young children and ask me to help them pick a few 
items because they struggle to control the children inside the store…so if we’re not too busy, 
we will do it for them..even if the store is a bit busy, the maids can see, and so they will wait a 
little while…but we still help them…it is okay.” Assistant Store Manager, C-2-C 
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 Stores with Medium Occurrence of OOS (Medium-OOS) 4.4
 Store Characteristics 4.4.1
There were four stores in this group, two of which were located in the North region and two 
in the West region of Singapore. Three stores were single-storied with the fourth being a 
two-storey supermarket (refer to Table 4-8 for additional characteristics of medium-OOS 
stores). Periods of operations for these four stores were relatively short with an average of 
only four years. Based on the number of SKUs carried and the floor space of the stores, this 
group had an average of 0.97sqm per SKU. Extent of OOS occurrences averaged less than 
3% (2.70%). Error scans due to similar packaging was the most common cause of OOS 
occurrence in medium-OOS stores. Most stores characteristics (e.g. age, location, size, 
number of SKUs) within this group were heterogeneous except that they all had back rooms.  
 
 In-Store Process  4.4.2
Table 4-9 summarises the major in-store processes of medium-OOS stores. Product 
assortment offered by stores in this group included fresh produce normally found in 
traditional wet markets (loose or pre-packed), beauty and health products and general 
groceries. Two stores also provided electronic goods for their customers. All four stores 
closely adhered to the GSOPs that covered in-store planning and receiving. In-store 
replenishment conducted in these four stores typically began with accessing stocks stored 
on top of the display shelves or sponsored storage boxes. Additional stocks were moved 
from the back store onto display shelves and excess stocks placed on top of the display 
shelves. Supplier-delivered stock was left along the aisles. Store staff also replenished 
display shelves with this stock (see Figure 4-23). 
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Figure 4-23 Supplier stock waiting to be processed 
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Table 4-8 Characteristics of medium-OOS stores 
Store ID N-3-A N-4-C W-3-C W-4-A 
Average or 
Generalised 
Characteristics 
for Group 
Store Format SS SS-R SS S-2 NA 
SKUs ± 28,000 ± 9,000 ± 10,000 ± 20,000 ± 17,000 
Size (sqft) ± 25,000 ± 9,000 ± 7,000 ± 28,000 ± 18,000 
Back room Y Y Y Y Y 
Receiving 
Area Designated Makeshift Designated Makeshift NA 
Age 5 2 6 4 4 
Nbr of 
members in 
one Internal 
Security Team 
(IST) 
5 4 5 13 7 
% OOS 3.11 3.30 2.40 2.00 2.70 
Top 3 
Common 
Causes of 
OOS and OS 
• Inaccurate 
PoS data 
capture 
• Bar coding 
errors 
• Pilferage 
• Pilferage 
• Stock 
keeping error 
• Error due to 
similar 
packaging 
• Error 
deliveries 
from HQ 
• Error 
deliveries 
from 
suppliers 
• Under/Over 
scans 
• HQ records 
not timely 
updated with 
store returns 
• Supplier 
records not 
timely 
updated with 
store returns 
• Error due to 
similar 
packaging 
Error due to 
similar 
packaging 
Location 
Characteristics 
• Within an old 
shopping 
complex 
• Receiving 
area inside a 
multi-storey 
car park 
(connected 
to shopping 
centre) 
• Customers 
from middle 
income 
group* 
• Within a 
central 
neighbourho
od shopping 
area  
• Surrounded 
by 
provisional 
shop 
• Competitor 
supermarket 
chain store 
across a 
major 
pedestrian 
walkway 
• Customers 
from low 
income 
group* 
• Amongst 
residential 
flats 
• Large and 
sheltered 
receiving 
area, also 
used as 
mobile 
storage 
• Large 
mosque 
nearby 
• Customers 
from low to 
middle 
income 
group* 
• Standalone 
refurbished 
old building 
with very 
large 
sheltered 
area 
• Entire level 2 
was ‘back 
room’ 
• Customers 
from low to 
middle 
income 
group* 
 
NA 
NOTE: 
SS = Single storey  SS-R = Single storey below residential block  S-2 = Supermarket with two levels   
Designated = Loading/unloading bays or sheltered areas  Make-shift = At the back of store or quiet end of store, 
limited shelter 
*As advised by store respondent 
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Table 4-9 In-store process of medium-OOS stores 
Store ID N-3-A N-4-C W-3-C W-4-A 
In-Store Planning: 
Product 
Assortment 
• Wet market 
produce 
• Pre-packed 
fresh produce 
• Grocery 
• Beauty & health 
• Electronic 
products 
• Pre-packed 
fresh produce 
• Grocery 
• Beauty & health 
• Wet market 
produce 
• Pre-packed 
fresh produce 
• Grocery 
• Beauty & health 
• Wet market 
produce 
• Pre-packed 
fresh produce 
• Grocery 
• Imported beer, 
wine & alcohol 
• Electronic 
products 
• DIY furniture 
In-Store Planning: 
Types of VAS 
Re-packaging of 
biscuits 
Re-packaging of 
fresh produce 
Re-packaging of fresh produce and 
biscuits 
In-Store Ordering GSOPs adhered, Hand-held PDAs used 
In-Store Receiving GSOPs adhered, Hand-held PDAs used 
In-Store 
Replenishment:  
Types of Storage8 
• Supplier 
Sponsored 
storage boxes 
• Back room 
• Top of display 
shelves 
• Sponsored 
storage boxes 
• Back room 
• Top of display 
shelves 
• Back room 
• Top of display 
shelves 
• Below 
escalators 
• Back room 
 
 
 
Figure 4-24 Types of storages used by medium-OOS stores
                                               
8 See  Figure 4-24 for types of storage used by medium-OOS stores. 
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The back room of W-4-A, unlike the other three stores (see Table 4-9), was located above the store. 
They used a unique way of moving stocks from the back room down to the display areas (see Figure 
4-25). The back rooms of the other three stores (see Figure 4-26) were used to store not only stock, 
but also display items of expired promotions (e.g. suppliers’ display boards that promoted special 
‘deals’) awaiting pick-up by suppliers. 
 
                                                
Figure 4-25 Replenishment from second level of store W-4-A 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-26 Back rooms of medium-OOS-OS stores 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Stocks were 
lifted in and out 
of back store on 
the second level 
through this 
hole…with this 
forklift truck. 
Supplier’s display items (expired) which 
promoted special ‘deals’ or new products, 
awaiting pick-up by suppliers. 
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 Locations and Causes of OOS and OS in Medium-OOS Stores 4.4.3
OOS and OS occurrences at various stages of in-store process at medium-OOS stores are 
indicated in Figure 4-27, together with the GSOPs and SSOPs designed to address their 
occurrences.  
 
Error scans and confusion caused by inaccurate or out-dated barcodes of products in PoS 
resulted in mistakes at checkout stations. Poor staff diligence at the receiving stage resulted 
in inaccurate inventory information, especially in cases where incorrect receipts, while 
manually noted, were not recorded in a timely manner on the systems as staff became 
overwhelmed with the pressure to expedite incoming deliveries and avoid congestions at 
receiving areas. Poor supplier performance often caused confusion due to packaging 
mistakes and missing records of returns, which in turn affected inventory accuracy. Stores 
experienced OS due to HQ warehouse pushing excess stocks into the stores. Additional 
challenges caused by the HQ warehouse included, wrong deliveries, as well as missing 
records of product returns.  
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Figure 4-27 Locations and causes of OOS & OS in medium-OOS stores 
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 GSOPs and SSOPs of Medium-OOS Stores  4.4.4
The GSOPs and SSOPs of medium-OOS stores are summarised in the following tables 
(See Tables 4-10 to 4-14). The majority of the stores in this group adhered to the GSOPs 
laid down by HQ.  
 
Before OOS Occurrence 
HQ adopted ‘preventative’ strategies toward in-store operations. For example, GSOP for 
transaction scans at the checkout stations were to be fast and accurate. To encourage such 
performance, FS factored accurate (scans) performance in the calculation of cashiers’ 
remuneration. Another GSOP related to maintaining accurate inventory information was on 
the timely release of the list products’ barcodes. GSOPs required store managers to 
collaborate with HQ to ensure the list was accurate. One particular store, N-3-A, would make 
personal calls to HQ regularly to ensure that their list of product barcodes was accurate. 
 
During OOS Occurrence 
Most stores in this group adhered to GSOPs as OOS or OS occurred at the different stages 
of in-store processes. . However, one store (N-3-A) extended GSOPs and established 
SSOPs that allowed quick resolutions, such as immediate correction of error scans at 
checkout stations or confusion caused by inaccurate information on product barcodes in the 
PoS system. 
 
After OOS Occurrence 
After the occurrences of OOS or OS, store managers seemed to adopt a less strict approach 
towards errors caused by staff, suppliers and HQ warehouse. Their preferred approach was 
towards counselling and collaboration to improve the performance of staff, suppliers and HQ 
warehouse. Some store managers made personal calls to their suppliers to ensure inventory 
and delivery information was updated and accurate. GSOP for incorrect deliveries from 
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suppliers warranted a financial penalty of S$200 to S$300 per occurrence, but store 
managers did not enforce the rule. Instead, they withheld issuance of the fine if suppliers 
delivered correct stock within the same day. They also worked closely with HQ warehouse to 
ensure accurate information in all parties’ systems so that supplier relationships were 
maintained.  
 
In summary, most characteristics of stores in this group were heterogeneous. Three stores 
in this group adhered to most GSOPs in the management of OOS occurrences. One 
particular store, N-3-A, established SSOPs to ensure specific in-store activities (such as 
error scans), were quickly resolved. With regard to GSOPs to manage OOS occurrences 
that occurred in other in-store processes, N-3-A adhered to them accordingly.  
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Table 4-10 GSOPs and SSOPs to address causes that occurred at checkout stations in medium-OOS stores 
 BEFORE DURING AFTER 
CAUSES GSOP SSOP GSOP SSOP GSOP SSOP 
Cashier scan error • Cashier trained to scan 
each item.  
• Factored scan 
accuracy performance 
into remuneration. 
 SM to overwrite PoS so 
cashier rescans item(s). 
N-3-A & W-4-A SE 
overwrites PoS. 
• Cashier is counselled 
or disciplined.  
• Sent for further training 
if necessary. 
• N-3-A SM tolerated but 
will counsel if errors 
increased. 
• N-4-C & W-4-A SMs 
counselled. 
Under scans during peak 
hours 
 
• Cashier trained to scan 
each item.  
• Factored scan 
accuracy performance 
into remuneration. 
 • Error was undetected 
until inventory levels in 
system indicated 
discrepancy.  
• Immediate investigation 
by SM followed into 
cause of discrepancy. 
 Cashier is counselled or 
disciplined. 
 
N-3-A, N-4-C & W-4-A 
SMs counselled cashier, 
stressed remuneration 
incentive. 
 
Error scans due to 
similarity in packaging 
Cashier trained to scan 
each item. 
 SM to overwrite PoS so 
cashier rescans item(s). 
N-3-A & W-4-A SE 
overwrites PoS. 
Cashier is counselled or 
discipline 
• N-3-A SM tolerated but 
will counsel if errors 
increased. 
• N-4-C & W-4-A SMs 
counselled. 
List of barcodes is not 
current in PoS 
SM to collaborate with 
headquarters to ensure 
list of barcodes are 
updated. 
N-3-A calls HQ to closely 
collaborate to ensure 
accurate information in 
both parties’ systems. 
 
• SM to call HQ to upload 
updated list into PoS.  
• Print the updated list to 
manually overwrite on 
PoS when necessary. 
N-3-A, W-3-C & W-4-A 
SM tasks SE to manually 
overwrite PoS when 
necessary. 
SM to collaborate with 
HQ to ensure list of 
barcodes are updated. 
 
N-3-A called HQ to 
closely collaborate to 
ensure accurate 
information in both 
parties’ systems. 
 
PoS only detects item 
barcode & not packaging 
bar code. Thus bulk 
purchase discount not 
awarded. 
• System problem 
currently being 
reviewed by SM at time 
of interview. 
• Cashier advised to be 
diligent to pick up 
occurrence. 
 Cashier to manually 
overwrite the PoS and 
key in bulk discount. 
 System problem 
currently being reviewed 
by SM at time of 
interview. 
 
Bar code that links to 
type of packaging is 
missing for some 
products in PoS 
SM to collaborate with 
HQ to ensure list of 
barcodes are accurate. 
N-3-A calls HQ to closely 
collaborate to ensure 
accurate information in 
both parties’ systems. 
 
• SM to call HQ to upload 
updated list into PoS.  
• Print the updated list to 
manually overwrite on 
PoS when necessary. 
N-3-A, W-3-C & W-4-A 
SM tasks SE to manually 
overwrite PoS when 
necessary. 
 
SM to collaborate with 
HQ to ensure list of 
barcodes are updated. 
 
N-3-A called HQ to 
closely collaborate to 
ensure accurate 
information in both 
parties’ systems. 
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Table 4-11 GSOPs and SSOPs to address causes that occurred at stage before checkout station (customers’ baskets in medium-OOS stores 
 BEFORE DURING AFTER 
CAUSES GSOP SSOP GSOP SSOP GSOP SSOP 
Pilferage/Theft Staff to be diligent to 
spot such incidence. 
 
• N-3-A has 5 IST 
members, W-3-C 
has 6 & W-4-A has 
13. 
• N-4-C SM requires 
all staff to double as 
security team. 
• Print out pictures of 
regular 
unreasonable 
shoppers and 
habitual thieves. 
• Displayed them onto 
notice board in SM 
office to help staff 
spot them. 
 
• Apprehend and 
escort to SM office. 
• Encourage ‘culprit’ to 
pay for stolen item.  
• If not, contact police. 
 Staff to be praised 
and rewarded for 
being diligent. 
 
 
Table 4-12 GSOPs and SSOPs to address causes that occurred at Receiving Stations in medium-OOS stores 
 BEFORE DURING AFTER 
CAUSES GSOP SSOP GSOP SSOP GSOP SSOP 
Error scans • Receiver trained to 
scan only item bar 
code.  
• Scans to be checked 
with records on PDA. 
N-4-C & W-4A SM will 
visit receiving stations 
to assist in easing 
congestion when 
necessary. 
Error was undetected 
until inventory levels 
in the system 
indicated discrepancy.  
 • Receiver to be 
counselled and sent 
for retraining if 
necessary.  
• If poor diligence 
occurred again, a 
warning letter would 
be issued. 
N-4-C & W-4-A SMs 
counselled. 
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Table 4-13 GSOPs and SSOPs to address causes that occurred at HQ warehouse of medium-OOS stores 
 BEFORE DURING AFTER 
CAUSES GSOP SSOP GSOP SSOP GSOP SSOP 
Over/Under order pick Stores to share 
information with HQ to 
ensure accuracy in 
both parties’ systems. 
N-3-A called HQ to 
closely collaborate to 
ensure accurate 
information in both 
parties’ systems. 
• Raise & submit 
documentation to 
note error deliveries 
to HQ.  
• SM to call for 
missing orders to be 
delivered in the next 
scheduled delivery.  
• If over stock, adhoc 
promotions to 
encourage 
movement of over 
stock. 
W-4-A restacked 
stock to make space. 
 
Stores to share 
information with HQ to 
ensure accuracy in 
both parties’ systems. 
 
N-3-A called HQ to 
closely collaborate to 
ensure accurate 
information in both 
parties’ systems. 
 
Pushes stocks onto 
stores thereby 
causing over-stocking 
Continuous planning 
possible space 
management 
strategies to anticipate 
such an occurrence. 
 • Activate creative 
space management 
strategies such as, 
adhoc specials 
• Restack stock to 
accommodate extra-
stock. 
W-4-A restacked 
stock to make space. 
 
SM to feedback and 
remind to HQ about 
challenges related to 
space. 
 
N-3-A called to HQ to 
minimize such 
occurrences. 
 
Products returned to 
headquarters but the 
records were not 
updated 
Stores to share 
information with HQ to 
ensure accuracy in 
both parties’ systems. 
N-3-A called HQ to 
closely collaborate to 
ensure accurate 
information in both 
parties’ systems. 
SM to remind HQ via 
personal call to 
update the records. 
 
• N-4-C SM mentioned 
about updating 
records to visiting 
HQ staff at the store. 
• W-3-C tolerated 
HQ’s untimely 
updating of records. 
SM to feedback and 
remind the 
implications of 
inaccurate information 
on inventory 
forecasting. 
N-3-A called HQ to 
closely collaborate to 
ensure accurate 
information in both 
parties’ systems. 
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Table 4-14 GSOPs and SSOPs to address causes attributable to suppliers of medium-OOS stores 
 BEFORE DURING AFTER 
CAUSES GSOP SSOP GSOP SSOP GSOP SSOP 
Wrong product Stores to share 
information to ensure 
accuracy in both parties’ 
systems. 
• N-3-A called suppliers 
to closely collaborate to 
ensure accurate 
information in both 
parties’ systems. 
• N-4-C, W-3-C &W-4-A 
spoke to supplier 
representatives at the 
stores. 
Penalty for incorrect 
deliveries. However, if on 
good terms, allow 
supplier to correct 
delivery within the same 
day. 
 • Remind suppliers the 
importance of accurate 
deliveries.  
• If occurrences were 
high, feedback to HQ 
so that official warning 
can be issued. 
 
• N-3-A called suppliers 
to closely collaborate to 
ensure accurate 
information in both 
parties’ systems. 
• N-4-C, W-3-C &W-4-A 
spoke to supplier 
representatives at the 
stores. 
Short-packed/ 
wrong quantity 
Stores to share 
information with 
suppliers to ensure 
accuracy in both parties’ 
systems. 
• N-3-A called suppliers 
to closely collaborate to 
ensure accurate 
information in both 
parties’ systems. 
• N-4-C, W-3-C &W-4-A 
spoke to supplier 
representatives at the 
stores. 
• Accept quantity and 
allow supplier to bring 
remaining quantity 
within the same day. 
Otherwise, raise 
documentation to note 
split-delivery.  
 • Remind suppliers the 
importance of accurate 
deliveries.  
• If occurrences were 
high, feedback to HQ 
so that official warning 
can be issued. 
 
 
Supplier error packaging Receiver/ 
Stacker to be diligent to 
spot such incident. 
• N-3-A called suppliers 
to closely collaborate to 
ensure accurate 
information in both 
parties’ systems. 
• N-4-C, W-3-C &W-4-A 
spoke to supplier 
representatives at the 
stores. 
• If serious error, SS will 
remove affected items 
from display shelf, SM 
contacts supplier 
immediately. 
• If minor, cashier to note 
error when scanning 
affected items.  
• If necessary, supplier to 
deliver affected items 
with correct packaging 
immediately. 
 SM to feedback supplier 
and collaborate to work 
on putting in checks to 
spot such incidents. 
 
• N-3-A called supplier to 
work on preventing 
occurrence. 
• N-4-C, W-3-C &W-4-A 
spoke to supplier 
representatives at the 
stores. 
 
Products returned to 
suppliers but the records 
were not updated 
Stores to share 
information with 
suppliers to ensure 
accuracy in both parties’ 
systems. 
• N-3-A called suppliers 
to closely collaborate to 
ensure accurate 
information in both 
parties’ systems. 
• N-4-C, W-3-C &W-4-A 
spoke to supplier 
representatives at the 
stores. 
• Inaccurate information 
undetected until 
inventory reconciliation 
exercise was 
conducted. SM to call 
supplier for immediate 
action. 
 SM to feedback and 
remind suppliers the 
implications of inaccurate 
information on inventory 
forecasting. 
 
• N-3-A called suppliers 
to closely collaborate to 
ensure accurate 
information in both 
parties’ systems. 
• N-4-C, W-3-C &W-4-A 
spoke to supplier 
representatives at the 
stores. 
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 In-Store OOS and OS Management  4.4.5
Store managers in this group adopted a more tolerant attitude towards errors made by their 
staff and suppliers compared to low-OOS stores. Some store managers felt that there were 
unavoidable factors, such as makeshift receiving areas, while others preferred to encourage 
and counsel staff about the importance of reliable OSA. The different approaches were 
influenced by store managers’ attitude towards employee welfare and retention.  
 
Store Managers’ Influence on Range of Products 
Stores with larger display floor area provided a wider range of products and services 
compared to smaller stores. For example, two-storied supermarkets had a wet market and 
groceries sections on the ground floor, health and beauty sections and electronic goods 
sections on the second floor. Such stores offered a wide array of live seafood (see Figure 4-
28) and VAS, such as on-site services of a butcher and fish monger. With an extensive array 
of fresh food, the challenge to achieve accurate forecasting for this product category was 
highlighted by some store managers. Loss of stock due to damage and pilferage was high in 
this product category. Store managers used strategies, such as repackaging and heightened 
security to minimize losses. Loose products were repacked into set units and/or weight per 
packet, e.g., fresh fruits delivered in rattan baskets by suppliers, were repacked into small 
packets or shrink-wrapped on Styrofoam trays (see Figure 4-29, read Box 4-3).  
 
 
Figure 4-28 Wide range of live seafood 
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Figure 4-29 Repacked fresh fruits 
 
Electronic goods (see Figure 4-30, read Box 4-4) were not part of the standard list of 
products issued by HQ but were offered in response to customers’ requests. Customers’ 
who requested electronic goods were international students or parents of international 
students that resided near one store (N-3-A). Foreign workers from India, China and 
Philippines were also buying electronic goods from the stores (N-3-A and W-4-A). Store 
managers explained that locals, i.e. Singaporeans, also purchased electronic products due 
to convenience and perceived reasonable prices. 
 
 
 
Figure 4-30 Electronic goods in two-storied supermarket 
 
 
 
Box 4-3 
“We offer two types of packaging for some fruits to 
distinguish quality. When we receive the fruits from the 
suppliers, our staff will quickly sort out the ones that are in 
very good condition and pack them into the Styrofoam 
trays. The remaining fruits would be sold loose (unpacked) 
in the wooden fruit trays. Other reasons for re-packaging 
the fruits is to quick replenishment (due to easier handling 
compared to unpackaged fruits) and to minimize pilferage.” 
W-4-A 
Box 4-4 
“We didn’t stock electronic goods such as rice cookers. 
But we noticed more and more foreign students and 
workers visit our stores. So we offered a small range of 
cheaper brands of rice cookers to see if they would be 
interested. To our surprised, the rice cookers were sold 
out very quickly. So we kept introducing new ranges of 
electronic goods. We noticed that even our local 
(Singaporean) customers were buying the electronic 
goods. Therefore, we decided to provide an extensive 
range of electronic goods in our store. Assistant 
Manager, N-3-A 
 
137 
 
Store Managers’ Influence on Store Operations 
While GSOPs were closely followed by store managers of stores in this group, these stores 
worked closely with HQ to establish and implement SSOPs. Store managers successfully 
convinced numerous suppliers to sponsor storage boxes (see Figure 4-31, read Box 4-5) 
because they found storage via such storage boxes was safer than block stacking stocks in 
open spaces on top of display shelves. As such, they actively approached suppliers to 
sponsor the installation and maintenance of storage boxes. In return, brands carried by 
these suppliers were advertised on the storage boxes. Another advantage of the storage 
boxes was that stackers improved their replenishment efficiency because of quick 
identification of stocks as well as ease in stock retrieval. 
 
 
Figure 4-31 Improved replenishment from supplier-sponsored storage boxes 
 
Stores’ Relations with Store Staff 
Stores in this group experienced staff diligence issues at checkout stations and receiving 
stage (see Figure 4-32). While HQ indicated corrective actions for mistakes made, store 
managers adopted a more tolerant and encouraging attitude toward compared to low-OOS 
stores. They preferred to investigate and send staff for training whenever mistakes occur.  
 
“We have one person in charge of receiving. Even before the store opens at 7am each day, the 
deliveries have already started. Suppliers will stop coming after 4pm but deliveries from HQ 
can sometimes sent deliveries just before we close for the day. We go through over 150 POs 
Box 4-5 
“Before having the supplier sponsored storage boxes, we block-
stacked stocks on top of the display shelves. As we replenish the 
shelves during operating hours, sometimes there will customers near 
the stackers. Therefore, stackers have to be careful not to drop the 
stock. So they took a longer time to replenish the shelves. Another 
problem we had before we had the boxes was customers who helped 
themselves with the stocks above the shelves.” Acting Assistant 
Manager, N-4-C  
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(purchase orders) each day so it is very easy to make mistakes. Sometimes, we send more 
staff to help at receiving when too many suppliers and HQ deliveries, all come at the same time. 
We do what we can to help each other basically. But mistakes will happen.” Store Executive, 
W-4-A 
 
“…our loading/unloading bay….is sheltered and quite spacious. So we can easily 
accommodate several deliveries coming in at the same. So receiving should be good, correct? 
No..we still have mistakes at this stage. We try talking to the staff in charge of this area and ask 
them why they make mistakes and they always blame the suppliers for inaccurate deliveries or 
stocks go missing. We will need to seriously review this process.” Supervisor, W-3-C 
 
   
Figure 4-32 Dedicated and sheltered receiving areas 
 
Stores’ Relations with Headquarters (HQ) 
Stores in this group worked closely with HQ on in-store activities, especially activities related 
to inventory, forecasting, and in-store ordering. However, most stores experienced “dumping 
of excessive stocks” by HQ. This was done to make space in HQ’s warehouse for incoming 
stocks, new and/or promotional products. Stores had to establish creative ways to manage 
space, such as putting excess stocks in roller cages, so as to accommodate stocks that 
were not ordered and/or oversupply of stocks ordered.  
 
“Maybe because our store is quite big (2-stories) so HQ always deliver a lot of stocks to 
us…stocks which we didn’t order. We called HQ to complain (about it) before but they still do it. 
So these days, we just accept it and get my ‘people’ (stackers) to find space to accommodate 
the excess stock.” W-4-A 
 
“Sometimes, HQ would deliver more stocks than ordered. We called HQ to let them know such 
deliveries of extra stock caused us a lot of problems because we really don’t have the 
space…to manage this problem, we just have many adhoc promotions to clear existing stock to 
make space for excess stocks.” N-4-C 
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Stores’ Relations with Suppliers 
Suppliers’ performance for stores in this group had been poor with persistent incorrect 
deliveries and non-timely updates in their systems. For example, suppliers failed to update 
their systems of stores’ returns of damaged goods or incorrect products. Instead of issuing 
penalties for poor performance, store managers arranged face-to-face meetings with 
incumbent suppliers to discuss ways to minimize and resolve issues. 
 
“Normally, Store managers don't meet vendors. Vendors deal only with our (HQ) buyer on new 
products, price negotiations, promotions and so on. However, if the deliveries were consistently 
having problems, then store managers can give feedback directly to vendors during deliveries.” 
MD 
 
“We (store managers) will try to meet the sales representatives of our suppliers when they visit 
the store to manage their stocks. We work closely with them on delivery issues…hoping to 
prevent or resolve problems, maybe caused by incorrect information and therefore, we get 
wrong deliveries.” Acting Assistant Manager, N-4-A 
 
Store Relations with Customers 
Two of the four stores (N-3-A & W-4-A) were over 20,000 sqm. While they try to attend to 
customers’ requests, the reaction times were not as quick as the smaller stores in this group. 
However, as both larger stores had wider aisle space, customers’ experienced a more 
comfortable shopping experience and enjoyed a wider range of products and services 
compared to the other two smaller stores (N-4-C and W-3-C).  
 
Store personnel of N-4-C were consistently reminded by its store manager to be attentive to 
customers because there was a store from a competitor supermarket chain located across a 
pedestrian walkway. Although customers continued to patronise their store, it was not 
uncommon for the same customers to walk over to the competitor store for periodic specials.  
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“We have to be diligent with our customers’ needs. But with ABCD (competitor supermarket 
chain) so close to us, there is only so much we can do with our prices. So, we focus on 
customer service. We make sure we chat with them (customers) and be ‘super’ quick to offer 
assistance. ABCD also knows there is competition. But we cannot keep lowering our prices. So 
we monitor each other’s weekly specials to ensure we don’t have the same items or product 
category. In the end, we (FS and ABCD) will still have customers and the customers get the 
best prices for their grocery shopping. We are ‘okay’ about it.” Acting Assistant Manager, N-4-C 
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 Store with High Occurrence of OOS (High-OOS) 4.5
 Store Characteristics 4.5.1
The seven stores within this group were located in different parts of Singapore where 
consumers came from varied income levels. The average age was ten years and size of 
stores was less than 10,000 sqm. Most stores had designated receiving areas and back 
rooms. Additional store characteristics are summarized in Table 4-15. Based on the number 
of SKUs carried and the floor space of the stores, this group has an average of 0.74 sqm per 
SKU (similar to low-OOS stores). Extent of OOS occurrences averaged less than 8% (7.56%) 
in this group. Pilferage and error scans due to similar packaging were the most common 
causes of OOS occurrences in high-OOS stores. Stores characteristics (e.g. age, location, 
size, number of SKUs) within this group were heterogeneous.  
 
 In-Store Processes of Stores with High-OOS 4.5.2
Table 4-16 shows in-store processes of high-OOS stores. Products assortment offered by 
stores in this group included pre-packed fresh produce (four stores offered loose fresh 
produce as well), grocery, beauty and health products. Repacking services of fresh produce 
were offered by all stores, except one due to space limitations. GSOPs on in-store ordering 
and receiving were practised accordingly. However, stores with makeshift receiving areas 
were observed to improvise their receiving processes to prevent traffic congestions, such as 
when these areas were used as shelter from bad weather. In-store replenishment was 
conducted with stocks stored on top of display shelves. Additional stocks from back rooms 
and mobile storage9 were retrieved when top shelves stocks were finished.  
                                               
9 Stores with no backrooms relied mostly on different types of mobile modular storage methods to facilitate 
excess stocks and returns to be rolled in and out of stores before and after operating hours. Where possible, 
some stores rented additional space directly in front of the stores to extend its display areas. 
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Table 4-15 Characteristics of high-OOS store 
Store ID N-1-C S-2-A S-3-C E-1-B W-6-B W-7-B C-1-C 
Average or 
Generalised 
Characteristics 
for Group 
Store Format SS-R Hype SS-R SS-OC SS SS SS-R NA 
SKUs ± 10,000 ± 16,000 ± 11,000 ± 6,000 ± 12,000 ± 10,000 ± 3,000 ± 10,000 
Size (sqft) ± 6,000 ± 45,000 ± 4,000 ± 6,000 ± 14,000 ± 13,000 ± 5,000 ± 14,000 
Back room Y Y N Y Y N Y Y 
Receiving Area Makeshift Designated Makeshift Designated Designated Designated Makeshift NA 
Age 15 7 5 11 3 3 25 10 
% of OOS 7 4 5 18.7 6.32 4 7 7.56 
Internal Security 
Team (IST) 5 7 4 4 6 5 5 5 
Top 3 Common 
Causes of OOS 
and OS 
• Error deliveries 
from HQ 
• Stock keeping 
error 
• Error scans due 
to similar 
packaging 
• Pilferage 
• Stock keeping 
error 
• Supplier records 
not updated with 
store returns 
• Pilferage 
• Stock keeping 
error 
• Under/Over 
scans 
• Pilferage 
• Inaccurate 
Forecasting 
• Error scans due 
to similar 
packaging 
• Pilferage 
• Error scans due 
to similar 
packaging 
• Inaccurate 
supplier 
barcodes 
• Pilferage 
• Inaccurate PoS 
data capture 
• Error Supplier 
deliveries 
• Pilferage 
• Incorrect receipts 
• Inaccurate 
forecast of fresh 
food 
• Pilferage 
• Error scans due 
to similar 
packaging 
Location 
Characteristics 
• Amongst 
residential flats 
• Customers from 
low income 
group* 
• Within a large 
shopping centre 
near large Indian 
shopping 
precinct 
• Major public 
transport 
construction 
nearby 
• Customers from 
low to middle 
income group*  
• Void deck of a 
residential block 
• Heavily 
dependent on 
external storage 
space (i.e. 
extensive use of 
mobile storage) 
• Customers from 
low income 
group* 
• Part of a 
neighbourhood 
shopping 
precinct 
• Major hawker 
centre nearby 
• Provision shops 
of food and non-
food product 
categories 
nearby 
• Customers from 
low income 
group* 
• Below an 
industrial 
multistorey 
warehouse 
complex 
• Dormitory for 
construction 
workers nearby 
• Customers from 
low income 
group* 
• Standalone 
single storey 
building 
• Food court 
nearby 
• Surrounded by 
residential flats 
• Dormitory for 
international 
students nearby 
• 2 primary 
schools nearby 
• Customers from 
low and middle 
income group* 
• Void deck of a 
residential block 
• Customers from 
low income 
group* 
NA 
NOTE: 
Hype = Hypermarket  SS = Single storey  SS-OC = Single storey in old complex  SS-R = Single storey below residential block 
Proper = Loading/unloading bays or sheltered areas  Makeshift = At the back of store or quiet end of store, limited shelter 
*Advised by store respondents 
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Table 4-16 In-store processes of stores with high OOS 
Store ID N-1-C S-2-A S-3-C E-1-B W-6-B W-7-B C-1-C 
In-Store 
Planning:  
Product 
Assortment 
• Pre-packed 
fresh produce 
• Grocery 
• Beauty & health 
• Wet market 
produce 
• Pre-packed 
fresh produce 
• Grocery 
• Beauty & health 
• Electronic 
goods 
• DIY furniture 
• Pre-packed fresh 
produce 
• Grocery 
• Beauty & health 
• Imported beer, 
wine and alcohol 
• Wet market 
produce 
• Pre-packed 
fresh produce 
• Grocery 
• Beauty & health 
• Wet market 
produce 
• Pre-packed 
fresh produce 
• Grocery 
• Beauty & 
health 
• Electronic 
goods 
• Wet market 
produce 
• Pre-packed 
fresh produce 
• Grocery 
• Beauty & 
health 
• Imported beer, 
wine & alcohol 
• Pre-packed 
fresh produce 
• Grocery 
• Beauty & 
health 
In-Store 
Planning: 
Types of VAS 
Re-packaging of fresh produce 
Re-packaging of 
fresh produce and 
biscuits 
Re-packaging of fresh produce None 
In-Store 
Ordering GSOPs adhered, Hand-held PDAs used. 
In-Store 
Receiving GSOPs adhered, Hand-held PDAs used. 
In-Store 
Replenishment: 
Types of 
Storage10 
• Top of Display Shelves 
• Back room 
• Top of Display 
Shelves 
• Mobile Shelves, 
carts, trolleys 
• Top of Display Shelves 
• Back room 
• Top of Display 
Shelves (extra 
high ceiling) 
• Supplier 
sponsored 
storage boxes 
• Top of 
Display 
Shelves 
• Mobile racks 
• Back room 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
10 See Figure 4-33 for types of storages in high-OOS stores. 
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Figure 4-33 Types of storages in high-OOS stores 
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 Locations and Causes of OOS and OS in High-OOS Stores 4.5.3
Consistent with the presentation of the earlier two groups of stores, the causes of OOS and 
OS occurrences at the various stages of the in-store process of high-OOS stores are 
illustrated in Figure 4-34, together with corresponding GSOPs and SSOPs designed to 
address the occurrences. 
 
Similar to stores with low- and medium-OOS occurrences, stores in this group also 
experienced errors caused by staff and IT systems. However, the impacts of errors were 
heightened due to constant delay in detecting the errors, e.g. incorrect deliveries noted at 
the receiving stations but were not updated in a timely manner into the system. Other 
common causes of errors included packaging issues from suppliers as well as poor staff 
unfamiliarity with store systems. Error scans due to similarity of packaging and supplier 
mislabelling stocks also occurred in stores.  
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Figure 4-34 Locations and causes OOS & OS in high-OOS stores 
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 GSOPs and SSOPs of High-OOS Stores  4.5.4
GSOPs and SSOPs to manage the occurrence of OOS and OS at respective stages of in-
store processes are summarised in Tables 4-17 to 4-21.  
 
It can be observed from Tables 4-17 to 4-21 that the stores in this group complied with some 
GSOPs but most store managers implemented SSOPs to minimise OOS and OS in their 
stores especially, to manage OOS occurrences caused by HQ warehouse and suppliers. 
 
Before OOS Occurrence 
GSOPs were designed to ensure staff diligence executing in-store activities, accuracy in 
inventory information and the fostering of collaborative relationships with suppliers. Most 
GSOPs related to in-store performance were adhered to. However, with regard to relations 
with HQ and suppliers, most stores managers established SSOPs to ensure collaborative 
relations were consistent. Personal calls were made by store managers to both HQ and 
suppliers to ensure that both parties’ inventory information and deliveries were updated and 
accurate. 
 
During OOS Occurrence 
During OOS occurrences, most store managers were less strict with staff and suppliers that 
had poor performances. However, it was noted that detection of errors was after a period of 
time, resulting in increased implications to store inventory information.  
 
After OOS Occurrence 
Compared with stores of low- and medium-OOS and OS occurrences, a noted difference 
was that most store managers in this group preferred to counsel their staff, despite frequent 
recurrence of mistakes. Some store managers even tolerated poor staff performances due to 
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concerns of availability of manpower. Store managers from this group preferred to 
collaborate with suppliers to resolve the latter’s poor performance.   
 
In summary, unlike stores from the other groups, i.e. low- and medium-OOS groups, where 
characteristics of most stores were heterogeneous, the characteristics of all stores in this 
group were heterogeneous. Store managers in this group, although conforming to most 
GSOPs, failed to enforce corrective actions to minimise or ease errors committed by staff, 
HQ and suppliers. For example, instead of enforcing GSOP to discipline staff when lack of 
diligence caused errors in checkout stations, some store managers (N-1-C, S-3-C and C-1-C) 
only counselled the staff, while others tolerated the poor performance due to concerns of 
availability of manpower. The result of such a lax approach may be the underlying reason 
why stores in this group experienced high OOS.  
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Table 4-17 GSOPs and SSOPs to address causes that occurred at checkout stations in high-OOS stores 
 BEFORE DURING AFTER 
CAUSES GSOP SSOP GSOP SSOP GSOP SSOP 
Cashier scan error • Cashier trained to 
scan each item.  
• Factored scan 
accuracy 
performance into 
remuneration. 
 SM to overwrite PoS 
so cashier rescans 
item(s). 
S-2-A SE overwrites 
PoS. 
 
• Cashier to be 
counselled or 
disciplined.  
• To be sent for further 
training if necessary. 
• N-1-C, S-3-C & C-1-
C SMs only 
counselled. 
• S-2-A & E-1-B SMs 
tolerated but if error 
increased, cashier 
would be counselled. 
Under scans during 
peak hours 
 
• Cashier trained to 
scan each item.  
• Factored scan 
accuracy 
performance into 
remuneration. 
 • Error was 
undetected until 
inventory levels in 
system indicate 
discrepancy.  
• Immediate 
investigation 
followed into cause 
of discrepancy. 
 Cashier to be 
counselled or 
disciplined. 
 
S-2-A & E-1-B SMs 
tolerated but if error 
increased, cashier 
would be counselled. 
Error scans due to 
similarity in packaging 
 
Cashier trained to 
scan each item. 
 SM to overwrite PoS 
so cashier rescans 
item(s). 
S-2-A SE overwrites 
PoS. 
 
Cashier to be 
counselled or 
disciplined. 
• N-1-C, S-3-C & C-1-
C SMs only 
counselled. 
• S-2-A & E-1-B SMs 
tolerated but if error 
increased, cashier 
would be counselled. 
PoS deducts loose 
item inventory despite 
carton bar code was 
scanned. 
System problem was 
being reviewed by SM 
at time of interview but 
Cashier advised to be 
diligent to pick up 
occurrence. 
 Cashier to manually 
overwrite the PoS and 
key in the correct 
information. 
 System problem was 
being reviewed by SM 
at time of interview. 
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Table 4-18 GSOPs and SSOPs to address causes that occurred at stage before checkout station (customers’ baskets) in high-OOS stores 
 BEFORE DURING AFTER 
CAUSES GSOP SSOP GSOP SSOP GSOP SSOP 
Pilferage/Theft Staff to be diligent to 
spot such incidence. 
 
N-1-C has 6 IST 
members, S-2-A has 
7, S-3-C has 4, E-1-B 
has 4, W-6-B has 4, 
W-7-B has 5, & C-1-C 
has 5. 
• Apprehend and 
escort to SM office. 
• Encourage ‘culprit’ to 
pay for stolen item.  
• If not, contact police. 
 Staff to be praised 
and rewarded for 
being diligent. 
 
 
Table 4-19 GSOPs and SSOPs to address causes that occurred at receiving stations in high-OOS stores 
 BEFORE DURING AFTER 
CAUSES GSOP SSOP GSOP SSOP GSOP SSOP 
Error scans Receiver trained to 
scan only item bar 
code. Scans to be 
checked with records 
on PDA. 
 Error is undetected 
until inventory levels 
in the system indicate 
discrepancy.  
 • Receiver to be 
counselled.  
• To be sent for 
retraining if 
necessary.  
• If it occurs again, a 
warning letter would 
be issued. 
S-3-C, E-1-B, W-6-B 
& C-1-C SMs only 
counselled receiver. 
Headquarters/Supplier
s under-deliver but 
staff accepts 
consignment. Incident 
is noted but not timely 
updated in PDA 
system. 
Receiver trained to 
note error deliveries 
and update to PDA 
system immediately. 
 Receiver raise note 
but stops there so as 
to alleviate congestion 
in the receiving 
station. Error only 
detected when 
discrepancy arises 
from inventory 
reconciliation exercise 
is conducted. 
 Receiver to be 
counselled or 
disciplined. 
 
S-3-C, E-1-B, W-6-B 
& C-1-C SMs only 
counselled receiver. 
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Table 4-20 GSOPs and SSOPs to address causes that occurred at HQ warehouse of high-OOS stores 
 BEFORE DURING AFTER 
CAUSES GSOP SSOP GSOP SSOP GSOP SSOP 
Wrong product 
delivered 
Stores to share 
information with 
suppliers to ensure 
accuracy in both 
parties’ systems. 
S-2-A, E-1-B, W-6-
B & W-7-B SMs 
called HQ to closely 
collaborate to 
ensure accurate 
information in both 
parties’ systems. 
• Raise 
documentation to 
note error delivery.  
• SM to call HQ to 
put correct product 
onto next 
scheduled 
delivery. 
 
• S-2-A, E-1-B, W-6-
B & W-7-B SMs 
called HQ  
• N-1-C, S-3-C & C-
1-C mention it in 
the next ordering 
cycle. 
 
SM to collaborate 
with HQ to ensure 
list of barcodes are 
updated. 
 
S-2-A, E-1-B, W-6-
B & W-7-B SM call 
HQ to closely 
collaborate to 
ensure accurate 
information in both 
parties’ systems. 
 
Products ordered 
but not delivered 
Stores to share 
information with HQ 
to ensure accuracy 
in both parties 
systems.  
S-2-A, E-1-B, W-6-
B & W-7-B SMs 
called HQ to closely 
collaborate to 
ensure accurate 
information in both 
parties’ systems. 
• Raise 
documentation to 
note missing 
deliveries.  
• SM to call HQ for 
missing orders to 
be on next 
scheduled 
delivery. 
 
• S-2-A, E-1-B, W-6-
B & W-7-B SMs 
calls HQ. 
• N-1-C, S-3-C & C-
1-C mention it 
when someone 
from HQ visits the 
store. 
 
Stores to share 
information with HQ 
to ensure accuracy 
in both parties 
systems. 
 
S-2-A, E-1-B, W-6-
B & W-7-B SMs 
called HQ to closely 
collaborate to 
ensure accurate 
information in both 
parties’ systems. 
 
Supplier award 
differential pricing 
with competitor 
supermarket 
Stores to 
collaborate with 
suppliers to ensure 
close relations and 
negotiate to get 
competitive pricing. 
S-2-A, E-1-B, W-6-
B & W-7-B SMs 
called suppliers. 
 
Headquarters upon 
discovery would 
block 
distribution/sales of 
products under that 
supplier until 
incident was 
resolved. Stores 
disallowed to 
interfere. 
 Stores to 
collaborate with 
suppliers to ensure 
good relations and 
negotiate to get 
competitive pricing. 
S-2-A, E-1-B, W-6-
B & W-7-B SMs 
called suppliers. 
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Table 4-21 GSOPs and SSOPs to address causes attributable to suppliers of high-OOS stores 
 BEFORE DURING AFTER 
CAUSES GSOP SSOP GSOP SSOP GSOP SSOP 
Wrong product delivered Stores to share 
information with 
suppliers to ensure 
accuracy in both parties’ 
systems. 
S-2-A, E-1-B, W-6-B & 
W-7-B SMs call suppliers 
to closely collaborate to 
ensure accurate 
information in both 
parties’ systems. 
Penalty for incorrect 
deliveries. However, if on 
positive terms, allow 
supplier to correct 
delivery within the same 
day. 
 
E-1-B issued penalty. 
 
• Remind suppliers the 
importance of accurate 
deliveries.  
• If occurrences are high, 
feedback to HQ so that 
official warning could 
be issued. 
S-2-A, E-1-B, W-6-B & 
W-7-B SMs called 
suppliers. 
 
Short-packed/wrong 
quantity 
 
Stores to share 
information with 
suppliers to ensure 
accuracy in both parties’ 
systems. 
S-2-A, E-1-B, W-6-B & 
W-7-B SMs call suppliers 
to closely collaborate to 
ensure accurate 
information in both 
parties’ systems. 
• Accept quantity and 
allow supplier to bring 
the remaining quantity 
within the same day.  
• Otherwise, raise 
documentation to note 
split-delivery.  
E-1-B issued penalty for 
wrong delivery. 
 
• Remind suppliers the 
importance of accurate 
deliveries.  
• If occurrences are high, 
feedback to HQ so that 
official warning can be 
issued. 
• S-2-A, E-1-B, W-6-B & 
W-7-B SMs call 
suppliers to closely 
collaborate to ensure 
accurate information in 
both parties’ systems. 
• N-1-C, S-3-C & C-1-C 
mentioned the error 
when suppliers’ 
representatives visited 
the stores. 
 
Supplier error packaging Receiver/Stacker to be 
diligent to spot such 
incident. 
S-2-A, E-1-B, W-6-B & 
W-7-B SMs call suppliers 
to closely collaborate to 
ensure accurate 
deliveries. 
• If serious error, remove 
affected items from 
display shelf and 
contact supplier 
immediately.  
• If minor, cashier to note 
error when scanning 
affected items.  
• If necessary, supplier 
has to deliver affected 
items with correct 
packaging immediately. 
E-1-B issued penalty for 
wrong delivery. 
 
SM to feedback to 
supplier and collaborate 
to work on putting in 
checks to spot such 
incidents. 
 
S-2-A, E-1-B, W-6-B & 
W-7-B SMs called 
suppliers. 
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 In-Store OOS and OS Management  4.5.5
Store managers in this group adopted a collaborative approach towards managing OOS and 
OS occurrences. They counselled staff and made personal calls to suppliers to resolve 
conflicts or errors. 
 
Store Managers’ Influence on Range of Products 
The majority of products offered in stores under this group were prescribed by HQ. Similar to 
stores with low- and medium-OOS and OS occurrences, stores in this group also offered 
products requested by their respective customers.  
 
“As you can see, near to our store is a dormitory for construction workers. So they come in and ask for 
cheap “tilam” (meaning mattress in Malay), cheap furniture like foldable chairs and tables, pots and fans. 
So you will find such items in our store but not in other stores. We sell quite a lot of “tilam” actually. Even 
some locals (Singaporeans) also buy the “tilam”….maybe for their maids. With such wide variety of 
products offered, our stackers must ensure stocks are always available. But if HQ or suppliers don’t 
deliver on time, we will lose customers to the other shops selling similar items near our store” Store 
Manager, W-6-B 
 
However, while the majority of the products prescribed by HQ were offered, store 
management of this group used varying packaging strategies to suit customers’ buying 
habits as well as to minimise inventory shrinkage. The hypermarket had dedicated sections 
in non-display floor areas to perform repackaging of fresh food and vegetables. Single storey 
stores had small spaces on display floor areas dedicated to re-packaging products received 
in bulk directly from suppliers, such as fruits, vegetables, condiments and biscuits (see 
Figure 4-35). Repackaging loose items into standardised bags or shrink-wrapped on 
Styrofoam trays resulted in reduction of product damage and loose items repackaged into 
bigger packaging also deterred pilferage as handling larger packaging by customers was 
more visible. Larger packaging also proved more difficult to steal. 
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Figure 4-35 Re-packaging of fresh food 
 
Store Managers’ Influence on Store Operations 
In-store operations of stores in this group were mostly guided by GSOPs. However, SSOPs 
were also established to cater for idiosyncratic elements of the market environment that 
affected in-store operations. For example, single storey stores located in residential blocks 
rolled out trolleys containing a variety of products, such as fresh produce (fruits and 
vegetables), confectionery, household cleaning products and low-value health and beauty 
products (facial tissues and toilet paper rolls) to rented display areas outside the stores. 
These trolleys were then rolled back into the stores when they closed. As trolleys of products 
were positioned outside, store managers allocated additional levels of security to deter 
pilferage. Store managers appointed current staff to ‘double-up’ as security officers while 
they carried out their normal responsibilities, especially staff at checkout stations. The 
hypermarket in this group also adopted security measures used by other large stores in the 
case supermarket chain, e.g. the use of internal security teams as well as CCTV-captured 
images of thieves printed and posted in main staff offices.  
 
Although most stores in this group replenished display shelves from storage areas within the 
stores’ premises (e.g. top of shelves or back rooms), one particular store (W-6-B) had  
longer replenishment lead times compared to the other stores because it had two back 
rooms – one located behind but within the premise of the store and a second back room that 
was a single storey building separated from the store, located approximately five minutes 
away (see Figure 4-36, read Box 4-6). The second back room stored excess stock that the 
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first back room could not manage, stocks of packaging materials and excess material 
handling equipment (e.g. empty fruit and vegetable baskets or used carton boxes).  
 
 
 
                                                      
Figure 4-36 Walkway from main store leading to second back room 
 
Stores’ Relations with Store Staff 
Stores in this group experienced errors occurring in checkout stations, in receiving as well as 
ordering activities. However, store managers in this group did not penalise their staff, instead 
adopting a tolerant approach towards poor staff performance. When asked if mistakes 
occurred at checkout stations, store managers acknowledged that mistakes occurred during 
peak times and also when they didn’t receive updated list of barcodes in the store system 
before store opening hours. Store managers believed that staff made mistakes due to 
unavoidable factors that affected their ability to perform well. 
 
“We don’t have a set place for receiving, as you can see. The only shelter the staff gets was 
that big umbrella. When it gets very hot or when there was a storm, that task was very hard to 
perform because there was no shelter and there was no loading/unloading bay. So mistakes 
would surely happen. We can only advise and caution the staff to be more careful in future.” 
Assistant Executive, S-3-C 
 
“We were supposed to sack them after three times but we don’t because it is hard to find 
proper workers. Most locals don’t want to work in supermarkets because of long hours and 
poor pay. And also, they have to see customers’ face (i.e., deal with difficult and unreasonable 
This is the 
store 
Unsheltered 
walkway 
leading to 
second 
back room 
Box 4-6 
“…the second back room stored all the excess stock and packaging 
materials. Good to have the space but no good because it takes longer to 
retrieve or store goods from it. And when it rains, it’s bad because by the 
time we push the stocks into this back room, the cartons or loose stocks 
would be wet. Then my staff would have to dry the items before storing 
them. Similarly when retrieving stocks from here to go into the store, my 
staff would need to dry the items before they put on the shelves…This is 
very time-consuming.” Manager, W-6-B 
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customers). So they don’t apply for the positions. So when a ‘Johorian’ (i.e. an applicant from 
Johor Bahru in Malaysia) apply, we take them. If you look around, most of the staff on the floor 
are from Malaysia. They worked for a while; found that it was good, so they called their family, 
relatives and friends to come over too. The only problem is their English is not very fluent. 
Luckily, they can speak Chinese and Malay, so not so bad.” Assistant Store Manager, C-1-C 
 
“Staff from Malaysia are easier to manage as they are more obedient and hardworking than the 
locals. Locals can get quite arrogant – sometimes, when they are not happy, they just walk out.” 
Store Manager, N-1-C 
 
“Quality workers are hard to find. Many Singaporeans don’t want to work in supermarkets 
because of the long hours and that they have to face demanding customers. So we have no 
choice but to employ the Malaysians. Generally, they are very hardworking but their language 
skills and computer skills are inadequate. But if they are “trainable” that means, they are willing 
to be trained, follow instructions and so on, then, it is okay. But we have staff who make 
mistakes and don’t admit it…they blame others…argue with customers…these are the ones 
that are not “trainable”. Assistant Manager S-2-A 
 
“I have this female staff, kept making mistakes. I gave her so many warnings, even written 
letters and also sent her for company training, but still cannot improve. In the end, one day, I 
watched what she was doing, and pointed out the mistakes to her directly. She seemed to 
improve. So I decided to train her myself and she improved a lot. So from that time onwards, I 
will train staff in my store myself as I found it much faster and effective. Also maybe because I 
use Chinese to explain to them the processes.” Store Manager, W-6-B 
 
Stores’ Relations with Headquarters (HQ) 
The majority of the stores in this group worked closely with HQ, with some stores ‘yearning’ 
for more independence than others. The store management of such stores expressed such 
attitudes because they had been ‘around’ much longer and had established SSOPs that 
worked for their stores (but were not necessarily in line with GSOPs).  
 
“The way we run our store is a bit different from the other stores because we have been here a very 
long time and we know our customers very well and they know us very well too. What is important is that 
our store must operate profitably so that HQ will not come down on us. If we don’t do well, then HQ can 
come to us and force us to follow back their policies.” Assistant Store Manager, C-1-C 
 
As a majority of the stores were single-storey and located in residential areas, store 
managers paid more attention to customers’ requests because competition was more 
intense in residential locations.  
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“It is tough for us – there is Ang Mo Kio Hub (a shopping centre of 350,000 sqm retail space with a bus 
interchange at its basement) just down the road so we need to come up with ideas to attract customers 
to come in. Sometimes, it is not about prices – we try to make friends with them so that they feel more 
comfortable and friendly when they shop with us. Whereas if they shop there (Ang Mo Kio Hub), 
because the shops are big, they have to spend time to buy their things. Here, we try to make it more 
friendly and they can find us and ask questions about the products. Sometimes, we even suggest 
recipes for them…..no choice..just have to be more creative to attract them (the customers).” Assistant 
Store Manager, C-1-C 
 
Stores in this group commonly experienced errors caused by HQ deliveries and inaccurate 
information between HQ system and respective stores’ systems. For example, when HQ 
made wrong deliveries, stores were still required to accept them, with adjustments made in 
stores’ records, and when stores returned damaged goods to HQ, but HQ system did not 
register the transaction, it was still recorded by the stores’ systems.  
 
Stores in this group also experienced OOS occurrences due to conflicts between HQ and 
suppliers. Because of this, HQ blocked the distribution of the products belonging to the 
incumbent supplier, causing OOS of those products within the stores. Suspension of these 
suppliers’ products also affected other stores in the supermarket chain. However, 
respondents from stores of the other two groups (i.e. low- and medium-OOS stores), felt that 
the conflict was managed at HQ level and that they had no involvement in the resolution. 
While the conflict was being resolved, some store managers of high-OOS stores (S-2-A, W-
6-B and W-7-B) offered similar products at discounted prices. This SSOP was also 
established by some store managers of low- (N-2-A, E-2-B, E-3-B and E-6-B) and medium-
OOS stores (N-3-A and W-4-A). 
 
“Sometimes, we can experience stockout in certain brands or assortment because HQ blocked 
the supply. Once, we found out that HQ blocked because they found out that the supplier was 
giving our competitors cheaper prices than us. The issue was quite serious because it was one 
of our major suppliers…even our MD became involved in the discussions. Anyway, we just let 
them handle the situation. When customers asked us about the OOS product, we just 
explained that supplier was having issues.” Supervisor, C-1-C 
 
158 
 
“When HQ blocked certain brands or product assortment, we will offer similar brands and 
products assortment with discounts or allocated bigger shelf space, so that customers will still 
buy from us. The grocery industry in Singapore is very small so news gets around and 
suppliers of similar brands and products assortment would exploit the situation and ‘run’ 
promotions to entice customers to switch to their brands and products.” Assistant Manager, S-
2-A 
 
Stores’ Relations with Suppliers 
Store managers in this group worked closely with suppliers and their sales representatives, 
with frequent communications to improve forecasting and product performance. When errors 
occurred in deliveries and packaging, some store managers would feed back to suppliers via 
email while others would make personal calls to in order to resolve conflicts. 
 
“Our store offers a very wide range of products and our customers have given us feedback that 
they really like the wide range we offer. Therefore, we try very hard to minimize storage space 
inside the store to ensure display space was optimized and that aisles were wide enough for 
customers to shop in comfort. Therefore, we don’t want suppliers to give us wrong stock…we 
try to avoid being out-of-stock because our customers will complain to us. So we would call 
them regularly to ensure our orders were retrieved from their (suppliers’) systems were correct.” 
Manager, E-1-B 
 
Stores’ Relations with Customers 
Store managers from this group were proactive towards customers assistance because most 
stores were patronised by customers from low income groups. According to store managers, 
these customers were most likely to switch stores due to price differences.  
 
“Our stores do offer very competitive low prices but they are competitive compared to other 
supermarket chains and major convenience stores. Our customers are very price conscious so 
we make sure we do our market research adequately and ensure lowest prices for most items 
in the store. But we know that there are customers who are willing to pay a bit more for 
convenience, e.g. they rather buy a packet of sugar from the provision shop below their home 
rather than walk all the way here, even though if it was a five minutes’ walk. In that case 
(scenario), we cannot help it. What we can manage is to offer lowest prices and very good 
customer service. Talk to them like our friends rather than just customers. They are happy 
when they shop here and we are happy because we get to chat with them. So it becomes a 
friendly and happy store atmosphere.” Manager, N-1-C 
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Store managers of three stores (S-2-A, W-6-B and W-7-B) were familiar with the needs of 
two different types of customer – foreigner workers and students. These three stores were 
located near construction sites as well as dormitories. Therefore, in order to attract and 
retain their patronage, store managers made efforts to ‘reach out’ to these customers and  
learn about their needs (food and non-food products) and limitations (budget and living 
space). 
 
“….because many of our customers are not local (Singaporean)…they are construction 
workers mainly from Bangladesh and China, so we try to stock items they’re familiar with, such 
as curry or turmeric powder. And because they tend to save money on food so that they send 
the rest back home, they usually buy the cheapest range of food items. So we stock those 
product ranges for them. We know them well because we talk to them. Initially, especially the 
Bangladesh workers were very shy…we tried to talk to them and they walked away. So we 
stopped and start again with body language – we just smiled at them. Over times, the smile 
became ‘hellos’ and then, we managed to chat with them. That’s how we come to be familiar 
with their buying behaviour. Manager, W-6-B 
 
Store managers of two stores (E-1-B and W-7-B) revealed that they also had customers who 
owned or worked in food stalls in the hawker center and food court located within minutes of 
the FS store. Although these customers procured most of their ingredients from wholesale 
markets, they also bought certain ingredients (e.g. garlic, onions and bean sprouts) from 
these two stores. 
  
“We have hawkers buying some of their supplies from us because they said the quality of our 
vegetables, such as, bean sprouts were better than their own suppliers. Besides, they said 
bean sprouts spoil easily so they’d rather buy smaller quantities and if they need more, they 
would need to walk less than three minutes to our store to buy them. Over time, we’ve become 
their regular supplier of highly perishable food items, such as bean sprouts.” Manager, W-7-B 
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 Summary Discussion 4.6
Close examination into how the 19 FS stores managed OOS and OS occurrences in their 
stores revealed that there was no patterns observed to the stores in each group by standard 
metrics, such as district, size, age, number of SKUs, receiving area and back rooms). 
Although there were standardised guidelines on execution of in-store logistical activities, 
there were major factors that affected the stores’ ability to manage OOS and OS 
occurrences. While GSOPs and SSOPs provided insight on ‘why’ and ‘how’ OOS and OS 
occurrences were managed, it was also observed from the findings that ‘when’ (i.e. at which 
point of the execution of in-store processes) those operating strategies were actioned had 
some influence on store performance.  
 
 Error Detection Lead Time 4.6.1
From the findings, it was noted that stores from the three groups experienced common 
causes of OOS and OS occurrences, such as poor staff diligence, especially amongst staff 
working in receiving and checkout stations. Error scans occurred in both stations, resulting in 
inaccurate inventory information in the systems. GSOPs stated that staff personnel had to be 
disciplined or given verbal warning, and most store managers from low-OOS stores (except 
the store manager from E-2-B) counselled and disciplined their staff. Store managers from 
medium- and high-OOS preferred to counsel and tolerate errors made by their staff, HQ and 
suppliers.  
 
Another key observation on the rectification of scanning errors was the time taken to detect 
the error as well as to action the relevant GSOPs and SSOPs. Store managers from low-
OOS stores adopted a proactive approach in the detection of errors at receiving and 
checkout stations. Store managers from medium- and high-OOS stores relied on their 
cashiers to be diligent in their scans because GSOP had factored in accurate scan 
performance in their remuneration. Error scans that occurred in medium- and high-OOS 
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stores were only detected when inventory system did not reconcile with the PoS system, 
meaning that error scans were detected and rectified much faster in low-OOS stores. 
However, an interesting observation noted that the time taken to detect errors at scan 
stations was affected by the size of the store. For instance, most stores had similar store 
features: one receiving station and at least three checkout stations. However, the larger 
stores had more than three checkout stations. To ensure adequate monitoring of scan 
stations, more senior staff would be required. The size of store also determined the number 
of senior management available per store (see Table 4-22). As such, the size of store and 
number of senior management available per store influenced the amount of time spent on 
error detection and resolution.  
 
For example, while some stores managers (e.g. from low-OOS store C-2-C and medium-
OOS store N-4-C) stated that they positioned themselves at checkout stations and receiving 
stations, it was not the situation that each checkout line had a store manager on hand to 
resolve any conflict that may occur. Store managers stationed themselves at checkout 
stations and waited for cashiers to ‘signal’ (i.e. either raise their hand, call for the store 
manager or speak into their two-way radios) for assistance. If a cashier failed to highlight the 
mistake, store managers would not be able to detect error immediately. Store managers 
could only be stationed at either the checkout station or the receiving station but not at both 
areas at the same time. Therefore the bigger stores with a store manager and more than 
one store executive  were apparently better able to monitor checkout and receiving stations 
at the same time. 
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Table 4-22 Senior Management available per store 
Store Size Senior Management Per Store 
Small stores  
(Category C - 4000 to 9000 
sqm) 
Store Manager x 1 
Store supervisor x 1 
Medium stores  
(Category B - 10,000 to 33,000 
sqm) 
Store Manager x 1 
Assistant Manager or Acting Manager x 1 
Store Executive x 1 
Store supervisor x 2 
Large stores  
(Category A - 25,000 to 45,000 
sqm) 
Store Manager x 1 
Assistant Manager or Acting Manager x 1 (per department – e.g. 
Fresh food, Meat, Seafood, Grocery and Non-Food) 
Store Executive x 1 (per department) 
Store supervisor x 1 (per department) 
Source: FS’s MD (2010) 
 
 Replenishment and Shelf Management 4.6.2
Another finding revealed in this study is that in-store replenishment performance varied 
across 19 stores due to factors such as types of storage (e.g. top of display shelves, 
sponsored supplier storage boxes and back rooms) and shelf space management. Most FS 
stores replenished display shelves from stocks stored in the space above tops of display 
shelves. This approach allowed fast and convenient display shelves replenishment. Small 
stores (e.g. S-3-C, C-1-C, N-1-C, and E-1-B, all from high-OOS groups) with narrow aisles 
could only replenish display shelves before and after stores’ operating hours due to space 
constraint and to ensure safety of customers. However, as deliveries from suppliers were 
during operating hours, replenishment of display shelves became challenging and the 
situation was exacerbated for stores with no back room or extended space on the shop front. 
During one of the interviews, stackers were seen hurriedly stuffing stocks into any available 
space they could find in the small store (the shore where this occurred had no back room) or 
in the extended space at the shop front to keep the aisles (very narrow) clear for customers. 
 
 Some store managers from the three groups (N-2-A from low-OOS stores, N-3-A from 
medium-OOS stores and S-2-A from high-OOS stores) established a SSOP that insisted that 
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products had to be placed to the edge of display shelves, with products’ front facing forward. 
Benefits of products being placed to the edge of display shelves include, creating the illusion 
of OSA, and allowed stackers to improve management of stock levels on the shelves. 
However, replenishment lead time in these stores resulted longer than those who did not 
have this SSOP, which meant duration of item OOS was longer.  
 
 Space to Manage SKUs 4.6.3
An interesting observation in the findings was the amount of space available to manage the 
wide range of SKUs in stores. Looking at the average number of SKUs per store and 
average store size in the three groups, it was noted that both low- and high-OOS stores had, 
on average, 0.74 sqm per SKU and the medium-OOS stores had 0.97 sqm per SKU. From 
these results, it is fair to assume that medium-OOS stores had more space to manage SKUs 
compared to both low- and high-OOS stores.  
 
To manage SKUs offered by each store, FS stores had different types of storage. The most 
common type of storage across all FS stores was above the display shelves, allowing for 
quick replenishment. The next most common type of storage space was in back rooms, 
although there were size differences as well as variations in back room location. Stores with 
back rooms mostly had access behind the stores, with the exception of two stores (medium-
OOS store W-4-A and high-OOS store W-6-B) where the back room was located away from 
the store. This had the implication that the stackers in these latter stores took longer to 
replenish shelves with goods from their back rooms. Stores with no back rooms managed 
storage of stock using the tops of display shelves and a range of mobile storage equipment, 
such as roller cages, mobile shelves and mobile trolleys. 
 
When space was still needed to manage excess stock, FS stores also used a range of 
mobile storage equipment, which could be rolled out of stores during store opening hours 
and rolled back into the stores when they were closed. The system of mobile storage 
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equipment was placed behind the store or out of pedestrian walkways during store opening 
hours. While the system of mobile storage equipment helped stores to manage excess 
stocks, replenishment lead time was lengthened due to time spent on ‘search and retrieval’ 
as there were no formal systems on how to arrange the stock inside the respective types of 
mobile storage equipment.  
 
Another method used to manage excess stock was the implementation of creative 
management strategies, such as adhoc store specials and ‘stock clearance specials’. Store 
managers from the three groups, especially from medium-OOS stores, used this method 
whenever HQ pushed excess stock into their stores.  
 
 Level of Effort in Relationship Management 4.6.4
GSOP stated that stores should share information with HQ and suppliers to ensure inventory 
records in all three parties’ systems. In addition to the sharing of inventory information, 
GSOP also tasked store managers with communicating to suppliers the importance of 
accurate deliveries. Most store managers from low-OOS stores made personal calls to HQ 
and suppliers to ensure inventory records and deliveries were accurate. However, when an 
incorrect delivery occurred, most store managers from low-OOS stores made personal calls 
to HQ and suppliers to rectify the discrepancies as soon as they were discovered. One store 
manager from medium-OOS stores (e.g. N-3-A) and most store managers from high-OOS 
stores also made personal calls to HQ and suppliers to ensure accurate inventory 
information and deliveries. Other store managers only made it a point to stress to HQ staff or 
suppliers’ representatives the importance of accurate inventory information and deliveries 
when they visited the store. Highlighting the importance of accurate inventory information to 
HQ staff or suppliers’ representatives strongly suggests that the level of effort made by store 
managers towards ensuring accuracy in inventory information and operations has important 
ramifications on mitigating OOS and OS occurrences. 
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 Customer Reactions to OOS 4.6.5
Collectively, store managers of the 19 stores agreed the need for high levels of customer 
service. As such, all store personnel were trained to be customer-centric: attentive towards 
customers’ needs for assistance and helping customers to complete their grocery shopping 
needs. To achieve OSA, GSOPs were established to keep display shelves full (e.g. stackers 
and senior management were to conduct frequent physical walkabouts during operating 
hours to monitor stocks on display shelves). In the event that a display shelf was empty, 
GSOP tasked stackers to place yellow OOS labels over product display labels while 
retrieving more stocks from storage areas to replenish shelves. In addition, there were four 
possible actions (leave shelf, continue to display yellow label, remove OOS item product 
label and expand neighbouring products or replaced with substitute) to be taken if there was 
no stock of OOS item in store. In short, FS stores had established strategies to minimise 
customers’ reactions to OOS, with the main aim being to ensure that customers complete 
their grocery shopping in their stores. 
 
 Location Characteristics 4.6.6
Location characteristics were found to affect how store managers managed OOS and OS 
occurrences in their stores. Findings revealed that not all store managers adopted HQ’s list 
of products to be offered. The newer stores adopted a higher percentage of products listed 
by HQ and the reason given was the short length of operation and the fact that the stores 
were still gathering insights on customer buying preferences. The older, more established 
stores only adopted 60 (and at most 80) per cent of products listed by HQ and the remaining 
product assortment was provided to suit their customers’ buying preference. For example, 
stores with a high proportion of customers from low income groups, tended to stock cheaper 
brands of groceries and wet market fresh produce. While this strategy sustained store 
patronage, the wide variations in product assortments adopted by the older stores posed a 
challenge for HQ to manage. Not only did they have to manage the supply chain of 
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prescribed products but also of those unique to the different stores. With increased product 
proliferation and high inventory levels, order-picking operations at HQ warehouses faced 
complexity and higher chance of mistakes (Skinner 1974). Such mistakes could flow into the 
stores and cause OOS and OS occurrences. In contrast, findings from this study have 
revealed that stores with higher SKUs had a lower extent of OOS occurrences when 
compared with stores with lower SKUs, which experienced higher extent of OOS 
occurrences (see Table 4-23).  
 
Table 4-23 Comparisons of SKUs and extent of OOS occurrences in low-, medium- and     
                    high-OOS stores. 
 Low-OOS Stores Medium-OOS Stores High-OOS Stores 
SKU (Average) ± 15,000 ± 17,000 ± 10,000 
% of OOS (Average) 0.98% 2.70% 7.56% 
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 Conclusion 4.7
Within-group analysis revealed that some in-store processes experienced higher frequency 
of errors (e.g. receiving and checkout stations) compared to other in-store processes. Errors 
were caused by staff (e.g. under-scans at checkout stations, error scans due to similarity in 
packaging) and physical store factors (e.g. error scans at makeshift and unsheltered 
receiving stations to prevent congestion at the stations, longer replenishment times due to 
lack of back rooms). A system of mobile storage equipment (e.g. roller cages, mobile racks 
and shelves) was adopted to manage OS of products caused by internal factors (e.g. when 
HQ pushed excess stock onto stores) and external factors (e.g. unsuccessful product 
promotions). The time taken to detect and resolve in-store process errors by store managers 
also affected the integrity of stock level information in the stores’ systems.  
 
Store managers paid special attention to relationship management with HQ and suppliers, 
so as to enable quick resolution of errors in inventory information and prompt correction of 
inaccurate deliveries. Some of the initiatives taken by store managers to maintain good 
relations with HQ and suppliers included personal calls to HQ and supplier, assisting 
suppliers with replenishment when customer traffic was low and the store managers’ 
keenness to improve product knowledge from suppliers. Store managers also adopted 
customer-centric strategies (e.g. being attentive to customers’ need for assistance, replacing 
shelf-tags of OOS items with yellow OOS labels while stackers retrieved replenishment stock 
and frequent walkabouts by store staff to check stock levels of display shelves) to ensure the 
minimisation of customer reactions to OOS. 
 
Finally, the adoption of micro-marketing strategy on offering localised product assortment 
caused HQ to experience challenges in managing their extensive product assortment ranges. 
HQ not only had to manage the ‘chain-wide’ list of products, but also had to manage product 
assortment specifically offered by stores to meet local customers’ demands. This increase in 
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product complexity had resulted in a higher occurrence of mistakes made with orders and 
deliveries. 
 
The next chapter will examine the above issues in further depth, together with a comparative 
analysis of OOS and OS management approaches employed by stores in the three groups.  
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Chapter 5 Discussions 
The within-group analysis revealed different levels of efforts expended by managers of low-, 
medium- and high-OOS stores in managing OOS and OS occurrences. Most store 
managers of low-OOS stores displayed high levels of diligence in the detection and 
resolution of errors. These managers also made their staff responsible for achieving and 
maintaining OSA by including incidence of mistakes made that had a direct, or perceivable 
indirect, impact on inventory record as an employee performance indicator. The exception 
was E-3-B, which took little proactive action to increase GSOP effectiveness, though it 
adhered closely to GSOP. On the other hand, most high-OOS store managers (except those 
of W-6-B and W-7-B, which adhered to GSOP) displayed tolerance and acceptance of 
mediocre outputs from staff, HQ and suppliers. To understand the effects of contrasting 
attitudes towards causes of OOS and OS occurrences in stores, this chapter cross-
examines the findings of the within-group analysis to identify similarities and differences 
between OOS and OS management approaches used by store managers in the three 
groups. 
 
The chapter is organised into three main sections, starting with Section 5.1, which presents 
the key findings of the cross-group analysis, including a discussion of the main similarities 
and differences in the management of OOS and OS causes common across the three 
groups. Section 5.2 discusses the management of OOS and OS occurrences in stores in 
each of the three groups. The discussion includes a list of propositions that provide insights 
on how FS’s stores managed OOS and OS occurrences. Section 5.3 concludes the chapter 
with a summary discussion that highlights key considerations in the management of OOS 
and OS occurrences in the stores of supermarket chains.  
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 Cross-Group Analysis 5.1
 Key Findings 5.1.1
Findings showed that although the three groups of stores experienced different causes of 
OOS and OS, eight common causes were identified as those experienced by stores in all 
three groups (see Table 5-1).  
 
Table 5-1 Causes of OOS and OS occurrences experienced by low-, medium- and high- 
                  OOS stores 
Stage where Causes Occurred Causes of OOS and OS Occurrences 
Checkout Station • Cashier error scans  
• Error scans due to similarity packaging 
Customers’ Basket • Pilferage 
Receiving Station • Accounting error due to error scans 
Ordering • Inaccurate product demand knowledge 
Suppliers • Wrong deliveries 
• Suppliers’ error in packaging 
HQ Warehouse • Pushed excess stocks to stores 
 
Looking at the eight common causes as reportedly experienced by stores from the three 
groups, five were due to FS staff: cashier error scans, errors scans due to similar packaging, 
accounting error due to error scans and inaccurate product demand knowledge and HQ 
pushing excess stocks to stores. The remaining three causes were due to external factors 
where FS management had little or no control: pilferage, incorrect deliveries and suppliers’ 
errors in packaging. It is therefore apparent that the most common causes of OOS and OS 
occurrences experienced by all stores were related to in-store logistical processes. It was 
also observed that the frequency of in-store errors increased during peak operational times 
(e.g. high customer traffic, several deliveries arriving at the same time and urgent 
replenishment of shelves during times of high customer traffic). 
 
In addition to the eight causes faced by stores of the three groups, the findings also revealed 
that low-OOS stores cited the highest number of OOS and OS causes (18). Medium-OOS 
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stores reported 15 different causes, while high-OOS stores indicated 13 causes of OOS and 
OS occurrences. The reason low-OOS stores reported the highest number of OOS causes 
might have been because store managers from that group treated OOS and OS occurrences 
as major factors affecting their store performance. As such, store managers from low-OOS 
stores were more diligent towards managing OOS and OS occurrences, as compared to 
store managers of medium- and high OOS stores. 
 
Another observation was related to how store characteristics (i.e. store size, number of 
SKUs and floor space to SKU ratio) influenced store managers’ ability to manage OOS and 
OS occurrences. Extant literature suggests that the above store characteristics affected 
store managers’ ability to manage OOS and OS occurrences. However, this does not seem 
to be the case with FS stores. For example, when compared with medium- and high-OOS 
stores, low-OOS stores had the largest average store size, managed the second-largest 
number of SKUs and yet experienced the lowest amount of OOS occurrences. High-OOS 
stores had the smallest average store size and number of SKUs but experienced the highest 
amount of OOS occurrences. Based on these observations, it could be inferred that these 
store characteristics were factors that store managers considered in managing OOS and OS 
occurrences. It is possible that the larger the store size and SKUs offered, the higher the 
pressure to ensure store performance. However, it could also be argued that regardless of 
the differences in the aforementioned store characteristics, store managers with a proactive 
attitude towards management of OOS and OS occurrences via strict adherence to GSOPs 
could improve store performance, as Ton and Huckman (2008) assert. Store managers from 
low-OOS stores were successful in keeping OOS occurrences down, despite high levels of 
SKUs, contradicting Skinner’s (1974) suggestion that high levels of SKUs would increase 
operational complexity and result in higher operational problems. Store managers of low-
OOS stores displayed positive attitudes towards management of OOS and OS occurrences 
with high levels of diligence in error detection and resolution. They also made consistent 
172 
 
efforts to work closely with HQ and suppliers to ensure information on inventory and 
deliveries were accurate. 
 
 Key Similarities in OOS and OS Management 5.1.2
Table 5-2 lists eight common causes of OOS and OS occurrences and approaches adopted 
by store managers of the three groups. As these eight common causes were well known to 
have the potential of causing OOS and OS occurrences, or were familiar to store managers, 
GSOPs and SSOPs were deployed, with the exception of a proactive approach adopted 
towards the improvement of the design of PoS system. This proactive approach emerged as 
a collective reaction from some store managers from larger stores (e.g. N-2-A, N-3-A, S-2-A, 
E-4-A and W-4-A) because they were frustrated with recurring mistakes caused by design 
issues of the PoS system.  
 
Table 5-2 Key similarities in OOS & OS management 
Causes of OS & OOS Store Managers have Similar Approaches for: 
Inaccurate information due to 
inherent design issues in PoS 
system 
Proactive towards resolution. Store managers 
collaborated to provide suggestions to address and 
improve PoS system design. 
Headquarters pushes stocks onto 
stores 
Stackers were empowered by store managers to 
implement creative space management strategies, 
such as restacking stocks in storage areas followed 
by ad-hoc specials and ‘clear stock’ promotions, to 
accommodate the over-stocked items. 
Inventory shrinkage of loose items 
in the fresh produce sections due 
to  
Store managers positioned themselves in strategic 
areas as a deterrent. 
Organized retail crime (ORC) When apprehended, the police were always contacted. 
Over-stocking of promotional items 
Stackers tasked to monitor promotional stocks for 
planning and staging of ad-hoc specials to improve 
stock movement. 
 
The approaches adopted to manage the eight common causes of OOS and OS occurrences 
reflected store managers’ common attitude towards managing these causes despite 
173 
 
differences in store characteristics (i.e. store size, number of SKUs, location and length of 
operations).  
 
Approaches to manage ‘unknown’ or unfamiliar causes varied due to the differing experience 
stackers and store managers had in dealing with unknown causes. In other words, stackers 
and store managers who had worked for FS, or had worked in the supermarket industry, 
might have been better equipped to manage unknown causes. However, information on 
stackers’ and store managers’ years of experience in the supermarket industry or length of 
service with FS was not included in the date collection exercise. This would be a factor for 
future research, i.e. to investigate the extent to which experience in supermarket operations 
could affect employees’ (stackers and store managers) management of OOS and OS 
occurrences.  
 
 Key Differences in OOS and OS Management 5.1.3
Cross-group analysis examined how stores from the three groups managed OOS and OS 
occurrences in their stores. Findings revealed that the way GSOPs and SSOPs were 
implemented could result in different extents of OOS and OS occurrences.  
 
Table 5-3 lists the main factors that contributed to OOS and OS occurrences in stores under 
the three groups. The table also lists the various approaches undertaken by store managers 
in the three groups to manage factors contributing to OOS and OS occurrences.  
 
Most factors were staff-related, such as competence levels, diligence and trainability. While 
the culture of FS stores embraced the importance of relationships and positive re-
enforcement strategies, such as encouragement and rewards, mistakes remained due to 
staff lacking due diligence.  
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Store managers of low-OOS stores adopted strict approaches towards staff who had 
demonstrated lack of diligence, such as verbal warnings, re-training and customised or 
personalised re-training when necessary. For example, an employee working at the 
checkout station had a poor command of the English language and therefore failed to 
improve her skills from re-training sessions conducted in English. Her store manager 
realised the problem and personally re-trained her on PoS specifications in Mandarin. Store 
managers in medium- and high-OOS and OS occurrence groups tended to adopt a more 
staff-friendly approach by counselling and encouraging staff to be more careful and attentive.  
 
Though a lack of staff diligence was partly to be blamed, inaccurate product scans at the 
receiving stage and checkout stations were also unavoidable realities, due to the practical 
limitations faced by stores, such as lack of supervisory personnel to oversee the checkout 
stations. In many instances, errors were only detected when regular systems’ updates 
produced discrepancies in reports, especially during inventory reconciliations. Error 
occurrences increased when several deliveries arrived at the same time and when the stores 
experienced peak patronage, such as weekends or before festive holidays. 
 
Managers of low-OOS stores adopted proactive strategies to deal with this recurring issue, 
such as putting more staff at checkout stations during peak periods and stationing 
themselves near checkout stations to enable quick conflict resolution and avoid or minimise 
congestion. Some store managers examined the situation when mistakes occurred and 
instead of penalising the staff, encouraged and counselled.  
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Table 5-3 Key differences in OOS and OS management towards factors contributing to OOS 
and OS 
Factors Contributing to OOS & OS Low-OOS Stores 
Medium-OOS 
Stores High-OOS Stores 
Number of factors  18 15 13 
Attitude towards poor staff 
performance, especially staff with 
different levels of user competence of 
store systems 
VW, CR, R, D 
Varied between E 
& T amongst 
stores. 
T followed by E 
Attitude towards information accuracy 
at checkout stations 
Pro towards quick 
resolution to 
prevent & ease 
congestion. 
E T followed by E 
Under-scans at checkout stations due 
to staff’s different levels of user 
competence of PoS system 
VW, CR, R, D E T followed by E 
Error scans at checkout stations due to 
packaging designs  VW E T followed by E 
Error, over- and under-scans at 
receiving station 
Varied between 
VW & E amongst 
stores. 
E E 
Attitude towards inventory shrinkage P & ED P P 
Attitude towards information inaccuracy 
at receiving station due to staff’s varied 
levels of PDA system competence 
VW, CR but stores 
with mobile 
receiving stations 
will be varied 
between Pro & E. 
E E 
Relationship with headquarters PC to resolve issues. 
Varied between 
PC & T amongst 
stores. 
Varied between 
PC & E. 
Attitude towards information accuracy 
with headquarters 
PC to ensure 
records is updated 
on time. 
SE to remind 
records was 
updated on time. 
SE to remind 
records was 
updated on time. 
Error deliveries by headquarters – 
wrong quantity and product 
Immediate PC to 
ESDD. If serious, 
ad-hoc delivery to 
be arranged. 
SE & FDD@HQ. 
RNSD 
SE & FDD@HQ. 
RNSD 
Error deliveries by suppliers – wrong 
quantity and product 
Varied between 
VW & PC 
amongst stores. 
ESDD if possible. 
Varied from VW, E 
& PC amongst 
stores. RNSD if 
possible. WWNSD 
if necessary. 
Varied from VW to 
PC. RNSD if 
possible. WWNSD 
if necessary. 
Attitude towards information accuracy 
with suppliers 
PC to ensure 
records is updated 
on time. 
Varied from PC 
and/or FSDR@S 
PC and/or SE to 
ensure records 
are updated on 
time. 
NOTE: 
VW = Verbal Warning  CR = Customised Re-training  PC = Personal Calls  E = Encouragement  T = Tolerance  
Pro = Proactive  RT = Early Retrain  D = Dismissal  P = Prevention  ED = Early Detection  
ESDD = Expect same day delivery  RNSD = Request next schedule delivery  SE = Send email  
FSDR@S = Feedback to suppliers’ driver and representative at store  
FDD@HQ = Feedback to delivery drivers from headquarters  WWNSD = Will wait for next scheduled delivery 
 
176 
 
Store managers of medium- and high-OOS tolerated mistakes (because they understood the 
constraints faced by affected staff) or encouraged and counselled staff on the importance of 
how individual performance could affect the overall team performance of the store. Although 
these store managers appeared to have adopted a sympathetic style of management, they 
did not appear to have effectively curbed frequency of errors committed, as evident in the 
higher extent of OOS and OS occurrences they experienced compared to those of the low-
OOS group. 
 
Mistakes made due to inaccurate scans at receiving stations caused inaccurate inventory 
information in the stores’ systems. Staff at receiving stations would record the error manually 
(on a piece of paper), with the intention to update the system while they waited for the next 
delivery. But it was common for staff to forget to follow up the task. In some instances, 
records were updated only after the next round of inventory ordering had occurred, and this 
delay caused OS in affected products. Store managers from low-OOS stores enforced strict 
management towards such incidences via verbal warnings or strong words of 
encouragement towards performance improvement. Store managers from medium- and 
high-OOS stores, on the other hand, tended to counsel and encourage staff to be more 
attentive and to seek help when needed. 
 
Store managers of the three groups also exercised different levels of effort in order to 
manage relationships with HQ. Store managers of low-OOS stores would make regular 
personal calls to engage with HQ and to resolve conflicts. This approach was proven 
effective as problems tended to be resolved almost immediately. This finding corroborates 
with that of Fernie and Corcoran (2010), who found that lack of formal communication and 
inadequate training from HQ to store staff have a direct impact on OSA in stores. One store 
manager (N-3-A) from a medium-OOS store used personal calls to resolve conflicts, while 
other store managers in the same group tolerated mistakes made by HQ in the hope that HQ 
would in turn tolerate mistakes made by them. Four store managers from high-OOS stores 
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always made personal calls, whereas other store managers in the same group sent informal 
emails to specific staff at HQ to resolve conflicts. An important observation was the issue 
relating to ‘who to call’ at HQ office to report problems and achieve a quick resolution. Store 
managers from low-OOS group revealed that they’ve identified specific HQ staff that had the 
ability to resolve problems efficiently and effectively.  
 
Incorrect deliveries from HQ were normally not tolerated by store managers in the low-OOS 
group. These managers noted that whenever mistakes occurred during order picking at HQ 
warehouse, their in-store operations would be affected, making it difficult to maintain OSA of 
products. Most of the low-OOS stores expected same-day re-delivery from HQ to rectify the 
mistake and would even issue strong requests for ad-hoc deliveries, especially if the affected 
stock was a high-turnover item. Store managers from medium- and high-OOS and OS 
groups, however, only emailed HQ about delivery errors and requested the corrected stock 
or corrected quantity of stock be delivered in the next scheduled delivery. 
 
Similarly, store managers from low-OOS stores did not tolerate incorrect deliveries from 
suppliers. Verbal warnings of poor delivery performance were normally issued by store 
managers, followed by personal calls to suppliers’ main office to demand correct deliveries 
be completed on the same day. Store managers from medium-OOS stores adopted different 
strategies to manage incorrect deliveries from suppliers. These strategies adopted included 
making personal calls to suppliers’ main office, reminding suppliers of the consequences of 
incorrect deliveries and requesting a concerted effort from suppliers to ensure accuracy in 
the next scheduled delivery. However, most store managers from this group tolerated short 
lengths of OOS and waited for the next day’s scheduled delivery. Four store managers from 
high-OOS stores made personal calls to the suppliers’ main office and requested the next 
scheduled delivery. They also tolerated a short length of OOS and waited for the next day’s 
scheduled delivery.  
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Accurate suppliers’ inventory information was treated as an important issue by all store 
managers, and personal calls to suppliers’ main office to ensure accuracy of information 
relating to inventory levels, forecasting and product performance were maintained. This 
practice reinforces what has also been observed in previous studies (e.g. Grant and Fernie 
2008; Ettouzani et al 2012): lack of collaboration and unreliable performance (e.g. irregular 
system updates) from suppliers affected quality of deliveries and stores’ ability to maintain 
OSA of products.   
 
 Discussion of Key Findings 5.1.4
Factors Contributing to OOS and OS Occurrences 
The aforementioned cross-group analysis shows that there were four main factors impacting 
on in-store logistical operations that led to the occurrence of OOS and OS in stores: 
inaccurate information in HQ’s ERP system, inventory shrinkage, incorrect deliveries by 
suppliers, and scanning errors at receiving and checkout stations. These four issues were 
predominantly human errors due to lapses or negligence. 
 
Inaccurate information in HQ’s ERP system typically arose from HQ’s attempt to push 
excess stocks to stores to accommodate incoming stocks at HQ’s warehouse. Poor staff 
diligence to record such unexpected stock had been identified as a common cause of OOS 
and OS occurrences in stores. Inventory shrinkage was due to pilferage and excessive 
goods-handling by customers. Incorrect deliveries by suppliers were the result of suppliers’ 
failure to update their stock levels, causing inaccurate inventory information and scanning 
errors at receiving stations in stores. Scanning errors at receiving and checkout stations 
were caused by poorly designed product packaging and other factors. However, failure to 
exercise diligence to detect the errors by check-out staff was the main cause of the problem. 
In short, the four main areas that led to OOS and OS occurrences in the case supermarket 
stores were predominantly human-related mistakes or lapses when performing in-store 
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operations. As revealed in the case findings, store managers in the three groups sought 
staff-related measures, such as recruitment of quality staff, induction training of in-store 
logistical processes and regular personal development training (especially on in-store 
systems) to improve the skills and level of diligence of store staff.  
 
The results of the cross-group analysis therefore showed that majority of the OOS situations 
in supermarkets occurred as a result of some relatively trivial matters, such as pilferage or 
scanning errors, rather than due to unexpected major logistical or supply chain disruptions. 
This observation leads to the following two propositions: 
 
P1: OOS situations are not necessarily caused by major logistical or supply chain 
disruptions. They can be triggered by relatively trivial human errors or 
operational slips. 
 
P2: Managing OOS requires an understanding of the implications resulting from 
various apparently trivial operational issues and an ability to deal with those 
issues effectively. 
 
The results of the cross-group comparison further revealed that the effective management of 
OOS lies in the manner in which GSOPs are enforced. For instance, store managers who 
adopted a proactive attitude toward rectifying information discrepancies and a disciplined 
approach toward correcting scanning errors tended to have lower OOS incidences. In 
contrast, store managers with an indifferent attitude toward resolving such discrepancies 
experienced a higher level of OOS incidences. This suggests that: 
 
P3a: Strict enforcement of GSOPs plays a crucial role in reducing the incidence of   
OOS.  
 
P3b: A proactive stance toward error identification and a disciplined approach 
toward error rectification will result in lower OOS incidence, while a tolerant 
attitude toward such issues could promote, rather than mitigate, OOS 
occurrences.  
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GSOPs related to HQ and suppliers’ delivery errors were established to minimise OOS and 
OS occurrences and to facilitate reliable supplier performance. Although penalties were in 
place to deter poor supplier delivery performance, such penalties did not apply to deliveries 
from HQ. Therefore some store managers had adopted preventative SSOPs to ensure 
reliable deliveries from both HQ and suppliers. In addition, a proactive approach towards 
early resolution of supply or delivery errors also had the effect of preventing subsequent 
OOS occurrences. On the other hand, a lax attitude that procrastinated error resolution 
simply created a latent failure path that later surfaced in more complex ways with significant 
implications on inventory management, yielding the next proposition: 
 
 P4: Early resolution of supply or delivery errors can prevent subsequent OOS 
occurrences. Deferring error resolution will not only result in OOS but can 
generate a host of unexpected inventory management problems.  
 
Furthermore, a proactive approach in dealing with supply or delivery errors may not be 
confined to operational adjustments alone. Soft, personable approaches, such as 
relationship management (e.g. a personal phone call), could readily dispel further 
propagation of errors, as evidenced from the ways in which low-OOS store managers dealt 
with these issues. These findings offer the following proposition: 
 
P5: A soft, personable approach to relationship building has the effect of limiting 
the complexities associated with OOS and results in a quicker resolution of 
the matter than a physical operational solution. 
 
Inadequate storage space was a common concern for all stores due to customers’ insatiable 
demand for increasing product ranges and VAS. Continuous efforts were therefore focused 
on finding ways to create more floor space and optimise remaining space for storage 
purposes. Although OS occurrences could be managed via the creative use of space, 
findings from this study show that such an approach may cause further problems: 
 
P6a: Managing OS through innovative space creation is only a stopgap measure. 
It will degenerate to a situation of stock mismatch and inventory inaccuracy, 
creating a false OOS and leading eventually to the occurrence of an OS 
situation. 
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When there were discrepancies in stock level information, stackers would make adjustments 
in a virtual warehouse called ‘Warehouse 99’ because although stock could appear to be low 
in the system, it didn’t mean that the stock was sold. Instead, the stock could be in the 
customers’ baskets, stolen or simply placed on another display shelf. The manner in which 
some of the FS stores, especially the low-OOS stores, dealt with the problem suggests that 
a virtual warehouse was a useful means of accounting for phantom stock, leading to the next 
proposition: 
 
P6b: Creating a virtual warehouse offers an effective means of resolving OOS 
situations arising out of innovative space creation.  
 
Literature has shown that OOS and OS occurrences were caused by external factors such 
as inadequate collaboration between distribution centres (Aastrup and Kotzab 2009) and 
retailers, and internal factors, such as inaccurate execution of in-store processes (Corsten 
and Gruen 2003).  This study has found that despite collaboration with distribution centre 
and suppliers, effective execution of in-store processes and early detection of errors were 
important factors in managing OOS and OS occurrences in the stores.  
 
Store Managers’ Attitudes toward Managing Causes of OOS and OS Occurrences 
Number of Causes Reported 
Key findings of the cross-group analysis indicated that the attitude of store managers 
towards OOS and OS occurrences influenced their level of diligence and effort towards 
management of OOS and OS occurrences. This could be observed from the number of 
causes of OOS and OS occurrences reported by each store manager from the three groups. 
 
Store managers in the low-OOS group exercised high levels of diligence in detection and 
resolution of errors, as well as greater level of effort in ensuring accurate inventory 
information and deliveries, suggesting that they possessed a concerned attitude towards the 
management of OOS and OS occurrences. Due to their keenness to minimise OOS and OS 
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occurrences in their stores, store managers of low-OOS treated each cause as important 
and therefore exerted a high level of effort to detect and address them.  
 
Medium-OOS stores reported fewer causes, while high-OOS stores had the least number of 
OOS and OS causes reported among the three groups. It is therefore plausible to suggest 
that store managers of medium-OOS stores were less concerned than their low-OOS 
counterparts in managing the causes of OOS and OS occurrences, and that store managers 
of high-OOS stores were least concern among the three groups in dealing with potential 
OOS and OS occurrences in their stores. This interpretation is consistent with findings of 
previous studies (Gruen et al. 2002; Svensson 2002; ECR Europe 2003; McKinnon et al. 
2007; Fernie and Grant 2008; Aastrup and Kotzab 2009), which have repeatedly indicated 
that senior management’s proactive attitudes towards management of OOS and OS helped 
minimize their occurrences and improve OSA in stores. This study further reveals that a 
more concerned attitude also implies a higher level of diligence in detecting possible OOS 
and OS causes, leading, in turn, not only to more conscious efforts to deal with OOS and OS 
events but also an ability to devise more effective means to minimize, as well as handle, 
their occurrences.  In sum, a concerned attitude towards OOS and OS occurrences tends to 
evoke a virtuous cycle of OOS and OS management, while a less concerned attitude would 
lead to a vicious cycle of OOS and OS occurrences. This leads to the next proposition: 
 
P7: A concerned attitude towards OOS and OS occurrences engenders a high 
level of diligence in detecting and addressing every possible OOS and OS 
cause, which also result in developing more effective means to manage OOS 
and OS events. 
 
Length of Operations, Store Size and Number of SKUs 
Of the three groups of stores, the average length of operations of medium-OOS stores was 
the shortest. Store managers from newer medium-OOS stores also confirmed that their 
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stores, being ‘new to the neighbourhood’, adhered closely to GSOPs to enable standardised 
(FS) store operations. Yet unlike their low-OOS counterparts, medium-OOS store managers 
were reluctant to enforce GSOPs that involved strict disciplinary actions (e.g. issuing verbal 
warnings or warning letters) when staff made mistakes. These store managers felt that their 
store personnel, regardless of whether they were new recruits or transferred from another 
FS store, were ‘still settling into the new environment’. In addition, store managers from 
medium-OOS stores were concerned that strict disciplinary approaches might lead to high 
staff turnover. Furthermore, managers of the newer medium-OOS stores were trying 
particularly hard to cultivate their relationship with HQ to seek the latter’s forbearance due to 
their ‘unfamiliarity’ with the new environment. This observation suggests that length of store 
operations is a factor influencing store managers’ attitude towards enforcement of GSOPs 
that involve disciplinary actions, and which inevitably affects management of OOS and OS 
occurrences in stores.  
 
Though the low-OOS stores were not as new as the medium-OOS stores, they were still 
relatively young in history of operations, and were larger in size and offered a wider range of 
SKUs compared to medium- and high-OOS stores. Store managers of new stores preferred 
to follow closely the HQ’s list of products to offer as well as the GSOPs on store operations 
because they needed to enrich their experiences in the new store environment (e.g. local 
customers’ assortment preferences and locational characteristics). At the same time, these 
new stores were also closely monitored by HQ, which wanted to ensure that the larger, new 
stores in their chain could quickly establish store loyalty among residents in the new 
environment. This observation suggests that, in addition to length of operations, size of store 
and SKUs also affect store managers’ attitude towards managing the causes of OOS and 
OS occurrences. 
 
Compared to low- and medium-OOS stores, high-OOS stores had the longest store 
operations history. Store managers from this group were mostly tolerant towards errors 
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caused by their staff, HQ and suppliers. As expected, stores that had been around for a long 
time (e.g. high-OOS stores N-1-C and C-1-C had been in operations for 15 years and 25 
years respectively) had well and truly settled into their operating environment. They had rich 
knowledge of local preferences in product assortment and the necessary experience in 
dealing with challenges caused by physical constraints (e.g. makeshift receiving areas and 
no back rooms) and locational characteristics (e.g. shopping and product preferences of 
local residents). High-OOS stores were also generally smaller in size compared with low-
OOS and medium-OOS stores and carried fewer SKUs. It appears, therefore, that the 
combination of the three factors – length of store operation, store size and SKU size – could 
influence the way in which store managers viewed the seriousness of causes of OOS and 
OS occurrences. In the case of FS’s high-OOS stores, the relatively long history of store 
operation, small store size and narrower range of SKUs might have made their store 
managers feel complacent, which, in turn may have resulted in their comparatively lax 
attitude (compared with their counterparts in the low-OOS and medium-OOS groups) 
towards managing the causes of OOS and OS occurrences.  
 
Another point to note is that the smaller stores in the high-OOS group had a smaller 
management team compared to larger stores, implying that ‘there was only so much they 
could do’ given the limited management resources on-hand. While complacency was the 
trigger, small team size (i.e. limited management resources) added further fuel to reinforce 
the lax attitude among managers of high-OOS stores towards managing the causes of OOS 
and OS occurrences. This inference leads to the following two related propositions, which 
complement Proposition 3: 
 
P8a: Length of store operation, store size and range of SKUs offered, coupled with 
management resources, could influence store managers’ attitude towards the 
causes of OOS and OS occurrences. 
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P8b: A long history of store operations coupled with a narrower range of SKUs 
offered (due to small store size) could trigger a complacency attitude among 
store managers, which, when combined with the constraint of limited 
management resources, could descend into a lax approach toward managing 
the causes of OOS and OS occurrences. 
 
Literature has indicated that formats of stores, range of products offered, size and age of 
stores affected store operations, particularly in store replenishment (Uusitalo 2001; Burt and 
Spark 1994; 1995 and Messinger and Narasimhan 1997).  The findings of this study have 
shown that while these factors affect in-store processes, the store managers were still 
instrumental to lead store staff on effective execution of in-store processes. 
 
Process Conformance 
Another observation derived from the cross-group analysis was the store managers’ level of 
adherence to GSOPs. Store managers from low-OOS stores who adhered closely to GSOPs, 
despite having the largest average store size, managed the second-largest average number 
of SKUs (as compared to medium- and high-OOS stores) and achieved the lowest average 
extent of OOS occurrences. In contrast, store managers from high-OOS stores who adopted 
a lax attitude to implementing GSOPs, despite having the smallest store sizes and managing 
the smallest average range of SKUs (as compared to low- and medium-OOS stores), were 
confronted with the highest average extent of OOS occurrences among all stores in the 
chain. The intensity of enthusiasm towards managing the causes of OOS and OS 
occurrences thus appears to be positively related to the degree of process conformance, i.e. 
an attitude of high enthusiasm leads to a higher degree of process conformance in 
managing the causes of OOS and OS occurrences, giving the following proposition: 
 
P9: The stronger the store manager’s level of enthusiasm and concern toward 
OOS and OS occurrences, the greater their tendency toward ensuring 
process conformance. 
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Having said this, it must be appreciated that store managers from medium- and high-OOS 
stores were concerned that strict adherence of GSOPs that involved disciplinary actions 
against staff could result in higher staff turnover. As such, a challenge observed from this 
discussion was the need to determine the point where strictness in process conformance 
would turn a positive effect into a negative one. 
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 Managing OOS and OS Occurrences in Stores 5.2
One of the major findings from the within-group analysis of the FS supermarket stores shows 
that managing OOS and OS events is not confined to managing their causes, i.e. taking 
actions to prevent or minimize OOS and OS occurrences, but also managing these events 
when they occur, which poses the biggest challenge, and after they occurred. Previous 
studies have explored how the use of standard operating procedures and process 
conformance improved the execution of in-store processes (Raman et al. 2001; Fisher et al. 
2006; Ton and Huckman 2008). However, these studies typically analysed OOS events after 
their occurrence. This study examined how OOS and OS events were managed before, 
during and after their occurrences in-store. This section discusses the management 
approaches used by the OOS-concerned versus the OOS-lax store managers in managing 
OOS and OS occurrences. 
 
 In-Store Operating Environment  5.2.1
From the perspective of OOS and OS management, findings from the within-group analysis 
indicate that stores of the case supermarket, FS, typically operated under four major forms 
of retail environment, defined by ‘in-store retailing dynamics’ (see Table 5-4) and ‘knowledge 
of OOS and OS causes’ (see Table 5-5). In-store retailing dynamics refers to the hype of 
activities – shopping, product delivery and receiving and shelf replenishing, amongst others 
– happening within the store. Knowledge of OOS and OS causes refers to the store 
manager’s and staff’s knowledge or awareness about in-store events, including the actions 
of other colleagues, which could lead to OOS and OS occurrences. Broadly, both in-store 
retailing dynamics and knowledge of OOS and OS causes can be divided into two 
categories. In the case of in-store retailing dynamics, the two categories are labelled as ‘high’ 
and ‘low’. In the case of knowledge of OOS and OS causes, they are referred to as ‘known’ 
and ‘unknown’ causes. 
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High in-store retailing dynamics refers to those times when the store is exceedingly busy, 
characterised by situations in which store staff are facing competing demands 
simultaneously from numerous quarters – customers, suppliers, and store management. The 
typical scenario requires store staff to leave their scheduled tasks in order to attend to those 
situations that need their ‘urgent’ attention. A typical example is the sudden arrival of stock 
during peak shopping hours that leads to stock piling up in aisles, and that requires rapid 
reorganisation of work to shelve and store goods. Another example is a sudden downpour of 
torrential rain, which causes customers to loiter within the store (increasing shopping traffic), 
deliveries to be hurriedly received and hastily pushed to aisles by suppliers, and stackers 
asked to quickly replenish shelves to clear aisle space.  
 
Table 5-4 In-store operating environment 
In-Store 
Retailing 
Dynamics 
Definition Examples 
High A vibrant shopping atmosphere 
with competing demands placed on 
store staff who have to be 
redeployed from their assigned 
duties to undertake unscheduled 
tasks or to resolve unexpected 
issues. 
• A sudden arrival of stock during peak 
shopping hours, leading to stock 
piling up in aisles, requiring rapid 
reorganisation of work to shelve and 
store goods. 
• Workers at stores with no designated 
loading/unloading area who have to 
remove stocks from busy walkway 
during peak shopping hours. 
• Sudden rain causing customers to 
loiter within store, deliveries to be 
hurriedly received and hastily pushed 
to aisles by suppliers, and stackers to 
quickly replenish shelves to clear 
aisle space. 
 
Low A sedate shopping period when 
store staff are able to carry out 
their assigned duties with little or 
no distractions. 
• Staff replenishing shelves during off-
peak shopping periods as scheduled. 
• Staff organising stock in storage 
areas (e.g. back rooms or roller 
cages) according to schedule. 
• Stackers arranging shelves to look 
presentable and fully-stocked during 
quiet shopping periods. 
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Low in-store retailing dynamics refers to those times when stores are relatively quiet and 
store staff are able to carry out their assigned duties with little or no disturbance. Staff 
replenishing shelves during off-peak shopping periods as scheduled and staff organising 
stock in storage areas (e.g. back rooms or roller cages) without having to be asked to come 
to the store front to assist customers are two of the most common examples. 
 
Table 5-5 Known and unknown OOS causes 
Knowledge 
of OOS & 
OS Causes 
Definition Examples 
Known OOS events of product items expected 
by store managers and staff. 
 
OOS and OS situations where store 
managers and staff were aware of the 
full background of its occurrences, i.e. 
how, where, when and why they 
occurred. 
• Items becoming OOS because of 
supplier delivery delay or OOS at 
suppliers’ warehouse. 
• OS of some products due to 
inaccurate store forecast, 
especially at newer stores where 
information on customer product 
preferences were still being 
collected. 
• OS of some products due to HQ 
pushing stock onto stores.  
Unknown OOS and OS of specific product items 
that store managers and staff did not 
expect and were unaware of. 
• An item becoming OOS 
unexpectedly due to mis-shelving 
by new staff or misidentification 
because of very similar packaging 
with another item in backroom. 
• External factors triggering 
excessive or panic buying (e.g. 
producer‘s sudden announcement 
in ceasing production of a popular 
product; SARS epidemic)  
• OS of some products due to 
product recall announced by 
manufacturer or health authorities 
(e.g. possible contaminated chilli 
oil from China).  
 
‘Known’ knowledge of OOS and OS causes mean that store managers and staff are very 
familiar with, or have full knowledge of, those events that have a high chance of resulting in 
an OOS and/or OS situation (e.g. when store managers know full well that a delivery failure 
or warehouse OOS situation has occurred, and therefore an OOS situation will most likely 
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ensue in-store). Such events are be classified as ‘known’ under ‘knowledge of OOS and OS 
causes’. 
 
‘Unknown’ knowledge of OOS and OS causes, on the other hand, is OOS and OS of events 
that surprise store managers and staff, e.g. OOS of product items which the store managers 
did not expect. These events include undetected mis-shelving of products by new staff, 
resulting in phantom stock in-store and the misidentification of a product item during shelf 
replenishment due to similar packaging that eventually results in an OOS or OS situation. 
FS Supermarket had GSOPs in place and its stores had their own SSOPs to manage known 
causes of OOS and OS occurrences. For example, the GSOP to deter pilferage in stores 
was to install CCTV at strategic locations within the stores. The SSOP to deter pilferage was 
for selected store staff to be a part of the internal (within-store) security team. As unknown 
causes referred to OOS events occurring unexpectedly (e.g. when the system indicated 
presence of stock but stock could not be found in the storage areas), no GSOP or SSOP 
was in place to deal with these situations. Store managers, however, still had to manage 
them quickly to minimise any negative impacts filtering to store operations and customer 
service. 
 
 Managing OOS and OS Occurrences 5.2.2
To effectively manage OOS and OS occurrences under the four operational environments, 
store managers who were OOS- and OS-concerned were observed to use different 
management approaches to deal with each of the four operating situations (see Figure 5-1). 
When in-store dynamics were low and OOS and OS causes were known to stores, OOS- 
and OS-concerned store managers would implement strict SOP adherence (Strict SOP 
Adherence). However, when in-store dynamics were high and OOS and OS causes were 
known to stores, these OOS- and OS-concerned store managers would tolerate and, to a 
limited extent, encourage some minor deviations, typically as temporary measures, from 
SOPs, engaging in flexible SOP enforcement (Flexible SOP Enforcement). When in-store 
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dynamics were low and OOS and OS causes were unknown, the OOS- and OS-concerned 
store managers would direct store staff to search for possible phantom stocks and restore 
stock levels of display shelves (Search and Restore). Lastly, when in-store retailing 
dynamics were high and OOS and OS causes were unknown, the OOS- and OS-concerned 
store managers would lead or direct store staff to quickly improvise some stopgap measures 
to rectify the problem in order to minimise negative impact on store operations and customer 
service levels. All staff were required to inform the store manager as well as other senior 
staff of the improvised actions (Accountable Improvisation).  
 
In-store Retailing 
Dynamics 
High Flexible SOP Enforcement Accountable Improvisation 
Low Strict SOP Adherence Search and Restore 
 
Known Unknown 
Knowledge of OOS & OS Causes 
 
Figure 5-1 Management approaches adopted by OOS-concerned store managers 
 
In contrast Figure 5-2 describes the four management approaches implemented by store 
managers with a lax attitude towards managing the causes of OOS and OS occurrences. 
When OOS and OS causes were known, the OOS-lax store managers adopted the Flexible 
SOP Enforcement approach, regardless of the state of in-store retailing dynamics. When in-
store retailing dynamics were low and OOS and OS of product items were unknown, though 
these OOS-lax store managers would also adopt a Search and Restore approach, they 
would not instruct store staff to immediately search for the phantom stock and restore stock 
levels of display shelves. Instead, store staff would be asked to search for phantom stocks 
and restore stock levels of display shelves after they had completed their scheduled tasks. 
When in-store retailing dynamics were high and causes of OOS and OS were unknown, the 
OOS-lax store managers would allow their staff to use their own discretion to deal with OOS 
and OS situations without necessarily following up to ensure that the improvised actions 
were made known to other staff (Phantom Improvisation).  
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In-store 
Dynamics 
High 
Flexible SOP Enforcement 
Phantom Improvisation 
Low Search and Restore 
 
Known Unknown 
OOS & OS Causes 
 
Figure 5-2 Management approaches adopted by OOS-lax store managers 
 
Taken together, the contrasting OOS- and OS management approaches between those 
adopted by OOS- and OS-concerned store managers and those employed by OOS- and 
OS-lax ones point to the following propositions: 
 
P10a: When causes of OOS and OS are known, OOS- and OS-concern managers 
would adhere rigidly to SOPs to deal with the OOS and OS event, but would 
tolerate SOP deviations when in-store retailing dynamics become high. 
 
P10b: When causes of OOS and OS are known, OOS- and OS-lax managers tend 
to adopt a flexible approach to deal with the OOS and OS event, allowing 
staff to deviate from SOPs even when in-store retailing dynamics are low. 
 
P11a: When causes of OOS and OS are unknown, OOS- and OS-concern 
managers would take proactive actions to quickly address the OOS and OS 
event, including allowing staff to improvise accountable means to deal with 
the situation when in-store retailing dynamics are high. 
 
P11b: When causes of OOS and OS are unknown, OOS- and OS-lax managers 
would take their time to address the OOS and OS event, including allowing 
staff to improvise means to deal with the situation when in-store retailing 
dynamics are high but would not be concerned about the traceability of such 
improvised actions. 
 
Details of the different OOS and OS management approaches used by both OOS- and OS-
concerned as well as OOS- and OS-lax store managers are given in Table 5-6. 
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Table 5-6 OOS and OS management approaches 
OOS & OS 
Management 
Constructs 
Description Illustrative Evidence 
Strict SOP 
Adherence 
• Sticking closely to prescribed 
processes of both GSOPs and 
SSOPs with no tolerance for 
deviation. 
• Viewing SOPs as a blueprint. 
• Putting emphasis on discipline 
and re-training, where 
necessary. 
• Issuing verbal warning to staff (e.g. E-
2-B) responsible for scanning errors 
at check-out stations or at receiving 
stations (e.g. C-2-C) followed by 
formal warning letter, as per GSOP. 
• Re-training staff persistently making 
similar procedural mistakes (e.g. N-2-
A), as per GSOP. 
Flexible SOP 
Enforcement 
• Tolerating staff who deviate from 
following prescribed procedures 
of GSOP and SSOP, especially 
at busy periods or due to 
abnormal circumstances. 
• Viewing SOPs as guide. 
• Emphasising employee 
relationship building. 
• Counselling staff responsible for 
mistakes and reminding them of 
monetary incentives for accurate 
performance (e.g. N-3-A, N-4-C and 
W-4-A). 
• Ignoring minor procedural errors and 
counselling staff if similar errors 
persist (e.g. S-2-A and E-1-B).  
Search and 
Restore 
• Directing staff to explore means 
of rectifying OOS and OS 
issues. 
• Continuously monitoring OOS 
situations and correcting errors 
as they were discovered. 
• Placing yellow OOS labels over shelf-
tag of OOS items to initiate search 
and retrieval of replenishment stock. 
• Placing OS stock in mobile storage 
equipment (e.g. roll cages) as a 
stopgap measure. 
Accountable 
Improvisation 
• Empowering staff to improvise 
innovative means to resolve 
OOS and OS issues, especially 
on instances not covered by 
GSOPs or SSOPs. 
• Allowing staff to fill an agreed 
substitute product or a promotional 
product on shelf spaces vacated by 
OOS items. 
• Staging ad-hoc promotions, e.g. 
‘hourly specials’, of OS items or 
substitute products of OOS items. 
Phantom 
Improvisation 
• Allowing staff to use their 
discretion to resolve OOS and 
OS issues, especially in 
instances not covered by 
GSOPs or SSOPs without 
necessarily following up to 
ensure that the improvised 
actions were made known to 
other staff. 
• Allowing staff to use excess display 
shelf space to store an assortment of 
excess stock. 
• Allowing staff to expand display area 
by hanging stocks via metal hooks at 
the sides of display shelves 
indiscriminately. 
 
  
194 
 
 Conclusion 5.3
Cross-group analysis into how stores in the three groups manage OOS and OS occurrences 
in their stores has revealed that senior FS management’s (HQ and store managers) attitude 
towards the management of OOS and OS in stores influences the level of success in 
managing OOS and OS occurrences in FS stores. The results also show that the role of 
store managers is critical to the management of OOS and OS occurrences. This observation 
was also mentioned in DeHoratius and Raman’s (2007) study on how store manager 
incentive design impacted on store manager behaviour and, eventually, on retail 
performance.  
 
The results of the cross-group analysis further show that OOS- and OS-concerned store 
managers adopt strict SOP adherence when OOS and OS causes are known and deploy 
search and restore operations when OOS and OS causes are unknown. In contrast, OOS- 
and OS-lax store managers adopt flexible SOP adherence when OOS and OS causes are 
known and unknown, and engage in phantom improvisation when OOS and OS causes are 
unknown.  
 
Instead of laying blame on who caused particular OOS and OS occurrences, OOS- and OS-
concerned store managers exert high levels of diligence to detect errors and work towards 
quick resolutions of in-store problems. In addition, these proactive store managers also 
make keen efforts to identify key parties at HQ and at the suppliers to provide quick 
resolutions and assurance of accurate deliveries. A key observation from the cross-group 
analysis therefore seems to indicate that store managers’ attitudes towards managing 
causes of OOS and OS occurrence is an important factor in the management of OOS and 
OS occurrences in stores. 
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Chapter 6 Conclusions 
The literature on OOS and OS is flooded with studies on the causes of OOS and OS 
occurrences. While an equally extensive range of studies have also been conducted to 
examine how OOS and OS occurrences may be minimised, or are managed in practice, 
operational details are generally lacking on how some of the recommended measures, such 
as process conformance (Ton and Huckman, 2008) and improving inventory accuracy 
(Gruen and Corsten 2003), are to be implemented. By means of a case study of 19 of the 23 
stores of a progressive supermarket chain in Singapore, this thesis has revealed four OOS 
and OS management approaches employed by store managers with a dedicated focus on 
managing OOS and OS occurrences, which have been compared with those used by their 
less OOS- & OS-concerned counterparts. Because store managers with a dedicated OOS- 
and OS-focus were able to keep OOS and OS occurrences in their stores lower than others, 
their OOS and OS management approaches may serve as a benchmark of ‘best’ practice. 
The differences between their approaches and those of their less OOS- & OS-concerned 
counterparts also provide some finer points on how those ‘best practice’ measures ought to 
be carried out to achieve the desired results. These are two of the major contributions of this 
study, which not only has managerial implications but also theoretical significance. This 
chapter concludes the thesis by first presenting the salient findings in Section 6.1, 
highlighting the contributions of this study to the literature of OOS and OS occurrences. This 
is followed by a discussion on the theoretical implications of these findings in Section 6.2 
and their practical implications in Section 6.3. Limitations of the study are identified in 
Section 6.4 with suggestions for further research in Section 6.5. 
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 Key Findings 6.1
This study began with the objective of understanding how supermarket stores managed 
OOS and OS occurrences. It used a case study approach to examine how different stores 
belonging to the same supermarket chain, FS Supermarket in Singapore, differed in terms of 
their approach toward implementing the GSOP and SSOPs developed to manage OOS and 
OS occurrences. Dividing the 19 (of the 23) participating stores of FS Supermarket into three 
groups based on their level of OOS occurrences, this study found that stores with low OOS 
and OS occurrences did not differ from those with high OOS and OS occurrences in terms of 
store characteristics. All three groups contained stores with and without back rooms and 
while some had designated loading/unloading areas, others had only makeshift 
loading/unloading points. Likewise, the ratio of SKUs to store area (in terms of floor space) 
was equally heterogeneous between stores of the same group. In fact, stores in both the 
low- and high-OOS and OS groups had the same average SKUs to store area. 
 
What emerges as a distinguishing feature that separates the performance of the three OOS 
and OS occurrence groups is the attitude of the store managers towards OOS and OS 
occurrences. Of the three groups, store managers of the low-OOS and OS group were more 
concerned with OOS and OS occurrences than their counterparts in the medium- and, in 
particular, the high-OOS and OS groups. The OOS- and OS-concerned store managers 
tended to adhere to the prescriptions of the GSOPs and SSOPs rigidly, especially during 
periods when in-store retailing dynamics were low and where failures to conform to GSOPs 
and SSOPs were known to result in OOS and OS occurrences.  These store managers had 
little tolerance toward staff who failed to conform, though they also understood the need to 
be flexible in following SOPs at times, especially during periods when in-store retailing 
dynamics were high. But these store managers did not ignore the importance of steering the 
staff back on course to follow SOPs as soon as the in-store retailing dynamics subsided. 
This was evident from instances when these store managers reminded staff to re-store stock 
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temporarily left in storage cages as a stop-gap measure to ease congestion in aisles during 
busy shopping periods. 
 
In addition, OOS- and OS-concerned store managers were quick in taking follow-up actions 
on instructions given to deal with potential issues of OOS and OS occurrence. A case in 
point was the follow-up phone calls to suppliers and HQ staff to check whether inventory 
discrepancies had been confirmed, and rectified, subsequent to the notification of a possible 
stock discrepancy during receiving. 
  
Lastly, these OOS- and OS-concerned store managers also knew when to empower staff to 
use their ingenuity in dealing with situations not covered by SOPs. But they were also aware 
of the plausible pitfalls with such improvised efforts if left unchecked. These OOS- and OS-
concerned store managers would make it a point to have the improvising staff communicate 
to them and to other staff what had been ‘improvised’. The member of staff asked to ‘create’ 
space to temporarily store excess stock from HQ was a typical example of such 
improvisation. But OOS- and OS-concerned store managers would not allow staff to store 
excess items without notifying their colleagues of what they had done and where the excess 
items had been temporarily kept, a practice labelled as an ‘accountable improvisation’ in this 
study. 
 
In sharp contrast, store managers in the high-OOS and OS groups were noticeably relaxed 
toward situations which could potentially result in OOS and OS occurrences. Although these 
OOS- and OS-lax store managers implemented GSOPs as well as established SSOPs to fit 
their store environment, they had the habit of allowing staff to deviate from the prescriptions 
of the SOPs. Not only were they comparatively tolerant toward SOP-incompliant behaviour, 
they were also lenient toward staff mistakes on matters such as repetitive scanning errors, 
which had grave consequences on inventory accuracy, a primary cause of OOS and OS 
occurrences. These OOS- and OS-lax store managers made little effort to change this ‘bad’ 
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habit amongst some of their staff. Their OOS- and OS-relaxed attitude extended beyond 
tolerating staff incompliant behaviour; they procrastinated in taking follow-up actions on 
instructions given to staff in dealing with issues of possible OOS and OS occurrence. For 
instance, although the OOS- and OS-lax store managers also informed suppliers and HQ 
staff of possible stock discrepancies, they did not take timely follow-up actions to check and 
confirm whether the possible discrepancy had been identified and corrected. In a similar vein, 
although they were quick in empowering staff to improvise means of dealing with storage of 
excess stock, they did not bother to ensure that the improvised actions were conveyed to 
other store staff. This attitude was merely crisis problem-solving, rather than accountable 
improvisation. Their actions might be regarded as ‘phantom improvisation’. 
 
These attitudinal nuances between the two groups of store managers, i.e. the OOS- and OS-
concern and the OOS- and OS-lax, underscore the key findings of this study and confirm the 
importance of store managers in influencing the management of OOS occurrences identified 
in mainstream OOS and OS literature (DeHoratius and Raman 2007; Ton and Huckman 
2008; DeHoratius and Ton 2009; Raman et al. 2001; ECR Europe 2003; Fernie and Grant 
2008; Aastrup and Kotzab 2009; ECR Asia Pacific 2011). In particular, these findings echo 
Fernie and Grant’s (2008) observation that the key difference between high and low OSA 
levels depends upon ‘management and staff commitment’ (p.304) to address the problems. 
They also reinforce Ton and Huckman’s (2008) argument that store managers’ decision to 
exert strict adherence to standardised operating policies or to tolerate deviations from these 
policies impacted store performance. Aastrup and Kotzab (2009) drew a similar conclusion: 
the main distinguishing factor of low versus high OOS was store management’s attention 
and dedication to resolving OOS issues.  
 
This study not only confirms the significance of the store managers’ attitudes, dedication and 
commitment in influencing OOS management performance, it also unravels a broad 
spectrum of operational details on how attitudes toward OOS and OS occurrences translate 
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into actions that shape the outcome of OOS management. Furthermore, this study has 
unveiled a number of unique insights, which either expand extant findings or add a new 
dimension to proposed OOS and OS management strategies.  These insights are 
summarised in Table 6.1, in contrast with what have been documented in the literature. In 
addition, Table 6.1 also indicates the differences between what this study sought to address 
and what had been examined in previous studies. More significantly, the major contributions 
from this study, as summarised in Table 6.1, provide a number of operational details on how 
antecedents of OOS and OS occurrences could be managed. These operational details 
carry both theoretical and practical implications, which are discussed, respectively, in 
Sections 6.2 and 6.3. 
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Table 6-1 Comparison between past studies and present study 
 Previous Studies This Study 
Field of 
Investigation 
• Focused on two streams: consumer 
responses to OOS where causes emerged 
from demand side (e.g. Emmelhainz et al. 
1991 and Fitzsimons 2000), and extent and 
root causes of OOS emerging from supply 
side (e.g. Gruen et al. 2002 and Gruen and 
Corsten 2007). 
• Focused on the extent and root causes of 
OOS and OS emerging from the supply 
side. 
Study Focus • Examined relationships of OOS and OS and how their occurrences affect OSA in retail 
stores belonging to different industries and 
retail chains (e.g. Corsten & Gruen 2003 and 
Fernie & Grant 2008).  Ton and Raman 
(2010) is one of the few exceptions. 
• Explored and investigated how stores of a 
supermarket chain in Singapore managed 
OOS and OS occurrences. 
Context of 
Analysis 
• Based largely on retail environments in 
Europe and USA (e.g. A.C. Nelson 1968; 
and Aastrup & Kotzab 2009). 
• Stores of a single supermarket chain in 
Singapore, which has a retailing culture 
that blends western practices with eastern 
flavour. 
Study Approach • Explored OOS and OS occurrences at specific locations (e.g. backroom and display 
shelves) within stores (e.g. Fisher et al 2000 
and Walter et al. 2008). 
• Systematically examined OOS and OS 
occurrences in-stores using Kotzab and 
Teller’s (2005) grocery retail in-store 
logistical model as guide.  
Findings: 
 
 
• Store format, location and size, range of 
product variety and characteristics and 
execution of in-store processes were key 
factors influencing extent of OOS 
occurrences (e.g. Uusitalo 2001 and Ton & 
Raman 2010). 
• Lack of OOS- and OS-specific KPIs to 
measure staff performance was a major 
cause of OOS events (e.g. Ton & Huckman 
2008 and Ton & Raman 2010).  
• External coordination with distribution 
centres and suppliers affected in-store 
operations and OOS and OS occurrences 
(e.g. Gruen et al. 2002 and Aastrup & 
Kotzab 2009). 
• Store ordering and shelf replenishment 
practices could contribute to inaccurate 
inventory information (e.g. ECR Europe 
2003 and Hausruckinger 2006). 
• Lack of direction and inadequate training 
from HQ to stores was a prime contribution 
to poor in-store OOS and OS management 
(e.g. ECR Europe 2003 and Trautrims et al 
2012). 
• Store management played a crucial 
leadership role in managing OSA (e.g. ECR 
Europe 2003 and Ton & Huckman 2008). 
• Locational factors and store 
characteristics had little effect on OOS 
and OS occurrences, which were heavily 
influenced by both trivial human errors 
and operational slips as well as the 
manner in which standard in-store 
operation processes was enforced. 
• Use of OOS- and OS-specific KPIs had 
little effect on staff’s ability to handle OOS 
and OS occurrences 
• While external coordination with HQ and 
suppliers affected in-store operations, 
early resolution of errors, including a soft, 
personable approach to relationship 
building with suppliers and HQ, prevented 
OOS occurrences. 
• Purchase ready strategies, e.g. 
replenishment trigger mechanisms, 
minimized OOS and OS occurrences. 
• GSOP only provided broad guidelines for 
managing OOS and OS occurrences.  
Store management’s attitude, 
commitment and ability to introduce and 
enforce SSOPs were crucial. 
• Store operation and size, range of SKUs 
offered, and organisational resources 
influenced store managers’ attitude 
towards OOS and OS management, 
including use of virtual warehouses. 
Contributions • Offered solutions to resolve OOS occurrences in areas covering process 
improvement, operational accuracy, 
incentive alignment and human factors (e.g. 
ECR Europe 2003 and Aastrup and Kotzab 
2010). 
• Examined post occurrences of OOS, with 
little operational details and 
recommendations for practice (e.g. Corsten 
& Gruen 2003). 
• Offered four approaches to manage OOS 
and OS occurrences based on knowledge 
of OOS and OS causes and in-store 
retailing dynamics.  
• Provided insights on operational details to 
manage OOS and OS events for different 
stages of in-store processes. 
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 Implications for Theory 6.2
Studies on the causes and management of OOS and OS abound, as noted in the literature 
review. Yet there appears to be no coherent approach to empirically examining OOS and OS 
issues and exploring solutions that have been attempted by retailers to reduce OOS and OS 
occurrences, as reflected in Raman et al.’s (2001) observation that operational execution 
remains one of the biggest challenges retailers face in achieving OSA. This study has 
pushed that literature a small step forward by unearthing how stores of a Singapore 
supermarket managed OOS and OS causes and how their dissimilar approaches led to 
different outcome effects.  
 
From the cross-group findings, this study has derived 11 main propositions together with 
their variants to capture a host of relationships which link causes of OOS and OS 
occurrences to OOS and OS management measures. It has also identified the pivotal role of 
store managers’ attitudes toward engendering contrasting OOS and OS management 
performance outcomes. These propositions offer the foundation for building a platform upon 
which an integrated theory of OOS and OS management could be developed. 
 
Furthermore, most studies (e.g. Gruen et al. 2002; ECR Europe 2003; Corsten and Gruen 
2003; Kotzab and Teller 2005; Gruen and Corsten 2007; Aastrup and Kotzab 2010) on OOS 
and OS management have tended to focus on managing the causes of OOS and OS 
occurrences. This study has gone beyond looking at causes, delving into the approaches 
store managers with different attitudes toward OOS and OS occurrences use to deal with 
OOS and OS events as they surface. While managing OOS and OS causes is important in 
minimising or preventing OOS and OS occurrences, it cannot eliminate OOS and OS events. 
As Chapman et al. (2003) point out, many OOS and OS causes are unknown to store staff. 
Lack of knowledge of OOS and OS causes mean that stores will continue to grapple with 
OOS and OS occurrences. Evidently, understanding how store managers deal with OOS 
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and OS events offers valuable insights into how OOS and OS occurrences could be 
managed effectively in practice. This understanding is also vital to providing a theoretical 
framework, where testable hypotheses could be developed for validation. This is a major 
theoretical contribution to the literature. 
 
The contrasting approaches used by OOS- and OS-concerned and OOS- and OS-lax store 
managers also suggest that OOS and OS management cannot adopt a one-size-fit-all 
measure. OOS and OS management needs to be contextualised to the dynamics of the 
operating retail environment, a point which has not been given much attention in the 
literature. 
 
In summation, from a theoretical perspective, findings from this study contribute to 
advancing knowledge of OOS and OS management in at least three significant ways. First, 
these findings provide a theoretical thread, which links the relationships between attitude, 
commitment and dedication toward OOS and OS management and OOS and OS 
performance. Second, it integrates a range of major findings in extant literature on OOS and 
OS causes, e.g. infrequent replenishment activities to store, shelf and storage (Fisher et al. 
2000), occurrences, e.g. higher risk of pilferage and inventory obsolesces (Chandra and 
Kumar 2001), and management, e.g. physical checks and information technology systems 
(Corsten and Gruen 2003). Third and most significantly, this link takes many of the 
recommended OOS and OS measures from the broad strategic dimension (e.g. improving 
error scan through training) to the detailed operational level (e.g. improving error scan by 
giving personalised training to staff with a language barrier).   
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 Implications for Practice  6.3
This study has unearthed many procedural and routine actions undertaken by the case 
supermarket stores to manage OOS and OS occurrences. Admittedly, not all of the actions 
practised by the case supermarket stores might be applicable to other grocery retail outlets 
or in other parts of the world (e.g. due to cultural differences). There are, however, four 
relatively obvious contributions that findings from this study make in terms of offering 
guidelines for best practice in OOS and OS management:  
 
1) Role of Store Managers: Previous studies (Raman et al. 2001; DeHoratius and 
Raman 2007; Ton and Huckman 2008) have identified the pivotal role that store 
managers could play in influencing the outcomes of OOS and OS management. 
Findings from this study not only confirm this observation, but reveal how store 
managers could be effective in reducing OOS and OS occurrences. Having a 
concerned attitude towards OOS and OS occurrences, as recommended by Raman 
et al. (2001) and DeHoratius and Raman (2007), is a start. More importantly, store 
managers should take proactive actions to deal with recurring problems, such as 
making regular personal calls to HQ and suppliers to ensure inventory information is 
accurate and making extra efforts to identify the ‘key’ person to call to rectify errors 
immediately, and thus mitigate OOS and OS occurrences. Table 6.1 to 6.3 
summarise the key proactive actions FS Supermarket store managers took to deal 
with OOS occurrences with respect to some of the common concerns raised in the 
literature for three of the major in-store processes – receiving and check-out, 
ordering and replenishment. 
 
Given that execution is a nagging issue in retail operations (Raman et al. 2001), 
including supermarkets, some of the taken-for-granted operational details employed 
by the low-OOS stores (see Tables 6.2 to 6.4) could be used as a basis to develop a 
list of job responsibilities for inclusion into store managers’ position descriptions. 
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Table 6-2 Key operational details for developing a best-practice framework (receiving and  
                  checkout) 
In-Store 
Process 
Areas of Concern Regarding 
OOS and OS Occurrences 
Examples of Good practices Based 
on Experiences of FS Stores 
Receiving and 
Checkout 
• Accounting mistakes due to 
incorrect receipts and error 
data capture at receiving 
station, resulting in inaccurate 
inventory information. 
(e.g. Gruen et al. 2002; Corsten 
& Gruen 2003 and Kang & 
Gershwin 2005) 
• Error scans at checkout 
stations due to similarities in 
products and to alleviate 
congestion at checkout lines, 
resulting in inaccurate 
information in PoS and 
inventory systems. 
(e.g. Raman et al. 2001; Gruen 
et al. 2002; Kang & Gershwin 
2005 and Hausruckinger 
2006)  
• Incorrect suppliers’ deliveries 
due to wrong packaging and 
inaccurate information about 
stock levels and orders, in 
suppliers’ systems. 
(e.g. Kang & Gershwin 2005; 
McKinnon et al. 2007; 
Morgan & Dewhurst 2007 and 
Fernie & Grant, 2008) 
• Station supervisory staff at receiving 
stations for early resolution of error 
data capture to minimise inaccuracy 
in inventory management. 
• Station supervisory staff at checkout 
stations for early detection of error 
scans and immediate resolution to 
minimise inaccuracy in inventory 
management and alleviate 
congestion at checkout stations. 
• Make personal calls to key 
personnel, such as buyers at HQ, to 
obtain updated information to 
facilitate store operations (e.g. latest 
list of product barcodes, stock levels 
at stores and knowledge of new 
product assortments).  
• Make personal calls to suppliers to 
notify wrong delivery and request 
review of inventory records to identify 
possible inventory discrepancies, 
followed by subsequent phone calls 
to confirm results of inventory 
checks.  
• Provide feedback on identification 
and rectification of inventory errors to 
suppliers’ representatives when 
delivering in-store orders.  
• Maintain close working relations with 
HQ and suppliers to resolve errors 
(e.g. wrong deliveries) quickly to 
mitigate negative impacts of OOS 
and OS occurrences. 
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Table 6-3 Key operational details for developing a best-practice framework (ordering) 
In-Store Process Areas of Concern 
Regarding OOS and OS 
Occurrences 
Examples of Good 
Practices Based on 
Experiences of FS Stores 
Ordering • Inaccurate demand 
knowledge due to wide 
product assortment and 
variable product 
promotions.  
(e.g. Raman et al. 2001; 
Gruen et al. 2002 and 
Ettouzani et al. 2012) 
• Inaccurate orders due to 
pilferage committed by 
customers, staff or 
suppliers. 
(e.g. Miller 1997; Turcsik & 
Summerour 2001 and 
Verhoef & Sloot 2006) 
• Store manager to make 
regular personal calls to 
key personnel at suppliers’ 
office for close 
collaboration on 
promotions management. 
• Store manager to brief all 
floor personnel before store 
opening hours on changes 
in list of products and 
promotions. 
• Install CCTV at strategic 
locations within the stores. 
•  Establish proactive 
methods to deter theft in 
stores by: 
• (1) forming internal security 
team to comprise senior 
store management and 
rostered full-time floor 
personnel; and  
• (2) stationing store 
managers and supervisory 
staff in suspected high theft 
sections. 
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Table 6-4 Key operational details for developing a best-practice framework (replenishment) 
In-Store Process Areas of Concern 
Regarding OOS and OS 
Occurrences 
Examples of Good 
Practices Based on 
Experiences of FS Stores 
Replenishment • Disorganised frequency of 
replenishment activities 
due to: 
 No, or lack of, trigger 
mechanism to replenish 
shelves;  
(e.g. Corsten & Gruen 2003) 
 Long distance from back 
store to display shelves; 
and 
(e.g. McKinnon et al. 2007 
and Fernie & Grant 2008)  
 Misalignment of ordering 
schedule, delivery 
schedule and 
replenishment schedule. 
(e.g. ECR Europe 2003) 
• Store size and space 
management influenced 
product assortment 
management. OS occurred 
frequently due to wide 
array of product assortment 
(national list of product 
assortment combined with 
local list of product 
assortment). 
(e.g. Campo & Gijsbrechts 
2004 and Aastrup & Kotzab 
2009) 
• Senior store staff (e.g. 
store managers, assistant 
managers, executives or 
supervisors) to conduct 
regular physical 
walkabouts within stores to 
monitor stock levels of 
display shelves. 
• Reduce travelling distance 
from back store to display 
shelves by utilising space 
on top of shelves as 
storage.  
• Have supplier sponsored 
storage boxes installed 
above display shelves for 
storage. 
• Conduct replenishment an 
hour before and an hour 
after store closes, and 
during quiet operating 
hours.  
• Only urgent replenishment 
conducted when customer 
traffic is high to minimise 
disturbances to customers’ 
shopping experience. 
• Adopt a system of mobile 
display equipment, such as 
mobile display trays and 
trollies, to extended display 
area to spaces at shop 
front. 
• Run adhoc store 
promotions of targeted 
products to increase 
turnover (e.g. ‘hourly 
specials’, ‘buy one get one 
free’ specials). 
 
Another important finding of value to practice is the two approaches FS store 
managers adopted to deal with potential pilferage and theft occurrences within their 
stores. The first was positioning themselves in vantage locations within their stores, 
which enabled FS store managers to increase the visibility of in-store operations and 
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customer traffic. The second was the appointment of store staff to double up as 
internal security team to monitor customer shopping movements. Equally worthnoting 
is the regular informal information exchange on security practices and pilferage 
incidents among FS store managers.  
 
2) Adherence to SOPs: Ton and Huckman (2008) suggest that discipline in 
implementing standard policies and procedures is necessary to ensure process 
conformance. This study has found that adhering rigorously to SOPs works well only 
when in-store dynamics are low and factors known to have the potential to contribute 
to OOS occurrences are identifiable, such as error scans at checkout stations. When 
the operating environment in store is not so, flexibility in implementing SOPs is 
needed, as shown by the four OOS and OS management approaches exercised by 
managers of low-OOS stores. This study finds that quick conflict resolution is 
essential in dealing with OOS and OS events. Instead of laying blame on the causes 
of OOS and OS occurrences, positive-thinking store managers should focus on 
seeking quick solutions, e.g. developing creative space management ideas to 
accommodate excess stock. Quick decisions and flexibility in adapting SOPs to suit 
changing store operating environments could help avert possible disruptions to store 
operations, the latter of which could eventually degenerate into an OOS or OS 
situation. The four OOS and OS management approaches employed by managers of 
low-OOS stores of FS Supermarket offer a pragmatic guide for grocery retailers to 
deal with different operating conditions. 
 
3) Supplier Relationship Management: OOS and OS literature does not strongly 
recommend supplier relationship management as a means of reducing OOS and OS 
occurrences, though ECR Asia Pacific (2011) has noted that having close 
collaboration with supply chain partners is the most successful OSA initiative for 
retailers. Findings from this study show that FS store managers embraced the notion 
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that maintaining good relationships with suppliers would improve flow of information 
on product assortment, promotions, orders and deliveries. The proactive actions 
taken by store managers of the low-OOS group to make personal calls to suppliers 
and also the initiative they took to get to know the key person to call to achieve their 
objectives of immediate error rectification underscore the importance of supplier 
relationship management in OOS and OS management. 
 
Kotzab and Teller (2005) state that their empirical investigation did not acknowledge 
the flow of goods and information to and from the stores. This study has found that 
information related to movement of goods to and from stores plays a key role in OOS 
and OS occurrences. Many OOS and OS occurrences at FS stores were caused by 
inaccurate inventory information in the management information systems at HQ, 
suppliers and FS stores. The initiatives taken by FS store managers suggest that 
supplier relationship management could be used as a weapon to combat OOS and 
OS occurrences and should not be overlooked. Besides, supplier relationship 
management also carries a host of other business benefits for retailers, including 
getting suppliers to give them preferential treatment and sharing ‘exclusive’ product 
and promotional information. One way to cultivate supplier relationship management 
is the reciprocal help exhibited by FS store managers in promoting the products of 
some supporting suppliers when items from other competitors’ suppliers were OOS. 
 
4) Effects of Contextual Factors; While contextual factors (e.g. store size, number of 
SKUs carried, number of brands, availability of back room and designated receiving 
areas) have been found to cause OOS and OS events (ECR Europe 2003; ECR UK 
2007; Aastrup and Kotzab 2009; Reiner et al. 2013), this study has found that these 
factors do not affect the management performance of stores in terms of achieving 
OSA. The three groups of FS stores possessed heterogeneous store and contextual 
characteristics (e.g. store size, number of SKUs, makeshift versus designated 
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receiving areas and length of operations). Yet, this study found these heterogeneous 
stores and contextual factors did not affect store managers’ management of OOS 
and OS. Aastrup and Kotzab (2010) also observed that contextual factors, such as 
store size and number of SKUs, did not affect OOS occurrences.  These findings 
reaffirm the effectiveness of the management approaches used by stores in the low-
OOS group vis-à-vis their counterparts in the other two groups. 
 
 Limitations of this study 6.4
This research has certain limitations despite the rigor exercised in the data collection and 
data analysis processes. A common limitation in case study research is its inability to 
generalize its findings to other contexts. This study is no exception.  
 
Another notable limitation is related to the influence of context. This study was conducted in 
the context of one supermarket chain where a particular corporate culture may exist. This 
culture would form the basis of their business strategies and attitude towards employee 
management. Another supermarket chain in Singapore, or elsewhere, could possess a 
different operational culture which translates into different OOS and OS management 
methods but could be equally, if not more, effective.   
 
This research can be readily enhanced, if there were opportunities to focus on detailed in-
store operational and stock handling process over the span of a week as well as to conduct 
interviews with operational staff to obtain “front-line” information on in-store process and 
operational issues. The request to interview FS stackers was refused by FS HQ because 
they “did not want their stackers to be interrupted from their duties” was the reason given by 
the MD. However, these additional interviews could provide a more in-depth understanding 
of the actual execution of in-store activities as well as offer a better understanding of when, 
why and how lapses in the procedure adherence sometimes occur.  
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Another limitation of this study was its inability to secure information relating to OOS and OS 
occurrences by stock value classifications from FS HQ and its stores. Classifying OOS and 
OS occurrences by stock value could offer store managers a more refined means to 
determine effective approaches to managing OOS and OS occurrences. 
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 Recommendations for Future Research 6.5
There are a number of ways to minimise the limitations mentioned and to further extend the 
contributions of this study. First, to test the generalizability of the findings, this study could be 
replicated in other supermarkets chains in Singapore and in other geographical locales.  
Extending the study to other locations with different corporate cultures and social contexts 
would validate the effectiveness of FS’s OOS and OS management approaches.  
 
Replicating this study in retail chains of other industries where the impact of OOS could also 
result in losses (e.g. brand and store loyalty), such as home improvement retail chains (e.g., 
Bunnings) would be another logical extension of the present study. It would contribute to 
increasing our understanding of how retail chains in different industries manage OOS and 
OS occurrences in their stores.  
 
As mentioned in the previous section, it is suggested that opinions be solicited from floor 
staff about detailed in-store operational and stock handling processes to obtain ‘real’ 
information on in-store issues. This would allow execution issues be revealed and processes 
likely to experience lapses in procedural conformance be identified. At the store manager 
level, an interactive game-based experimental approach to assess how they react to a range 
of OOS and OS situations could also be scope for further study.   
 
Future research could also benefit from examining the frequency of OOS and OS 
occurrences in supermarkets and other retail outlets in different cultural settings. The 
question of how management followed up the results of remedial actions taken to deal with 
OOS and OS occurrences would also be a fruitful area for future exploration. 
 
Lastly, examining OOS and OS occurrences by stock value classifications and drivers of 
store execution problems is another possible avenue for further study.  Such a study has the 
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potential of helping HQ or store managers to direct appropriate resources to alleviate the 
OOS and OS problems relating to specific products. When drivers of store execution 
problems are identified, HQ and store managers would be in an informed position to 
establish SOPs to manage those drivers to mitigate the negative impacts of OOS and OS 
events.  
 
Concluding Remarks 
In their review of 40 years of OOS research, Aastrup and Kotzab (2010) commented that 
“OOS rates largely seem to fall into an average level at about 7 to 8% despite 40 years of 
research” and “despite clear evidence of the store as the major contributor to OOS situations, 
the store has largely remained a ‘black-box’ in OOS research” (p. 147). The experience of 
the low-OOS stores of FS supermarket chain in Singapore suggests that it is possible to 
achieve an OOS rate even below 1%. By plying inside the ‘black-box’, this study has shown 
that the key to minimizing OOS occurrences lies in the level of attention placed on trivial 
operational hitches. In conclusion, this study surmises that more fruitful revelation of best 
OOS and OS management practices could be gleaned from the operational level, an area 
left largely untouched in mainstream OOS and OS literature. While this study may be far 
from perfect, its findings have demonstrated that weaving the handling of trivial slips and 
lapses into strategic OOS and OS research offers promise to building a much-needed 
operational theory of OOS and OS management practice. After all, breakdown of many in-
store processes does begin with a less noticeable frivolous mistake.  
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Appendix B: Interview Protocol 
Interviewees Profile Managing Director Store Manager 
Date of interview   
Position in the store   
Location of store   
Group (indicates age & size of store in SKUs – A = 16-30K SKUs, 
B = 6-20 SKUs, C =  3-12K SKUs)   
Interview Questions 
About inventory management 
1. How do you collect and manage information on your 
inventory/stock? 
• Manual processes- can you describe the process 
• Automatic processes - can you describe the process 
• Semi-automatic - can you describe the process 
  
2. How do you perform inventory checks? 
• Physical/Visual walkabout the store 
• Via inventory recording system 
• Physical and inventory recording system 
  
3. How often do you conduct inventory checks? 
• Daily 
• Weekly 
• Fortnightly 
• Monthly 
  
4. When is the inventory checks conducted? 
• Before store opens 
• After closing hours 
• During operational hours 
  
5. Who conducts the inventory checks? 
5.1 Is this a designated task for this staff i.e. solely in charge of     
      inventory checks? 
5.2 Who does s/he reports to – store manager or finance or  
      procurement? 
5.3 Who is in charge of inventory management? 
• Store manager 
• Someone from HQ 
5.4 Who does this position report to? 
• Finance  
• Procurement 
  
6. Do you have established key performance indicators (KPIs) 
related to inventory management? 
6.1 What are the KPIs to be achieved in inventory management? 
6.2 Store-specific KPIs? 
6.3 HQ prescribed KPIs? 
6.4 Combined from HQ and store? 
  
7. Do you categorize your inventory? 
7.1 How many categories are there? 
7.2 What are the categories? 
7.3 What criteria do you base or formulate your categories? 
  
8. Do you have a separate inventory management system for on 
shelf space and back store? 
8.1 If yes, do you have different ordering procedures for both  
      respectively? 
8.2 If no, do you categorize inventory for shelf space separately  
      from inventory for back store? 
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About out of stock events in the stores 
1. Do you have out of stock events occurring in your store? 
1.1 Do you measure how often an out of stock even occur? 
1.2 How do you measure the occurrences of this event? 
1.3 How do you record the information? 
• Manual 
• Excel 
• Access 
• In-house management system 
• Vendor management system he information? 
  
2. Do you use a Planogram? 
2.1 If yes, who establishes the Planogram? 
• Store managers 
• HQ 
• Both 
2.2 Do you measure the level of compliance to the Planogram? 
2.2.1 If yes, is the level of compliance acceptable to HQ? 
2.2.2 If no, why is the Planogram not fully adhered? 
  
3. Do suppliers get involved in the planning of the Planogram?  
If YES: 
3.1 What is the extent of their influence in planning of the  
      Planogram? 
3.2 How are they involved in the planning of Planogram? 
  
About the stores’ ordering processes/policies 
1. Where does the store receive its inventory?   
2. Where does the store place its orders? 
• Warehouse/DC 
• Direct to suppliers, manufacturers, producers and trading 
companies 
• Both 
  
3. How does store places its orders?   
4. What is the frequency of order placement?   
About stores’ relationship with warehouse/DC 
1. Does the store adopt any operational strategy to manage its  
relationships with its distribution center? 
• Category Management 
• Vendor Management 
• Efficient Consumer Response 
• Consumer Response Management 
• Collaborative Planning Forecasting & Replenishment 
• Others (Please specify) 
If yes,  
1.1 Which operational strategy is adopted? 
1.2 Is this adopted with all suppliers or do you have different  
      strategy for different suppliers? 
  
2. How do you place orders with the DC? 
• Telephone 
• Fax 
• Email 
• Integrated vendor systems 
  
3. How often do you place orders with DC?   
4. What is the order processing time for each other i.e. when do  
    you normally receive the orders from the DC? 
  
5. Do you get the DC to perform any value-adding processing  
services for the store? If yes: 
5.1 What VAS performed by the DC for your store? 
5.2 How do these VAS affect order processing time and affect  
      inventory receiving time? 
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About stores’ relationships with suppliers 
1. How does store communicate/place orders with its  
    suppliers? 
  
2. Are stores’ systems integrated with the suppliers? If yes, 
2.1 Type of information visible to suppliers 
  
3. Do you have face-to-face meetings with your suppliers? If yes,  
    how often do you meet with your suppliers? 
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Appendix C: Derivation of Extent of OOS 
Occurrences at Stores 
 
Given:  
1) Total number of stores in SS Supermarket Chain in Singapore = 23 
2) Number of stores with total SKU & loss sale figures (in S$) given = 19 
3) Total value (in S$) of SS Supermarket SKUs, which will be denoted as Total $ Value of Chain 
SKU. 
 
Derivation: 
 
Let   𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝐾𝑈𝑠 𝑜𝑓 19 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠 = 𝑇𝑆𝐾𝑈,19 
Thus,  
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑆𝐾𝑈 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑒 = 𝑇𝑆𝐾𝑈,19
19
  
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝐾𝑈 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑛 = �𝑇𝑆𝐾𝑈,19
19
 × 23�  
 $ 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑆𝐾𝑈 (𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝑆𝐾𝑈 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒) = 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 $ 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑛 𝑆𝐾𝑈𝑠
�
𝑇𝑆𝐾𝑈,19
19
×23�  
 
∴   𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑎𝑠 % 𝑜𝑓 𝑆𝐾𝑈 = 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑎𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑒$ 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑆𝐾𝑈 𝑎𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑒  
 
where: $ 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑆𝐾𝑈 𝑎𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑒 = (𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝑆𝐾𝑈 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒) × 𝑆𝐾𝑈 𝑎𝑡 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑒  
 
 
 
